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Abstract 
Hope accompanied El Salvador’s peace agreements, ending 12 years of civil war. New 
peace and democratic renewal were expected in the tiny Central American state. Instead, 
extreme violence has persisted as a lived experience for individuals and a part of its state 
operations. Successive governments proved unable to consolidate control over the post-war 
crime wave. ‘Tough on crime’ public policy agendas, which included hard-handed 
violence-repression tactics, had little success in mitigating insecurity. In 2009, a new ex-
guerrilla party, the National Liberation Front ‘Farabundo Marti’ (FMLN), was elected on a 
hope and change platform. The party was committed to a new approach in security 
governance. This presented an opportunity to study the interactions of implicated actors as 
they negotiated the governance of security. It raises the question: To what extent did 
security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration 
(2009-2014)? 
To address this question requires an understanding of situated security concepts and an 
examination of the spaces created for actor interactions to formulate the policy guiding 
security governance. Broadly, security is often considered to be a response to the issues 
threatening state, society, or the individual. In the Latin American context, this expansion 
largely took place within the concept of citizen security – a term which recognised both 
rights and responsibilities within the state. However, the term has also been responsible for 
problematising institutional weaknesses or failure where an apparent inability to control 
violence is observed, justifying the inclusion of a range of non-state security actors. 
Theories of hybridity or state transformation instead posit that the gaze should be directed 
on those spaces where security problems, once identified, are managed in practice 
(Hameiri & Jones, 2015).  
For this study, three ‘levels’ of security governance are addressed: the 
national government, the Central American regional diplomatic structure, and strategic 
municipal jurisdictions. Second, by providing this multi-levelled analysis, the study 
includes the regional level, which is often ignored in existing Central American security 
studies. This is crucial to an understanding of the multiple and often competing agendas 
organising and supporting security interventions within El Salvador in a regional context of 
transnational threats. Third, this investigation shows the operational changes required of 
government institutions when other actors are introduced as authoritative participants in 
the process. Despite multi-actor, multi-level security governance strategies working to 
mobilise new actors, security concepts, and operational frameworks to reduce and manage 
security issues, many practical governance efforts enjoy only limited term results. This 
thesis concludes that broad changes in security governance structures are likely to be 
continually mitigated by traditional forces, limiting the potential for true transformation of 
security policy approaches.  
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1.1 The Failure of Hope: Security, Crisis and Governance 
in El Salvador 
  
 
Picture 1-1: Installations protest high number of violent deaths in 2015 El Salvador (Source: El 
Diario de Hoy and Reuters, 2015) 
At a controlled border crossing between Guatemala and El Salvador cars and trucks lined 
up as far as the eye could see, idling in great puffs of old-style exhaust. People were 
milling about; some going into bare-bones government buildings whereas others puttered 
about outside, waiting for the wheels of officialdom to slowly process their papers. The 
border guards and Immigration Department officials I was visiting with were eager to 
show off new computers and processing machinery paid for by recent international project 
infrastructure funds. A row of quickly yellowing tube screens amongst the sliding windows 
and peeling paint of the cinderblock tent. Around the side, a more solid building was 
attached to the processing centre, built to hold the deportees and the children. Outside 
were men, standing alone or lounging in small groups; they occupied spots of shade or 
hovered with an eye on the door. ‘Coyotes’ stated one official to me. ‘They are waiting for 
the deportees to be processed to start the journey again.’ 
This was the reality at the La Hachadura and Las Chinama border crossings when I 
visited in mid-2010. Here, three to four buses arrived each week from Mexico carrying 
children ‘caught’ on the migration route to the United States. That particular day, a group 
of about thirty children between of 7 and 16 had been returned from a holding centre in 
Mexico. Some had gone north on their own. Others, with siblings or friends. Some had left 
with the blessing of their parents or relatives who may have even paid the services of one 
of those coyotes waiting outside. Some had just, one day, departed.  
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A little boy of 7 and his 11 year-old brother were picked up by their large, comfortable 
mother driven to the collection centre by a slight, severe-looking uncle. There were tears 
all around. It was uncertain as to whether these adults had blessed the trip north but it 
hardly mattered. A straightforward slim youth of about 16 folded himself onto a chair and 
replied to my questions that he had attempted to go north to get a normal life with proper 
sneakers and high school mates. He had an aunt, he noted vaguely, in New York. The girls 
hung back, reserved and wary. One girl, about 15, had become pregnant on the route. She 
looked off into the middle distance, generally encompassing within her realm of protection 
two younger girls around 10 or 12. They had left because of ‘la violencia’. They had left 
because they wanted to go to school. They faced the danger and uncertainty and the 
horrors on the road because there was nothing left for them at home. Or it was too 
dangerous to take part in what services remained. For some, it was a choice of death. 
El Salvador, 2010 
 
The high expectations about Latin America’s future nurtured by many a quarter of a 
century ago have largely vanished into thin air. 
Koonings and Kruijt, 2007 
 
This is a study of the protection of civilians as citizens in one of the most violent peacetime 
nations in the world. Peace was officially declared for El Salvador on 16 January, 1992, 
between the right-wing government led by President Alfredo Cristiani and the guerrilla 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional: FMLN) after one of the fiercest conflicts of Latin America’s Cold War-era civil 
wars, which had resulted in massive internal displacements, international migration, and 
the death of an estimated 75,000 individuals. The United Nations (UN), an important 
international actor in the peace negotiations, continued in the post-conflict country in a 
peace-building role that analysts like McCormick (1997, p. 282) termed ‘momentous’ and 
‘unprecedented’ in UN history. The Salvadoran Peace Accords were also the first time that 
a UN member-state ceded significant aspects of the reform and reconstruction of its legal 
and security institutions to the international community (Wilkins, 1997). This negotiated 
pacification, demilitarisation, and transition to a democratic political landscape, has been 
lauded by some as ‘among the most successful instances of implementation of a negotiated 
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peace agreement in the post-Cold War period’ (Call, 2003, p. 830). Yet El Salvador’s civil 
war legacy of ‘of terror, of violence, of fear’ lived on to become ‘an endemic and 
permanent feature of the pattern of nation-building’ -- as within the wider region of Latin 
America, and as discussed  by Kruijt and Koonings (1999, pp. 2-3) in their seminal work 
Societies of Fear. As Moodie has noted, many Salvadorans have come to reference the 
post-peace period in El Salvador as ‘worse than the war’ (Moodie, 2010). For the tens of 
thousands who flee the country each year to brave the dangers of the migration route, it is a 
choice of fears. 
However, when I arrived in El Salvador for the first time in December, 2009, a brief 
moment of hope had blossomed. Elections the previous year had, for the first time, brought 
the ex-guerrilla FMLN party to the presidency. Many citizens expressed cautious optimism 
that a popular change might result from the process; the former guerrillas had ‘concluded a 
journey from armed insurrection to electoral triumph’ (Macías & Ramos, 2012, p. 81). The 
first three years for the FMLN were a rollercoaster of hope and fear. In mid-2010, alleged 
gang members set fire to a public bus in Mejicanos, a suburb of the capital San Salvador, 
shooting dead those passengers who attempted to escape the flames. This prompted the 
FMLN administration under President Mauricio Funes to pursue a course of hard-lined 
operations and punitive legislation – despite government promises to try and confront 
violence through less violent means. Nonetheless, the FMLN administration also did 
continue to develop grassroots-sourced prevention policy with centrally-supported, 
municipally-suggested, programming. Security in this context continued to be acted upon 
simultaneously as an immediate, existential threat as well as a more nuanced puzzle of the 
‘historical, geographical, spatial and structural complexities’ affecting individual wellbeing 
(Moser & McIlwaine, 2014, p. 2).  
Two years later in March, 2012, some of the highest murder rates in the world were cut 
almost in half, and seemingly overnight, as rival gang factions Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 
and Barrio 18 (M-18) announced they had agreed on a truce. What initially appeared to be 
an independently-negotiated ceasefire was complicated by revelations that government 
ministers and security establishment officials had been involved in all aspects of the 
negotiations. This presented the question as to whether the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) 
was government policy or a whim of powerful non-state actors. Gangs were promised that, 
in return for their ceasefire adoption, their socio-economic needs would be met through 
jobs training and community reintegration opportunities. A second phase of the SGT saw 
the establishment of municipalities ‘free from violence’ (Municipios Libre de Violencia: 
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MLVs) that included the withdrawal of military units from these communities. Safe public 
spaces for youth-at-risk were meant to provide confirmation of the goodwill held by all 
levels of government as well as civil society and the public. Simultaneously, community 
policing had been developed across the country and, although this was not to the exclusion 
of repressive combat activities, the entire police force had been required to undergo the 
minimal training hours in favour of the programme. 
Superimposed on these events were regional diplomatic efforts through the Central 
American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana: SICA), with 
the aid of the international community through the observer-donor Group of Friends, to 
form a united response to the security threats that they could agree their region was facing 
as a whole. Emerging from initial plans in the 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic 
Security, Central American states attempted to define a regional security model that 
ultimately was manifest in the Central American Security Strategy (Estrategia de 
Seguridad de Centroamérica: ESCA) in December 2007 and confirmed in June 2011. 
ESCA was guided by four operating principles: co-responsibility, regionalism, ownership, 
and the increase of cooperation efforts. Its four negotiated themes encompassed 22 projects 
for which Central American states solicited international funding, including: crime 
reduction; violence prevention; rehabilitation, reintegration, and prison management; and, 
institutional strengthening. The strategy was a Central American-driven initiative to 
emphasise action on transnational, non-traditional security threats. It also served as a 
parallel action to the United States-led Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI) which was US-funded to provide ‘equipment, training, and technical assistance to 
support immediate law enforcement options’ (Meyer & Seelke, 2015). El Salvador was an 
instigator of ESCA and it was heavily promoted by a small group within the government.  
A complex picture emerges of security as it is governed in practice. It is comprised of 
language, ideological frameworks, programming plans, and operational instruments. 
Guiding these interactions and discourses are the actor conceptualisations of the problems 
they are addressing. These issues have combined and overlapped in public, national, and 
regional security agendas, injecting the crime of the local into risks that affect national 
governments and regional borders, and vice versa, thereby complicating both its study and 
solutioning. How security is conceptualised has implications for public policy, for 
government programming, and for the actors that are involved in the formation of that 
policy as well as its implementation. Typically, research has focused on a dichotomy 
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between repressive (combat) and prevention operations to address specific security 
concerns.  
Works exploring the links between crime and violence affecting governance, political life, 
and democracy are many in the Latin American context (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Cruz, 
2011; Dammert & Malone, 2006; Jütersonke, et al., 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; 
Kurtenbach, 2013; Moser & McIlwaine, 2014; Frühling, Tulchin & Golding, 2003; Ungar, 
2011). Ethnographic studies have also focused on the framing, perceptions, and 
experiences of violence more locally in Central America: for the urban poor (McIlwaine & 
Moser, 2007, gangs (Savenije & van der Borgh, 2006), gender (Hume, 2009), elites (Cruz, 
2006), the media (Arriagada & Godoy, 2000), and ‘ordinary citizens’ (Moodie, 2010). 
However, there is only limited work that has been conducted on the policy community’s 
role in security governance.
1
 
The actors included in this study are not confined to traditional ‘elites’ involved in the 
governance of the ‘state’ and relations between states. Instead, non-state actors, civil 
society, and even violent actors have their role in the formation of security policy. How, 
and in what capacity, are these actors able to influence the policies and programmes that 
are implemented? The existing literature covers the debates over the conceptualisation of 
security from the narrow realist to the encompassing human definitions. How these issues, 
once defined as a security concern, are subsequently governed, has seen minimal 
exploration (Krahmann, 2003). Hameiri and Jones argue, ‘little of this literature explores 
how security problems, once identified, are managed in practice or how the systems 
established to manage them actually operate’ (Hameiri & Jones 2015, p. L129).  
The context of a former guerrilla group in government for the first time cast against a 
broader Latin American trend of a ‘left turn’ (Cameron & Hershberg, 2010) along with this 
new government’s invitation that a multitude of actors contribute ideas in the collaborative 
development of new policies presented a data-rich environment to study security 
governance. To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government 
during their first administration (2009-2014)? Founded out of wartime opposition, the 
FMLN came to office brimming with new ideas on how to solve the security problem. The 
security governance environment which they entered already contained many cooperating 
and competing actors; actors not only representing traditional security interests but the 
non-state violent actors of gangs. Acknowledging they were not the only stakeholders, and 
                                                 
1
 An excellent exception is Holland (2013) who delves into the ARENA party’s relationship with crime 
policy in El Salvador. 
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following their own ideological underpinnings, the FMLN was open to governing security 
in different contexts and spaces. Some acknowledge they were ideologically open to 
negotiating with criminals.  
This study will explore the spaces and scales where security is governed. First, it will 
outline the diverse conceptualisations of security used by actors and entities operating in 
the country and in the wider region. Second, it will present the myriad actors involved in 
the country’s multi-actor, multi-level2 attempts at managing El Salvador’s security 
problem. Finally, it will conclude with three case studies – at the regional, the national, and 
the local levels. The cases create an image of a security environment that remains based in 
the state but that is governed from a series of scales or spaces. New responses to diverse 
threats were not solely a government goal but something that took place at multiple scales 
and created by other sources. This thesis seeks to advance understanding of 
multidimensional security governance and to provide new analysis of the potential 
contributions and impacts of violence, crime, and security debates on policy and 
programming in El Salvador.  
1.2 Key Concepts 
The ‘left turn’ in Latin American politics (Cameron, 2010) and the election of an untried 
ex-guerrilla party to the presidency in El Salvador has implications for the understanding 
of security concepts, policy formation, and security operations in the country. How the 
government reacts to risk perceptions and threat events also has wider implications for 
questions on governance systems. Both the conceptualisation of security and the manner in 
which these security issues are approached, are contested parts of actor-driven security 
governance. However, as noted above, the shift from traditional or national security 
environments to acknowledge the complexity of non-traditional security has also re-
directed the academic gaze from a sole focus on states towards non-state actors which also 
has important implications for the concepts and response mechanisms that may be 
considered in risk solutioning. Following Koonings and Kruijt’s work on Violence and 
Resilience in Latin American Cities (2015), this work draws on a range of theories to 
discuss spaces of ‘engagement, mobilisation and participation’ by both traditional and non-
                                                 
2
 There is no sufficiently descriptive term for a 360 degree concept of governance. Within governance, the 
terms multi-level, multi-sectoral, multi-scalar, multi-lateral, and multidimensional represent different 
constructs. I attempt to stick to the terms multi-level and multidimensional, leaning towards the latter, 
because they best represent the spaces of interactions I am attempting to describe in a non-denominational 
manner. Here, multidimensional can include multiple sectors, combining multi-level and multi-lateral 
dimensions. These concepts will be elaborated further in Chapter 2. 
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traditional actors to examine constructs of violence and security, the impacts of these 
constructs and the results or outcomes thereof (Ibid., p. L207). This section will thus 
establish the key conceptual approach to violence and security in Latin America and the 
multilevel, multi-actor challenges associated with security policy formation that have 
important implications for policy, programme, and operational outcomes.  
Violence and political projects are tied up within concepts of security and for whom the 
protection from violence is created. Theorising security in the Latin American context has 
often skipped over traditional disciplinary discussions on the nature of security in favour of 
discourses that are ‘practical, applied and policy relevant’ (Tickner & Hertz, 2012, p. 92). 
Tickner and Herz (2012) argue that at the end of the Cold War both domestic and 
international policies in Latin America defined security as a state-centric, military-
dominated enterprise and had done so from the time of their independence acquired in the 
nineteenth century (also see Haenggi, 2003). In the aftermath of peace negotiations, 
violence was democratised; appearing as ‘an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of 
all kinds of goals’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 11). With this ‘new violence’ or what 
Moodie (2010) calls ‘common crime’ on the rise, Latin American states began pursuing 
democratic security and citizen security arrangements as ballast to institutional 
weaknesses.  
Latin American scholarship has explored in detail the structural weaknesses of state 
institutions as well as their inability to maintain the basic monopoly on the use of force 
(Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; 2004; 2007; 2015). However, as López-Alves argues, Latin 
American ‘states have never been too weakened or shrunken to completely lose control of 
political power or policymaking’ (López-Alves, 2012, p. 174). Furthermore, the violence 
affecting Latin American states is considered by some (for instance, Arias and Goldstein, 
2010) not a result of institutional failure but rather a function of the multiple violent actors 
that operate symbiotically with state actors to ‘help each other accomplish their goals’ 
(Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L4866). This echoes the reflection that opened Koonings and 
Kruijt’s seminal work a decade previous: 
Now I am the vice-president, even the acting president of this 
country. I have written the essential parts of the constitution. 
Apparently I am invested with all political power. But in fact, my 
friends, I have to share power with a lot of players, some of them 
invisible. (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, pp. 1-2)  
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Elsewhere, Moser and McIlwaine (2004, 2007) have explored the articulation between 
different types of violence and how it is negotiated between actors and becomes routine 
within social relationships from the personal to the institutional. In this way, violence and 
security discussions in Latin America, through their composition, are most often entangled 
with questions on the interplay between traditional and non-traditional actors interacting in 
violent spheres within their roles in directing or governing those spaces. 
Developing policies to govern security first requires an understanding of the risk 
environment. Since the end of the Cold War, concern about the levels of violence and the 
increasing diversity of criminal activities has risen in Latin America. In the 2011 
Latinobarometro survey, the most important problem for respondents across the 18 
countries of Latin America was Crime/Public Security (27.8%), approached only by 
Unemployment (16%) as a distant second (Latinobarometro, 2015).
3
 For El Salvador, 
40.1% of respondents identified Crime and Public Security as their greatest issue (Ibid.). 
Indeed, a large body of Latin American study on violence explores the emergence of crime 
as a security threat -- and developed through securitisation processes defined as the 
transformation of specific issues into security risks. In particular, the broadening of 
traditional security definitions for political or control purposes leaves these open to 
rhetorical manipulation. The Copenhagen School links this process to speech acts ‘within a 
political community [treating] something as an existential threat’ which facilitates the call 
to engage ‘urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Waever, 
2003, p. 491). The links between the conceptualisations of violence and security, relevant 
actors, and outcomes is central to this work (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Koonings & Kruijt, 
1999; Frühling, et al., 2003). This ‘new violence’ has sometimes been constructed as a 
product of unresolved socio-political and cultural contentions of previous periods and 
antagonised by incomplete post-conflict institutional reforms weakening the rule of law 
(Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p.11). Regime changes from repressive authoritarian 
administrations to nominally democratic constitutional entities emerged alongside a 
‘violent peace’ (Hume, 2009) on a ‘violently plural’ continent (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). 
However, Arias and Goldstein (2010) lead the way in conceptualising violence beyond the 
failure of state institutions or weak democracies and suggest that traditional and non-
                                                 
3
 These numbers have not changed much. In the latest report conducted in 2015, Latin American concerns 
over crime and public security decreased to 22.8% whilst unemployment remained a distant second at 16.2% 
(Latinobarometro, 2015). In El Salvador, 42.4% report crime and public security as their primary concern 
followed by unemployment at 14.1%. 
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traditional actors are each important players in the adaptation of Latin American societies 
to violently plural realities. 
Fluid conceptualisations of violence and vacillating security measures applied to address 
the risk environment have been accompanied by wide ranging groups of actors sourced 
from across the political, civil, and non-traditional spectrum. Arriagada and Godoy (2000) 
position violence and delinquency as ‘multi-dimensional phenomena’ and note that there is 
a related ‘growing recognition of the need to carry out multidimensional programmes 
combining both control and preventative measures’ (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000, p. 123). 
Much of the traditional social construction in public policy takes place within the analysis 
of national or local government frameworks. However, often the reality is a network of 
elected officials, international entities, and civil society representatives who contribute to 
policy-making across borders and institutional silos.  
The traditional democratic system government is defined a narrow specified assembly of 
activities with a set of authorised participants and privileged interests. Flexibilisation of 
institutional structures has admitted the idea that the state is only one actor among many. 
They operate to counter a perceived set of violent indicators to provide security, among a 
plethora of responsibilities which are better encompassed in the term governance (Boege, 
et al., 2009). In this, governance represents so much more than its basic definition as a 
‘new process of governing’ with a particular interest in power and policy (Rhodes, 1996). 
It has been used to describe decision-making in organisations and across institutional 
structures for issues management. At its most benign, governance could be considered a 
power which is shared or a sort of ‘collective problem solving in the public realm’ 
(Caporaso, 1996, p. 32 quoted in Sloat, 2002, p. 105).  
This is not to say that governance has universally overtaken government or that it is an 
alternative when government or state institutions are considered too weak or fragile to 
address institutional responsibilities. Rather, the term governance allows for the focus to 
shift to a variety of new arrangements and practices which have been operating ad hoc 
(Meehan, 2003). Within governance discussions there are two main strands. First, multi-
actor governance is a phenomenon arising as a stop-gap measure where government is not 
competent to act. Based on the premise that Latin American democracies have failed to 
deliver competent institutions capable of maintaining a monopoly on violence (e.g. 
O’Donnell, 1996), the idea of governance has gained traction to fill the gap. This argument 
suggests that governance may: (1) be essential to supranational entities like the European 
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Union to step into a role that represents fundamental changes in contemporary rule; (2) that 
it addresses issues of a transnational or global nature for which states are ill-equipped or 
unwilling to answer; and (3), in the case of a fragile, weak, or failing state, that the global 
political community, international organisations (IO), or other entities take it upon 
themselves or are invited to contribute to the decision-making process.  
Diminished violence can be positioned as a function of strengthened democratic processes 
and institutions and vice versa within the idea of growing governance mechanisms. 
Categories of failure or weakness for states ripe for alternative governance mechanism 
include those as explored in development and security strands (Boege, et al., 2009; 2011); 
classed as illiberal or incomplete (Gledhill, 2000); or those lacking democratic 
participation with ‘low intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell, 2004). Others, such as Pearce 
(2010), contest these conclusions. She argues that the proliferation of violence has 
occurred in parallel fashion with democratic transitions in Latin America and thus is an 
influential function within government institutions. To these cases, multi-lateral 
governance strategies have become an increasingly attractive manner by which to solve the 
problem where ‘government is no longer sufficient’ (FDFA Working Group, 2007, p. 45 
quoted in Boege, et al., 2011, p. 2; Corkery, 1999, p. 12). In such states, the government is 
only one actor among many and some may hold more power, even if this situation does not 
ignore the complete absence of institutions.  
It is this that Arias and Goldstein attempt to address by including the ‘lived experiences of 
ordinary citizens’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010, p. L129). They propose an alternative frame 
of analysis that recognises the ‘plural nature of [Latin America’s] current governing 
regimes’:  
In other words, rather than understanding Latin America’s endemic 
violence as simply a failure of democratic governance and 
institutions, we call attention to violence as an element integral to 
the configuration of these institutions, as a necessary component of 
their maintenance, and as an instrument for popular challenges to 
their legitimacy. (Ibid., p. L129) 
So too in this thesis, actors and institutional structures are explored as they employ and 
deploy understandings of violence as the means for the creation, implementation, and 
continuation of power, policies, and operations. Actors from IO, foreign states, shadow 
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institutions, and national criminal gangs can be argued to hold a role or influence in policy 
decisions within the governance of specifically constructed security environments.  
What this means is that specific bodies of literature on violence and security make separate 
but important contributions to conceptualisations of security governance. Within 
discussions of violence there is little consensus on what is included but that it can stem 
from ‘multiple sources, transforms all that it touches, and configures daily life and the 
workings of governance in various ways’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010, p. L194). In 
particular for Latin America, discussions on violence also need to explore the relationship 
between crime and political violence in order to understand the included actors and 
resulting policy interventions. As will be explored significantly throughout this thesis, 
‘violent crime as a security threat’ discourse is essential to developing a greater 
understanding of security governance. There is growing academic and policy acceptance 
that state structures have become flexibilised and therefore many security governance 
discussions perceive a decrease in state importance. Simultaneously, however, Latin 
America maintains a rigid hold on the idea of the state, complicating the region’s 
relationship with the governance of security.  
This is where aspects of state hybridity discussions may make important contributions to 
this thesis. Whereas mainstream realist and liberal approaches tend to deal best in known 
entities of governments or states, hybrid or multi-lateral forms of governance allow greater 
flexibility and also provide analysis of practical applications, traditional in Latin American 
scholarship but not always a priority in the more traditional branches. In order to bring 
together these different perceptions of violence, crime, and security governance, this thesis 
will structure discussions in terms of scale which creates the spaces for traditional and non-
traditional concepts to interact. This is not just a rescaling of various parts of state 
governance operations but the creation of new spaces which consider issue delegation or 
collaboration a constructive tool rather than a measure of traditional state or democratic 
weakness. Reflecting on scalar arrangements reached through negotiation, cooperation, and 
competition illuminates the governance approaches to violence and security in the Central 
American context and the power relationships forged in those multi-actor contexts. Having 
identified the many concepts and theoretical tools comprising ideas of security governance, 
it becomes possible to question what impact these dynamics may have on policy creation, 
programme implementation, and operational outcomes.  
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1.3 Problem statement 
Having outlined the key conceptual and theoretical tools that are needed to analyse the 
relationship between the spaces of violence, the participant actors, and the results or 
outcomes of these relationships, I return to the problem statement that drives the structure 
of this thesis. To what extent did security governance change under the FMLN government 
during their first administration (2009-2014)? In order to answer this question, this thesis 
must first identify the participant actors and the spaces in which they operate. It then turns 
to the issues of defining and elaborating the risks as identified by those policy actors. 
Finally, this thesis presents three multi-level case studies that emerged from the negotiated 
policy spaces. In addressing the above problem statement, questions of how security is 
conceptualised, by whom, and with what outcomes, become essential frames of analysis. 
These strands of questioning challenge the directionality of violence and security 
discourses that, in turn, shape the policies and programmes that are funded and 
implemented in a given sphere of operation. 
Question 1: In what spaces, and by whom, is security negotiated and governed in El 
Salvador? 
Despite the argument that the Westphalian state concept in Latin America continues to 
provide a framework for the understanding of state institutions (Flemes & Radseck, 2012; 
Tickner & Herz, 2012), perusal of Latin American security literature indicates that state 
institutions do not operate in a purely national setting when addressing complex security 
issues. As such, questions of scale intrude into discussions of actors and definitions of 
violence. Different levels of traditional government – municipal, departmental, national, 
regional etc. – even within cooperative governance structures, favour particular strategies 
or measures with the result that within geographic, institutional, and conceptual scales of 
operation, there can be overlap, conflict, and resistance (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). At what 
scales do conceptualisations of violence take place? And at what levels or in what spheres 
do actors attempt to resolve violence through security governance mechanisms? The 
objective of the first part of this research is to map security governance structures 
and actors in operation in El Salvador both laterally and across governance levels.  
Given its history of conflict, Central American scholars have engaged with the mapping of 
actors in security governance within peacekeeping efforts. Particular attention is often 
credited to the manner in which IO and interested entities may intervene in the affairs of a 
state for democratisation and institution-strengthening purposes (Bayley, 2011; Boege, et 
al., 2009). Security sector reform (SSR), where sector refers to those departments or 
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institutions directly associated with security within states, has also engaged in actor-
activity scaling to assess the best means for outside agencies to facilitate security 
governance within the boundaries of sovereign states (Froestad & Shearing, 2012).  
However, little exists for a multi-level analysis which incorporates municipal perspectives 
with national and international governing efforts. Notable exceptions found in the public 
security discipline include the work of Froestad and Shearing (2012), who reconceptualise 
security governance as a nodal assemblage of security actors based on hybrid 
arrangements, and that of Hoenke (2013), who expounds on the transnational-local 
dynamics in private security provisioning. These works challenge the conceived potential 
for legitimate and effective non-state security governance within local or informal 
settlement contexts; in particular, they ask, ‘whether local, community-based, non-state 
forms of security governance that respect liberal democratic governance ideals are 
possible, and if so, under what conditions’ (Froestad & Shearing, 2012, p. 4). This thesis 
thus questions whether local definitions of violence and locally-conceived security 
solutions play a role within the more traditional national security frameworks. It further 
looks at regional security strategy propositions for a set of violence risks and questions 
whether the supra-national scale can realise impacts and outcomes for the daily lived 
experiences of individuals. This involves delving into systems of rule (top-down, bottom-
up, nodal, network) and the understanding of legitimate (en)actors within these spheres. By 
deconstructing the nature and impacts of multi-level security governance structures with 
their participant actors, this thesis makes a timely contribution to multi-level and multi-
actor security governance debates. Even though a wealth of information exists on security 
governance as a theoretical concept and some efforts have been made to elaborate on 
empirical cases at the national, regional, and global levels, there has been limited empirical 
work undertaken to link multiple levels operating simultaneously in order to flesh out 
overlapping and symbiotic relationships.  
Question 2: What are the main security concepts framing scales of governance in El 
Salvador? 
In situating the above multidimensional actor study, it is essential to explore the 
contributions they make to security definitions. How do contributing actors construct their 
ideas of how the nature of the threat affects the nature of the negotiations that the actors 
undertake and contributes to the structural formation of the policy networks themselves. In 
other words, what is the nature of the violence being addressed or the type of security at 
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risk? A second objective of this thesis is to elaborate on the conceptualisations of 
security involved in El Salvador’s security governance. Although specific lists of 
indicators or contributing phenomena to violence vary widely, there are notable trends that 
persist in generally accepted constructs of violence. Homicides, money laundering, 
trafficking, extortion, and intra-familial violence are typical indicators used for 
constructing parameters for understanding violence. Youth and particularly those in poor 
areas dominated by street gangs and transnational criminal organisations are usually 
considered the primary violent actors that need to be countered. Specific groups are 
targeted based on actor and victimisation demographic trends although indicators and 
subject groups of alleged key perpetrators do not always align. Nonetheless, the term 
citizen security in all its ambiguity remains central to understanding violence, crime, and 
security in this thesis.  
The term’s construction in Latin American context provides a structure within which to 
understand the language and policies in security governance. It is within this framework 
that actors position their own understanding, institutional responsibilities, and operational 
capacities; in creating responses to situations of violence and crime, the actors and their 
conceptualisations of security matter as much as the subjects themselves. Furthermore, the 
institutional connotations of citizen security with rights and responsibilities can be used 
both to broaden and to narrow the set of agreed-upon security objectives. Academic and 
policy models have engaged with a wide range of explanations of violence affecting 
security from realist understandings of state responsibility for violence to human security 
extending far beyond the traditional threats. Origins discussions may include, but are not 
limited to: lingering historical and post-war effects of political violence lacking resolution; 
socio-economic inequalities; gang violence; organised criminal violence; incomplete 
institutional reforms leaving a security vacuum that facilitates the propagation of violence; 
and, public discourse / pressure in relation to criminality. This thesis also highlights the 
importance that ‘new’ plays in crime, security, and policy discussions. Questions arise with 
the rhetoric of a ‘new’ government and bring hope with ‘new’ approaches to a relatively 
‘new’ security threat. In questioning the conceptualisation of violence and security that the 
actors themselves hold and use to construct spheres of security governance, this thesis 
connects actor perceptions with policy outcomes.  
Question 3: What policies or programmes have emerged from the multi-level spaces of 
security governance in El Salvador? 
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The two previous research questions provide the frame for an analysis of multi-level 
security policies or programmes that emerge. Security negotiations in the context of a new 
government in El Salvador took place in a window of opportunity driven by public hope to 
bring about policy for governance changes. These questions have significant ramifications 
for analysing how concepts, actors, and moments of opportunity – or crisis – may be 
governed. They also lead to sub-questions on actor interactions for security response 
outcomes. First, on what basis do these entities choose to collaborate on security 
governance outcomes in El Salvador? Are they guided by a mutual solidarity, shared 
responsibility, or collective acknowledgement of potential risks? This is an important 
question for this thesis as it delineates the selection process for democratic and self-
appointed institutions in security governance. A second sub-question looks into 
competition in policy-making and outcomes. Which projects or operations are actually 
implemented and developed beyond political rhetoric? This thesis explores the foundations 
of specific policies and programmes to contrast dialogue and discussion with outcomes to 
substantiate which security concepts are actioned and by which actors. Finally, can 
collaboration or cooperation on security governance boost institutional response capacity 
and who directs the nature of that response? The research will explore the nature of 
dispersed action in security governance and whether this has implications for responsibility 
mechanisms.  
Crime and violence issues affecting security governance efforts in El Salvador are 
extensive and evolving. Changing configurations of governance, along with the allocation 
of power and resources, are contested activities inviting cooperation and power-struggles 
within non-traditional security governance mechanisms. The appropriate scale, executors, 
and operators become problems in and of themselves to be negotiated and managed. 
Shifting the gaze from traditional governance activities to exploration of the underlying 
socio-economic and power structures are of equal importance to studies on crime and 
security. However, often those issues addressed are those selected through the lens of 
citizen security were broadly democratic rights and responsibilities are securitised.  
Through a range of analytical frameworks and with reference to literatures on crime and 
violence, securitisation, and security governance, this thesis aims to expand on how 
security issues are created and managed. In other words, what does security governance 
look like in practice and in the context of the new FMLN government in El Salvador? 
1.4 Methodology 
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This section outlines how I approached the topic of security governance in El Salvador 
methodologically within the existing literature and existing gaps that this thesis aims to fill. 
Due to the voluminous scholarship on the Salvadoran conflict, peace-building, and post-
conflict violence as well as the open-ended character of my research question, I adopted an 
inductive approach to my research framework following the main tenets of Grounded 
Theory (GT) (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In doing so, I strove to mitigate the 
dominant narratives emphasising the dysfunctional characteristics of Central American 
post-conflict security policy and governance institutions to leave space for new discovery 
in the sensitive and often fence-posted issue of security. First, I outline my research 
approach as organised to ‘create the conditions for surprise’ (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 243). I 
then present the research process for this thesis including case selection, data collection, 
and analysis constructs. My positionality and integrity reflection close the section 
presenting the limitations to the broad, open-ended question guiding this research: To what 
extent did security governance change under the FMLN government during their first 
administration (2009-2014)? 
1.4.1 The research approach: Indicative and deductive 
approaches to research decolonisation 
The research problem on security guiding this research arose from my experience engaging 
with Central American residents who were negotiating dangerous migration routes in 
response to a fraught security climate. During my time working on migration policy in 
early 2010 I began to question my role as an international contributor to local policy 
development. At one meeting after another when considering the various components 
required for inclusion in my policy brief, people would casually remark, ‘well to talk about 
this topic, you really need to understand about security’. Coming away from this process, 
the need to ‘talk about security’ in every day policy topics combined with my observations 
on the contributions of multi-lateral interests to the development of national policy 
presented a unique opportunity for further investigation. The context of a former guerrilla 
group in government for the first time cast against a broader Latin American trend of a ‘left 
turn’ (Cameron, 2010) along with this new government’s invitation that a multitude of 
actors contribute ideas in the collaborative development of new policies, made the field 
appear to be data-rich.  
Having observed the extent to which diverse actor agendas could sometimes drive policy 
formation or influence its direction, one of my hunches was that security policy in this 
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context was a product of actor exchanges – either through policy diffusion between 
neighbours with similar experiences of violence (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Glatz, 2007; 
Langer, 2007; Midgley, 1984) or policy transfer from international actors to national 
institutions building on globalised ideas of best practice (Busch & Joergens, 2005; Dobbin 
& Simmons, 2007; Drezner, 2001; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Weyland, 2006). 
Furthermore, I conjectured that actor conceptualisations of the Salvadoran security 
environment, along with independent security ideologies and agendas, would influence 
what kind of policy was produced in these multi-actor contexts. Jervis argues that 
policymakers’ preferences can be linked with the perceptions they hold of their external 
environment, impacting on the policy they create (Jervis, 1976). However, formal security 
actors do not have equal opportunities to imbue policies with their agendas and 
conceptualisations – and actor debates do not translate directly onto policy and outcomes.  
Even when armed with a question and a prior knowledge of the literature, designing a 
methodological approach is essential to effective data collection and analysis. Margaret 
Mead advocated that ‘the way to do fieldwork is never to come up for air until it is all 
over’ (Mead, 1977, p. 136). This sentiment is in keeping with scholarship discussions on 
cultural difference and knowing to take into account both linguistic and cultural barriers 
most evident in verbal and non-verbal expressions (Rubenstein, 1988). As such, an 
inductive approach in keeping with the general tenets of GT was selected to initiate the 
study. In particular, Transformational Grounded Theory allowed for the combination of 
both constructivism (subject perceptions) and critical realism (participatory action) within 
the research framework. The dual methods also fit within Schutz’s social phenomenology 
of interpretive understanding (Schutz, 1967). However, given that the starting off point in 
the research question identified policy, it was important that the research design allow for 
the triangulation of pre-conceived notions of the research subject when embarking on case 
study empirical data collection (Wagenaar, 2011). GT also provided space to ‘incorporate 
the complexities of the organizational context’ involved in policy formation analysis, as 
suggested by Alderfer and Smith (1982); while, at the same time, ‘providing a detailed and 
carefully crafted account of the area under investigation’ (Martin &Turner, 1986, p.143). 
Deductive reasoning based in a detailed reading of existing scholarship was also used to 
develop the initial case study as well as formulate practical details such as the selection of 
interview subjects and the writing of questionnaires.  
The initial research question was driven by an interest in the role IO played in developing 
and influencing security policy and programme directions in El Salvador. Despite the 
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voluminous literature on the subject of security, there was relatively little that focused on 
the multidimensional actor roles in national security policy formation. Research on Central 
America is heavily focussed on grassroots, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and 
the interplay between individuals, and government bodies (Cruz, 2006, 2010; Holden 
1996; Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010; Snodgrass Godoy, 2006). ‘Security’ trended towards 
post-conflict peace building or transnational criminal organisations as regional threats. 
‘Violence’ focused on gangs and ethnographic studies on the experiences of violence. 
‘Actor-networks’ developed categories of hybrid organisational forms with an emphasis on 
civil society organisations. ‘Multidimensional, multi-level, multi-lateral’ drew scholarship 
on the Central American Common Market, peace-negotiations, and Southern Cone 
integration efforts. ‘Policy’ studies had focused police reforms, environmental cooperation, 
migration and the United States El Salvador doctrine. Most telling, when typing ‘El 
Salvador’ into scholarly search engines, the first results were split between civil war 
experiences and contemporary migration studies. A similar effort with ‘foreign relations’ 
was predictable in the domination of the United States among the sources. However, an 
inductive approach also proved important here as there is little situated or embedded Latin 
American theory (López-Alves, 2012; Tickner & Herz, 2012) 
Security, violence, organisational, and governance theories are developed, on the whole, 
with Northern approaches, ideologies, and influences (López-Alves, 2012). Tickner and 
Herz argue that international actors have facilitated relations between Latin American 
states and academia and funding provided to develop what amounted to ‘descriptive 
reflections’ driven by the need to produce knowledge to underwrite policy (Tickner & 
Herz, 2012, pp. 92-93). These hegemonies were created in a colonial period also 
experienced in other non-core countries leading to significant critique over IR’s colonial 
character (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004; Jones 2006; Shilliam, 2011) where knowledge is 
‘produced by and for the West’ (Acharya & Buzan, 2007, p. 288). Indeed, Nayak and 
Selbin (2010) have challenged the discipline’s operating modes, arguing that the very 
process of situating knowledge within a ‘story of IR’ reproduces the centrality of Northern 
discipline. The issue becomes how to best engage with this hegemony. Hamati-Ataya 
questions why non-western IR scholarship should be addressed any differently – that to do 
so risks marginalising non-core contributions to key debates – in essence, avoiding 
purposefully adopted marginalisation (discussed in Tickner & Blaney, 2012, pp. 8-9). 
Nayak and Selbin (2010) argue instead for a ‘disturbing’ or ‘reframing’ of the discipline.  
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In order to continue with the project while remaining sensitive to the post-colonial realities 
of IR scholarship, a modified ‘transformational’ GT approach was adopted along with a 
modification in the planned methods of data collection. As developed by Redman-
MacLaren and Mills, transformational GT speaks to this project with its inclusion of 
participatory action and decolonising methodologies and allows space for the researcher’s 
experience ‘to enable engagement with people experiencing the phenomena being 
researched’ whilst still pursuing critical analysis (Redman-MacLaren & Mills, 2015, p. 4). 
First, this adapted methodology was designed specifically to address questions of 
colonising data. Critical realism is illuminating in this instance to continue study of the 
links and sites of exchange of actor subjects but its preference for bounded knowledge is 
balanced here with a constructivist approach. However, transformational GT merits 
additional attention for its adoption of participation in action research (Redman-MacLaren 
& Mills, 2015). This approach is particularly attractive for constructivists for its potential 
ability to include constructed perceptions within the research process itself. It further offers 
opportunities to scrutinise relationship dynamics and power differences between entities as 
well as analyse concepts like security through actor narratives. However, it is less 
successful in considering case study selection and multi-level operational structures. As 
such, this thesis employs an open-ended mixed method approach to research design. 
Charmaz (2006) highlights the importance of including research participants in the 
production of knowledge. Its importance was echoed by Saint-Germain and Chavez 
Metoyer in expressed concerns over data imperialism: ‘a researcher from a more developed 
country taking up the time and resources of women in a less developed country and then 
making off with the data’ (Geiger, 1997; quoted in Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer, 
2008). In this way, PO became a strategic effort to decolonise research methodologies and 
create arenas for exchange which would encourage actor input to the continually evolving 
nature of this research. Further efforts were made to include a space for comment and 
critique of the questions and goals of the research project during formal actor interviews. 
While many more recent researchers would prefer to see the interview process as dialogue, 
shifting power dynamics play a significant role on both sides – with sometimes detrimental 
results; especially when it comes to creation of power asymmetries, agonistic interview 
techniques, and the re-packaging of such interviews as knowledge for public consumption 
(Kvale, 2006). 
1.4.2 Case study selection 
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The scope of this research was limited at the outset by temporal, geographical, and 
thematic delimitations. First, this research establishes a timeframe from the time that the 
new FMLN government took office in 2009 to the end of their first mandate in 2014. 
However, within this period, attention will focus on the specific case study programmes 
selected which are not evenly distributed or active throughout the period. Earlier 
administrations from the end of the Cold War and El Salvador’s 1992 Peace Agreements 
are considered as a precedent or baseline of how security had been governed over twenty 
years but does not comprise part of the evidentiary process used to analyse the political 
processes as such. The opportunity to establish formal actor perceptions and 
conceptualisations of security as they formed new national policies, instead of attempting 
to draw out meaningful influences from actor memories of policies long since implemented 
or abandoned, promised to be a more effective approach to the actor-policy relationship. At 
the same time, Central American states had initiated a regional security strategy in 2011, 
just prior to the pilot field study. This development provided a second unique case for 
analysis as it involved national entities negotiating from national positions with their 
neighbours on security strategies and programmes that would require national adoption in 
additional to regional cooperation. 
Second, the research focuses on El Salvador using three case studies impacting security 
governance within state borders as a geographical delimitation. It identifies cross-border 
and international support but does not pursue regional security as a body of study itself. 
Instead, the contrast between the two levels of security efforts opened an opportunity to 
elaborate on process distinctions simultaneously in operation within a single state. In order 
to assess what policy negotiations were implemented, however, it made sense to limit the 
study to one country but on several levels in order to follow results. The prevalence of 
scholarship in the region critiquing empty or failed policy agreements with little to no 
impact in the real world, and the general dismissal of regional bodies like the SICA, meant 
that I would have to find a way to study what did happen. The best way to do this was to 
include municipalities as a third level of study to add outcomes to security concepts and 
policy production. In some ways, this also transformed the dynamic of cooperation 
hybridity from a neo-liberal construct, suggesting that functions can be outsourced to a 
participatory framing with the potential for end-user or subject inclusion. This shift also 
impacted on employed terminology, with ‘hybrid’ or ‘transformed’ governance spaces 
more descriptive than ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’. In this way, stakeholder agendas could be 
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analysed not only within a national framework and on a regional diplomatic level but as 
their efforts were perceived in operation.  
The selection of case study municipalities was done to balance traditional, established, 
security governance structures with new security initiatives to seek evidence of governance 
transformation. Santa Tecla, Sonsonate, and Ilopango all had violence prevention 
programmes which were established after the Peace Accords but prior to the election of the 
FMLN government. All had had formal cooperation agreements on prevention with 
international entities, whether international organisations or a foreign government. In this 
way, all had followed set strategies to establish a set of practices with which the 
municipality intended to address violence through a conceptualisation of security 
mitigation. Thus, they all had some form of donor-recipient relationship; they all had Local 
Violence Prevention Councils (Consejos Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia: 
CMPV), and they all invited a diverse group of actors to address their security concerns, 
violent risks, and formulate potential threat interventions (reduction, management, and 
contestation) at hand. As political allegiances tend to significantly impact official and 
interpersonal dynamics, the selection was also balanced between the two main parties. At 
the time of the thesis fieldwork between 2012 and 2013, Santa Tecla was under FMLN 
local leadership whilst Sonsonate and Ilopango had ARENA-led municipal governments. 
Overall, the interactions between structural governance mechanisms of coordination, 
policy steering, and accountability along with the social mechanisms of actor interests, 
issues-framing discourses, and mobilised networks and resources, became important 
competitions in the outcomes realised within these violence prevention municipalities.  
Through this thesis, security governance through specific policy development and 
outcomes is analysed. However, the study is limited largely to the implementation of ‘new’ 
policies that were largely prevention-focused rather than Mano Dura operations typical of 
security performances in El Salvador. It does not deconstruct the implementation of crack-
down operations as conducted by joint police-military patrols. Although those activities are 
also highly relevant to the overall debate on the development of security governance in El 
Salvador, they involve military decision-making with different decision-making structures 
apart from the multi-lateral networks focused on here. Framed within a national context of 
security governance, the research only analyses policies and instruments relating to the 
specific timeframe that have a clear direct or indirect link with the idea of trying something 
‘new’ to address security risks in El Salvador. Within these policies, the focus is placed on 
actor networks and the multi-level dynamics involved in creating security governance 
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structures. Thus, whilst this work does look at some of the funding sources for mano dura 
responses, it does not aim to cover the operationalisation of joint-military police patrols.  
As such, the case studies at three different scales of security governance – the local, the 
national, and the regional – will highlight the operations and actor networks at a specific 
point in time in order to address the potential impacts that the ideas of a new governing 
party could have on the security governance process in El Salvador.  
1.4.3 Data collection and analysis 
To effectively address the research question set out in my work, I used a multi-method 
triangulation approach to data collection and analysis (Valentine, 2001). Semi-structured 
interviews form the most importance source of data for this research of which I conducted 
over 75 with a diversity of formal actors between January 2012 and April 2013. These 
actors included policy elites (elected representatives, party members, and government 
officials), security force personnel, foreign representatives, NGO employees, and 
organisational technical analysts, among others. As laid out in previous sections, actor 
interpretations of security are essential to the exploration of security policy and operations. 
However, perceptions are ephemeral and impressionistic. Neoclassical realists have 
attempted to engage with policy maker preferences beyond the state but tend to start from 
the assumption that there is an objective reality which policy makers may or may not 
perceive correctly (Schweller, 2006). In analysing the interviews of formal actors as policy 
influencers, I did not engage with questions of objective realities. Instead, semi-structured 
interview subjects serve two purposes for this study’s research structure. First, they provide 
data on security perceptions, actor network interactions, institutional agendas, and 
outcomes. They elaborate on their own perceptions of the contributions they and others 
made to policy development and they provide illustrations on outcomes including 
programming and operations. Research subjects further pointed to a unique security 
process in the region which had the potential to be transformative to the nature of the 
study. Second, these subjects were asked who they thought I should be interviewing to 
develop understanding of the security processes at work in the country. Not only was this 
an effective way to use ‘snowball sampling’ techniques to collect potential interview 
names but their recommendations also provided insight to the actor networks and, in some 
cases, provided a secondary insight into their interpretations of security.  
Generally, I strove to interview at least two people from each institution or organisation 
with which I had contact (Appendix C; Appendix D; Appendix E). For the Ministry of 
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Justice and Public Security (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica: MJSP) and the 
SICA, I interviewed at least one person from those relevant units for which I could gain 
access and often multiple individuals therein. At the municipal level, I conducted 
interviews with policy officials and, in some cases, met with the mayor, but also spent time 
touring various sites and projects with officials as well as conducted informal ‘group’ 
interviews with project participants. As much as possible, I attempted to maintain the 
interview as a conversation rather than a rigid line of questioning. In order to keep to the 
conceptual and structural goals of the questioning, balance was sought between the 
informal, open-ended narrative guided by the respondent’s experiences, perceptions, and 
opinions on the one hand and the important structural themes of the research goals on the 
other (Wagenaar, 2011). The questions themselves had been originally structured to cast 
questions in a ‘neutral’ light and allow the interview subject to guide terminology 
development (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Using this guide, interviews began with 
questions about positionality, including background and responsibilities in the security 
process. It then moved on to introductory questions on the three main pillars of research, 
including: (1) perceptions on the type of security risks facing the country and the indicators 
used to measure these threats; (2) perceptions on the key mechanisms used to attempt to 
build security; (3) perceptions on the degree of importance prescribed to multi-actor 
contributions to security building efforts and who those actors are; and, (4) perceptions on 
the impacts and outcomes of the projects or operations they had highlighted. Most of the 
interviews were recorded with the permission of the subject and subsequently transcribed 
so as to have access to written text and include direct quotes in this thesis.  
In addition to the data collected through interviews, I undertook participant observation 
(PO). My motivations to engage directly in the processes of security governance were 
three: data, gatekeeper access, and contribution. Although PO is helpful both in terms of 
developing comfort and familiarity with the topic terminology and activities, it does have 
drawbacks. In particular, documenting observations and conversations at the same time as 
making a contribution in your participant role is a complicated task. As Tipple and Willis 
(1991) note, the issue of subjectivity and objectivity may obscure rather than clarify other 
data results. The third part of the data triangulation involved documentary evidence for 
which I collected over 200 policies, briefings, and other reports related to my case studies. 
Many of the documents were obtained from interview subjects as I made a point of 
concluding every interview with requests for supporting evidence, especially when they 
had mentioned a specific document in the course of an interview.  
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To analyse these three components of data, large spider maps were created to allow 
information to coalesce in patterns. As I moved farther into the data, categories solidified 
between specific processes and broader issues of security concept development as a natural 
outcome of focused coding (Charmaz, 2006, p. 58). Thematic mapping served to link 
broad themes between interviews and observe variation in concepts and terms therein. 
Building on these observed trends, I returned to the literature in an attempt to place my 
observances within the larger theoretical contexts. The rough analysis when placed in a 
governance context pointed towards something more than multi-dimensional or multi-level 
cooperation but something less than a full security governance construct. From a security 
studies perspective, the observed processes were undeniably securitised, had undergone a 
brief period of attempted depoliticised, and then re-securitised. However, in both cases, 
this left gaps – most importantly how repression and prevention goals were able to be 
pursued concurrently.  
In summary, this study’s research framework was based loosely within Grounded Theory 
but employed both inductive and deductive methods to establish case studies, identify 
potential interview subjects, and place the research within greater theoretical frameworks. 
Through successive rounds of thematic mapping, a set of observable patterns emerged 
from which it was possible to unpack relationships between multi-scaled actors and the 
security issues they were attempting to address.  
1.4.4 Positionality and ethical considerations 
Challenges and ethical considerations are particularly important for security research to 
protect data sources. The first consideration was purely practical given the topic of crime, 
violence, and security governance. Given levels of violent plurality and corruption 
throughout the research environment including institutions, governance structures, and 
non-traditional participant networks, the connections to individuals that were indirectly or 
directly involved in aspects of the issues they were attempting to solve was unavoidable. 
This is a practical reality of the security environment in El Salvador. Reliability of the 
information was partially assured by ensuring a broad range of interview subjects and 
through data triangulation. Concerns over credibility in themselves make a contribution to 
the thesis as the actor relationships at play in security governance. The second challenge 
was to research criminal engagement in wider security governance efforts whilst mitigating 
security risks to the researcher and other participants. In all cases, no information was 
exchanged or commentary made on existing processes with interview subjects to avoid 
inadvertent transmission of sensitive information. It was also important to ensure that all 
P r i e s  | 26 
 
interviews took place in neutral spaces. The security environment also posed a practical 
transport challenge. However, support from the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) office to provide transportation and accompaniment when required provided my 
safety on a practical level but did not impact the type of research I was able to do, the 
people I was able to meet, or the locations to which I had access.  
Positionality is especially important here because of the participant observation portion of 
the data collection as well as the ideological nature of the academic study on crime and 
security. Within regional SICA meetings, I conducted active PO as a contracted consultant 
with the IOM. To establish my role, I performed introductions as developed in accepted 
PO ethics guidelines. In closed door sessions, I introduced myself as representing the IOM 
when I spoke but that I was also present as a PhD researcher who would be observing the 
proceedings to enhance my research into the security governance process. In open plenary 
sessions, there were no introductions and public access limited concerns over proprietary 
or protected information. Instead, the moderator and technical staff involved in running the 
meetings were informed prior to the sessions and their consent obtained verbally. Some 
participants would later ask about my research during breaks, upon which I was happy to 
elaborate. At national and municipal levels, my approach was closer to direct observation 
methods for meetings and policy workshops; through my introduction, it was clear that I 
was there in a research capacity and held no active role in the proceedings. Where possible, 
I would also attempt to interview participants without having engaged with them on project 
topics in an effort to reduce influence on interview answers provided by the interviewee. 
PO remained a particularly useful dimension to the research process in adding actor 
exchanges to the analysis of interviews and published reports. It also is in keeping with 
Grounded Theory tenets in that it allows the researcher to ‘choose direction as his/her 
understanding of the situation grows and new opportunities in the field present themselves’ 
(Tipple & Willis, 1991, p. 18). Overall, the data collection and analysis decisions were 
made strategically to address different components of the research question whilst 
mitigating where possible to the existing challenges and positionality considerations 
present in the research structure. 
1.5 Plan of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter has provided several key considerations and debates that frame 
current research on multi-actor, multi-scalar security governance related to the complex 
security environment in El Salvador. Contradictions that have developed since the end of 
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the Cold War with the simultaneous growth of democratic institutions and violent crime in 
Latin America have complicated security responses provided by government institutions. 
Instead, the ‘dispersal of security functions fundamentally shapes the distribution of 
political power, with implications not only for the structure of government but for the very 
boundaries of the state’ (Bayley, 2011, p. 59). In attempting to take control of hybridisation 
processes, involved actors have attempted to lay claim to ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ approaches 
in security governance. This thesis recognises the pluralities involved in scales, actors, 
definitions, and outcomes in attempts to address security risks in El Salvador. Rather than 
engaging in the legalities of policy and programme development, this thesis deconstructs 
how crime and violence conceptualisations impact on practical governance structures, 
strategies, and outcomes. At its core, there is an idea of shared responsibility within a 
notion that it takes more than traditional parties to address non-traditional security threats. 
However, security governance theory, even taking into account state structural changes, 
fails to fully explain the observed processes through which El Salvador addresses its 
complex security concerns. First, proponents of security governance do not sufficiently 
address the implications of existing multi-level governance structures including the 
relationships between municipal and national governments in incorporating international 
entities. Second, the delegation of responsibilities to governance structures is incomplete 
where national governments find it politically expedient to maintain control, especially 
over combat operations in crisis situations. Third, non-state actor powers can lead to the 
incomplete implementation of policy objectives or programmes if government structures 
feel they run counter to their political interests, despite the potential disastrous implications 
of ending an existing operation. As such, although security governance provides a 
sufficiently robust framework from which to analyse the multi-actor, multi-level processes 
at work in El Salvador, the current literature lacks an articulated framework capable of 
explaining how new modes of governance interact with existing traditional governance in 
hybrid states that maintain a ‘violent plurality’ (Arias and Goldstein, 2010).  
Chapter Two engages with theories of violence, security, and governance to pull out 
theoretical contributions for security governance in the Salvadoran context. Latin 
American violence and security scholarship is presented as it contributes to the 
development of citizen security. Relevant security insights are then connected to 
governance theories, focussing particularly on the issues of multi-dimensionality and 
hybridity. The chapter engages with questions of scale in an effort to untangle the 
processes of policy formation in non-government contexts. Chapter Three outlines the 
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socio-economic and political geographic setting of this thesis. The chapter paints a picture 
of the historical setting leading to the complex security environment encountered by the 
FMLN as they took office in 2009.This thesis then turns to the empirical findings of the 
research. Chapters Four and Five elaborate on the actor structures and security 
conceptualisations respectively. Each chapter draws out the thematic elements of their 
subject and maps them in the context of the theoretical framework. Chapter Six delves into 
the specific examples of policy efforts and outcomes at each level. Here, a short history of 
the case is given, followed by an account of the associated policies and programmes. Key 
operations or programme implementations are then assessed in light of stated policy 
aspirations. Each case is closed with analysis of the case framework in the context of the 
multi-scalar security environment and its contributions to security between 2009 and 2014.  
Finally, the conclusion integrates the case studies and draws out important empirical 
findings for practical illustration as well as presents gaps for future study. One important 
conclusion is that although there are arguments to be made for multi-actor, multi-level 
security governance or ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege, et al., 2009), government by-in is 
essential in order for these spaces to function. They do not cede their authority but rather 
undergo a form of transformation. Existing government institutions, both municipal and 
national, have struggled to take full advantage of multi-level security governance 
frameworks. However, in the most robust instances, multi-level security governance 
frameworks can direct and lead transformative policy development and programming 
implementation.  
  
Chapter 2 
Security, Governance, and Innovation: Constructing 
theory   
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El Salvador’s citizen security policy: ‘The set of public 
interventions brought to fruition by different state (national, 
regional or local) and social actors to confront and resolve the risks 
and threats, concrete or foreseeable, of a violent and/or criminal 
character that injures the rights and liberties of the person in a 
particular space.’ (Smutt & Carsana, 2012, pp. 18-19) 
2.1 Introduction 
Dead bodies with gunshot wounds sprawled in public streets, tattooed bodies of snarling 
young men squeezed behind bars, and shady coyotes smuggling vulnerable children across 
heavily-patrolled desert borders are all popular images associated with crime and violence 
in Central America. From those popular images, we can extract ideas about what types of 
violence are at issue: the individuals who are experiencing insecurity; the (alleged) 
perpetrators of criminal activities; and the local geography or context in which this 
violence takes place. We can also extrapolate the basic laws that are likely in violation and 
the institutions responsible for enforcing those laws. However, these are only simplistic 
presentations of the complex issues of crime, violence, and (in) security which might be 
considered. Expanding the view frame, another set of actors and issues are brought into 
focus: the entities involved in making the laws that are being broken; the actors tasked with 
developing the policies and programmes that redirect potential offenders and provide the 
social supports for those in danger of victimisation; and the operators tasked with 
implementing the prevention of violence and the enforcement of the law. Furthermore, we 
can examine these same issues from other angles outside the sensational gaze, including: 
the underlying or source causes of violence; what issues can be considered as violence or a 
security threat; and the work of developing potential mechanisms to reduce and prevent 
violence. In considering these composite parts of the violence image, actor perceptions 
become critical for the configuration of the modes and instruments used to confront, 
reduce, and prevent – to govern – violence.  
The aim of this chapter is to review the theoretical approaches to the governance of 
violence and security in Latin American context. Academic work on the region has 
explored extensively those links ranging from the interactions of governments to the daily 
lived experiences of individuals (Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Cruz, 2010; Dammert, 2012; 
Hume, 2009; Jütersonke et al., 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; 2004; 2007; 2015; 
Kurtenbach, 2013; Ungar, 2011). Tulchin et al. (2003) study the relationship of citizen 
security to institutional and security reforms and production of public policies. They argue 
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that insecurity can ‘impinge on the quality of citizenship in democratic governance’ (Ibid., 
p. 5). Dueñas and Rueda (2011) expand on the changing nature of crime and violence to 
study it as a continuum of individual, community, and state. Goldstein (2015) repositions 
citizen security as a concept that has different meanings for its participants in ways that 
reorient the direction of the state, impacting both understandings of responsibility and 
action. In this way, theories of violence dovetail with studies in security as they are 
governed.  
A separate security governance literature provides useful insights into how framed issues 
are confronted and managed but it often fails to engage with the practical governance 
outcomes. Issues securitisation and crisis governance theories largely overlook both the 
social conditions that underlie the practice (Balzacq, 2015) and what happens next (Bevir 
& Hall, 2013a; Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Furthermore, much security and securitising 
governance scholarship neglects to fully conceptualise the structural changes governance 
structures undergo to address ‘shifting paradigms of intervention’ (Moser & McIlwaine, 
2014, p.4). Most important, governance literature in the context of security provisioning 
often argues that these structures arise because the governments themselves are unable to 
fully maintain a monopoly on violence, and are fragile, or failing (Brinkerhoff, 2007; 
Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2008; Jakobi & Wolf, 2013a; 2013b; Patrick, 2012). In other 
arguments, multi-level or multi-lateral strategies are born out of a security situation where 
the state is weak or impotent or where non-traditional security risks expand beyond a 
single state’s jurisdiction (Caballero, 2009; Lea & Stenson, 2007; Risse, 2011). However, 
Arias and Goldstein (2010) posit that for Latin America, at least, the sites of security 
governance and how security is negotiated is more important than statements of weakness, 
predicated on concepts of democracy formed in Western Europe and North America.  
For this reason, the final section incorporates aspects of state transformation theory which 
explores non-traditional security governance that constructs governance structures on 
multiple scales to counter claims that existing national government and governance forms 
are inadequate (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Arias and Goldstein (2010) observe that similar 
adjectives from imperfect and illiberal to disjunctive have been used to characterise Latin 
American government institutions. They challenge these assessments. Instead, they 
propose turning the analysis to focus on ‘violence as an element integral to the 
configuration of those [democratic] institutions’, arguing the approach better reflects the 
relationships of civil society and violent actors have with different elements of the state 
(Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L159; L494). By introducing violent actors to the governance 
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continuum, they strive to unpack how this other set of actors ‘affect political practice at 
various levels of the polity’ including ‘the emergence of new forms of political order’ 
(Ibid., p. L505). Although not an explicit gap in Arias and Goldstein’s theories on violent 
pluralism, hybrid political orders (HPO) theory introduces International Organisations (IO) 
contributions into security governance discussions. Specifically, HPO scholarship explores 
the ‘multiple sites of political authority and governance where security is enacted and 
negotiated’ or where governance is found rather than where it is not (Luckham & Kirk, 
2013, pp. 9-10). It tends to include multiple security providers, positing that these spaces 
allow the state to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity in a multi-scalar context where 
arrangements are determined by both supply and demand entities (Ibid). The significance 
of security governance at multiple scales, and with a diversity of actors, is contextualised 
with the expanded and changing concepts of violence and security.  
This thesis uses the theories introduced above to discuss security concepts, actors, and 
scaled approaches in an attempt to move away from ideas of weak or failure in governance. 
It highlights that, although there is no neat theory to explain how crime and violence 
affecting security in Latin American states is governed in practice through formal actor 
efforts, it is possible to draw from across theories of Latin American violence and security 
governance theories to build an analysis framework. Bringing together these bodies of 
theory sets the groundwork for this thesis to join multi-level, multi-lateral (scalar) security 
governance structures to the implemented programmes that strive to change the violent 
daily experiences of El Salvador’s citizens. 
2.2 Evolving Concepts of Violence and Security in Latin 
America 
This section explores the key conceptual and theoretical components used to develop the 
connections between violence and security evolutions in the Latin American context. First, 
it follows the progression of security definitions as they evolved from a newly independent 
19th century Central America state-centric iteration to a 21st century interconnected 
governance of transnational threats. Next, it focuses further on the human and citizen 
security concepts that emerged after the Cold War within a framework of securitisation 
theory as it structured the ‘new violence’ and ‘common crime’ of the post-war period. To 
close, the section turns to orthodox scholarly explanations for the origins, sources, and 
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responsibility of violent manifestations. All of these sections are essential components to 
the manner in which security is governed.  
2.2.1 Connecting violence and security shifts in Latin America 
The following review traces four distinct periods in the development of Latin American 
violence and security theory evolutions. Having covered several explicating branches 
studying violence above, still greater specificity is required when expanding the 
importance of violence for security development. In a context of violence, how is security 
defined, by whom, for what subjects? Violence is as diverse as large scale conflict and the 
personal violence of the home. Alongside violence, what is the associated security risk?  
Traditionally, theorising security in the Latin American context is a task fraught with 
conceptual potholes not least because, like most of Latin American International Relations 
(IR), security knowledge has been on the whole, ‘practical, applied and policy relevant’ 
(Tickner & Herz, 2012, p. 92).  The nation state sits at the heart of Latin American 
epistemological and theoretical forays, not least because from their earliest days as nations, 
they have had to contend with global colonial influences. This ‘strong and permanent 
presence of “the international”’ has been a conceptual dividing force with both positive 
forces seen to bring new ideas and negative forces through historical links to enfeebled 
states (López-Alves, 2012, p. 162). In this, the nation-state remains the primary referent in 
Latin America as evidenced by the fact that diverse security challenges from public 
insecurity to transnational criminal trafficking flows are all, on some level, associated with 
state institutional weaknesses (Tickner & Herz, 2012). Regional security debates have been 
further influenced by a low incidence of inter-state war balanced with high levels of 
intrastate conflict with, at best, challenged monopolies on the use of force (Ibid.). In other 
words, although Latin America has ‘stable state systems’ and ‘formal institutional 
frameworks’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p.5), many internal institutions lack the capacity to 
contest violence and provide security.  
It is essential to articulate at least four distinct periods in the development of Latin 
American security thinking in order to understand the region’s contribution to wider 
security theory (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999; Tickner and Herz, 2012). First, geopolitical 
doctrine emerged in the 19th century with independence and state-building strategies. 
Rooted in its colonial past, violence became the tool of a hegemonic oligarchy as domestic 
state apparatuses were reconfigured to adhere to specific class agendas (Kruijt & 
Koonings, 1999). This was followed by a national security doctrine inspired by the United 
States’ influences but which carried over some key tenets from earlier geopolitical 
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structures (see for instance, Pion-Berlin, 1989; Galindo Hernandez, 2005). These military-
dominated states have been by turns labelled ‘Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime’ 
(O'Donnell, 1979) and ‘Terrorist State’ (Rouquié, 1987) among others. However, the most 
accepted term used to describe state structures in this period has been the ‘National 
Security State’: ‘a professionalized military institution wielding a specific doctrine of 
national security that the subjugation of the citizenry to the state could be attempted’ 
(Mares, 2008, p. 386). Violence became a tool to aspire, challenge, and keep political 
power: ‘[it] was based on clear doctrinal guidelines and strategic notions, as in a genuine 
war, but its perverse effects were inevitable in the sense that internal warfare led to state 
terrorism’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 10). The military, during this period, was also 
assigned to domestic security functions or the maintenance of public order. The result, in 
addition to government-led war on civilian populations’ was that a typically Weberian 
definition of state sovereignty and national security was embedded into security thinking 
with a tenacity which outlasted the military dominance of the 20th century. 
Following the end of the Cold War in a post-authoritarian Latin America, violence was 
democratised; appearing ‘as an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of 
goals’ (Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 11). This ‘new violence’ was the product of 
unresolved socio-political and cultural contentions of previous periods and antagonised by 
incomplete post-conflict institutional reforms weakening the rule of law (Ibid.). Public 
security followed in the immediate aftermath of war as a redirection of the neoliberal 
peace. Here, states that had been using violence against their own populations restructured 
to return to the basic security provisions of the neoliberal state. Cognisant of ‘new 
violence’ or ‘common crime’ on the rise that was perceived to extend beyond borders 
(Moodie, 2010), Latin American states began pursuing regional security arrangements to 
enhance cooperation to ballast institutional weaknesses. 
4
  
Latin America’s approach to the state and security shifted again, this time opting for a 
democratic security which continued to place emphasis on the state but with a distinct 
civilian focus as a means to inform their public security projects.
5
 New security and 
defence policies changed the patterns of civilian-military relations, although Pion-Berlin 
argues that the complex nature of the conversion has left scholars ‘justifiably sceptical’ 
(Pion-Berlin, 2001, p. 10). Democratic security is Latin America’s contribution to IR and 
                                                 
4
 State weakness was also a development of the early post-Cold War period in an attempt to explain conflict 
and war in the Third World interpreted as a function of the region’s historical interaction with the 
international system(Tickner, 2003, p. 347)..  
5
 This period is often referred to as a ‘third wave’ of democracy after Huntington’s 1991 pronouncement. 
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security studies, with particular emphases on post-conflict institution strengthening; 
civilian autonomy and control over the military; and, increasing space between Latin 
American efforts and previously dominant American unilateralism (Tickner & Herz, 
2012). Tickner (2015) further argues that democratic security located human need in its 
roots in a manner that preferenced institutional development, democracies, and economies 
that fulfilled the basic needs of the people. In other words, democratic security appeared to 
further the neoliberal project whilst retaining a significant awareness for the individual 
residents of the state. 
Leading into the 21
st
 century, Latin America has entered a new period of theory 
development as it struggles to conceptualise domestic insecurity and transnational threats. 
The region raises a small but significant challenge to the idea of Human Security through 
its nation-state-dominated lens by pursuing both theoretically and politically the idea of 
citizen security. In part, the response is a natural one given that international security 
concerns, like the nuclear disarmament question, pose a challenge BRIC or core countries 
but pale in importance to the domestic security issues driving immediate public and state 
concerns for the everyday realities of small, violent democracies. Furthermore, this builds 
on the previous preference for democratic security as ‘a powerful discourse for talking 
about the affairs of the state and the duty of democratic regimes towards their citizens’ – a 
subtle but important distinction from human security’s responsibility to protect (R2P) 
doctrine (Tickner, 2015). It is to these two concepts of security that this discussion now 
turns. 
2.2.3 Redefining violent threats and security issues 
When considering the rise of human security and the slightly later adoption of citizen 
security, the impact of a myriad of issues that can be constructed as a threat must be 
considered both in scope and scale. During these post-Cold War security iterations, ‘new 
violence’ and ‘common crime’ became structured as security threats through a process of 
what is generally called securitisation. Indeed, the development of human security took 
place in the context of the Copenhagen School’s rise which necessarily encompassed 
connections between crime, violence, and security. Goldstein (2015) argues that these two 
concepts represent both the individual lived experience as well as the practical programme 
of state formation. Both forms represent efforts to widen the conceptualisations of security 
and include a broad range of possible threats thereto. Citizen security focuses on 
insecurities incurred through the disruption of state responsibilities to its residents, often 
through criminal activity, as a new evolution of public security. On the other hand, human 
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security expanded to securitise a broad range of issues that impacted on the individual. 
However, in Latin America, it is citizen security that has been adopted and implemented 
widely whilst human security has remained a largely conceptual term. To unpack the 
reasons for this below presents important revelations on the nature of lived security in the 
region.  
Human Security 
Human Security developed as an important post-conflict term for the developing world. 
The language of human security encapsulates a wide range of applications, definitions, and 
terms. It is generally understood as ‘embodying a merger of ideas of development and 
security’ (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, p. 1) or can even be defined negatively ‘as the 
absence of threat to various core human values’ (Hampson, 2010, p. 231). In some 
interpretations, it represents that ‘our accepted definition of the limits of national security 
as coinciding with national borders is obsolete’ (Matthews, 1989 in Thomas and Tow, 
2002, p. 177) because human security represents global interdependence. Emerging from 
several critiques of Traditional Security, the 1994 UNDP report stated: 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: 
as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of 
national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the 
threat of nuclear holocaust. […] Forgotten were the legitimate 
concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily 
lives. For many of them, security symbolizes protection from the 
threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, 
political repression and environmental hazards. (UNDP, 1994, p. 
22) 
Expanding on the safety of the individual led to a vast number of proposals on the types of 
security which might be included. The UNDP model presented seven fundamental 
categories for consideration in security discussions including: economic, environmental, 
personal, community, health, political, and food. Furthermore, by engaging the 
development community in security discussions, crime, sustainable development, and 
policing join with the UNDP list under human security and it has been argued that this 
variety adds to the appeal of the term. 
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The 1994 UNDP report’s definition is also broad to the extent that it appears that there was 
a distinct disinterest in establishing specific boundaries and it states as much when 
discussing the ‘all-encompassing’ nature of the human security concept (UNDP, 1994, p. 
24). It also recognised that many of the security threats to individuals in developing world 
regions are non-military in nature. Critical securities studies allowed for the need to move 
beyond interstate security considerations, allow the inclusion of security considerations 
outside of the military, and ultimately reconceptualise notions of power balance between 
zones of influence as the prime effective instrument of global powers. In fact, as Acharya 
points out, ‘the logic of accepting a broader notion of security becomes less contestable 
when one looks at the Third World experience’ (Acharya, 1997, p. 304). Here, the state 
becomes only one variable in the wider contemplation of the individual and multilateral 
action where ‘an effective human security approach requires coordination’ (Glasius & 
Kaldor, 2006, p. 12). Furthermore, whereas traditionally the role or responsibility of the 
citizen was to support the state in its interactions with the international system, in human 
security terms, the state must serve the people and promote their safety and wellbeing as 
the conditions for its sovereignty (conditional sovereignty). If the state neglects to fulfil 
certain internationally-set standards of human rights and security welfare, the basic 
standards of sovereignty may be called into question. 
Human security not only enjoys popularity as a gentler, more inclusive form of security 
theory, it has in some ways benefitted from securitisation theory discussions in so far as 
any issue can be securitised. Whereas human security focuses on how security should be 
defined, the Copenhagen School has focused on ‘intersubjective processes’ as well as the 
potential political influences they may have (McDonald, 2010). Securitisation theory is 
good at explaining how a subject became defined as a security concern which defends ‘the 
move from a state-centric model towards a more multifaceted interpretation of security’ 
(Spence, 2012, pp. 189-190). However, the two branches of security theory do not sit 
equally well within the Latin American context.  
Whilst human security often remains at odds with democratic and citizen security 
objectives, securitisation is a strong reality in practice and fits within the state-centrist 
region. In part, this divergent fit is a function of the democratic security concept, defined as 
a ‘[…] more encompassing and positive concept that prioritizes the needs of individuals to 
live in peace and to have access to the economic, political and environmental resources 
required for a dignified existence’ (Somavía & Insulza, 1990, p. 7 quoted in Tickner and 
Herz, 2012, p. 100). It is for this reason that Goldstein (2015) argues that citizen security 
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became a lived concept in Latin America whilst human security remained largely within 
the realm of scholarship. The move to prioritise the rights of the individual was not only an 
embodiment of practical thinking during a post-conflict transition but one which spurred 
the period’s institutional reform and civil-military relations literatures (Ibid.). Unlike in 
human security where humans are considered the referent object, the citizens of democratic 
security are imbued with a nation-state construction, and democratic responsibilities in 
addition to their stipulated rights. Given the aforementioned Latin American persistence of 
a nation-statist identity, democratic security became a powerful model for 21
st
 century 
engagements with the structures inherent in security governance for the region and a 
unique contribution.  
Citizen security 
If democratic security is a structure to conceptualise governance, then citizen security may 
be considered the referent object. A post-Cold War security crisis across the region was 
based on real indicators and fuelled by media and rumour that provoked a new climate of 
fear and uncertainty (Hume, 2009; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Moodie, 2010). Rebuilding 
states lacked the ability to address the security crisis and neoliberal reforms appeared to be 
reducing the capacity of state institutions typically expected to provide the basic support to 
a country’s members. It was in this environment, that citizen security really emerged – as 
an idea to provoke an image of the threat and the means to counter risk. The term’s organic 
growth took place within a specific historical context in response to the region’s need for 
theories of security which help illustrate their reality. Although citizen security did not 
appear in the 1995 Framework Treaty or in the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas, it has enjoyed steady growth in scholarship 
and national parlance since 1975, with exponential growth from the end of the Cold War in 
1990, (Gómez, 2015). References to citizen security can be found in Spanish laws dating 
back to 1986 but it is its early impact on Spanish-language scholarship which is 
noteworthy (Arriagada & Godoy, 2000; Brysk, 2003; Carrion, 2002; Dammert, 2004; Rico 
& Chinchilla, 2002; Rivera Vélez, 2008; WOLA, 1998). Not only does the idea of citizen 
security feed into internal policy guidelines for police forces in Latin America, used to 
‘generate a new vision’ to move beyond the repression of authoritarian-era institutions, but 
it drove literature on civil-police reforms, de- and re-militarisation of security operations, 
and research on public perceptions of security institutions.  
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This security paradigm therefore invokes government responsibilities from a time when 
governments were just relearning what that meant. However, it extends to the individual 
citizens themselves, implying that they have both rights and responsibilities of their own. 
As such, it can be argued that the idea of citizen security in the post-Cold War era sought 
to re-establish understanding of the rights and responsibilities within a democratic society. 
Citizen security is emblematic of a post-colonial Latin America that sought to mitigate the 
long state neglect of citizens, with a particular acknowledgement that certain sectors of 
society were de facto second-class (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007; Peetz & Huhn, 2008). In this 
perspective, citizen security is ‘used to establish a conceptual link between poverty, 
exclusion, state failure and violence’ (Ibid., 2007, p. 12). Gómez observes that concept of 
the citizen ‘resonates with the idea of (re)construction of their nation’s historical 
articulation, and, furthermore, reflects in practice the actions of citizen security […]’ 
(Gómez, 2015, p. 34). Citizen security introduces considerations of rights and 
responsibilities whilst it narrows the concept of human security’s ‘freedom of individuals 
and communities from threats posed by conflict and violence to their physical, social or 
cultural integrity or survival,’ (Ibid., p. 13); thus providing a unique location for the state 
and the region to cover this extended range of threats and vulnerabilities. Violence in this 
frame is seen as a state’s failure of its governance responsibilities. 
Peetz and Huhn (2008) argue that citizen security has become a comfortable term for 
governments and other actors due to its connotations of prevention and relatively liberal 
approach to the violence and security facing Central America despite empirical evidence 
indicating most countries’ citizen security policies are on the whole repressive with little 
real consideration given to citizens. Call and Stanley (2001) term the division of 
responsibilities as public security rather than citizen security thereby inclusively discussing 
all existing security relationships within the borders of a given state but also allowing for 
reference to individuals without specifically having to deal with precise borders. In the 
context of post-civil war, re-stabilising societies, they discuss how the experience for 
civilians is notably insecure, ‘often as an increase in violent crime’ (Call & Stanley, 2001, 
p. 151). Thus, despite the widening definitions of threats, risks, and causes of insecurity, 
most stay within demarcated perimeters when discussing security definitions, policies, and 
strategies or a repackaged focus ‘in order to quantify what could be measured,’ according 
to MacFarlane and Weiss (1994, p. 278).  
Encouraged by the development-friendly idea of measurements contained within citizen 
security, the UN has adopted the term in its Latin America strategy. Specifically, a 2009 
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United Nations Development Programme report for Latin America elaborated that citizen 
security is the principal form of human security and guarantees its fundamental human 
rights (PNUD, 2009a). This is not to say that citizen security is an unknown value in other 
parts of the globe but rather that it has gained almost universal acceptance on the continent 
and represents a contribution that Latin America brings to other regions, like south-east 
Asia. Citizen security is thus also a term that can be operationalised for policy building and 
programme formation. Arriagada and Godoy (2000), for example, note that policies in this 
frame have the potential to generate new, more integral approaches for greater citizen 
security beyond the typical control and repression tools. Policies developed under this 
theory framework would, they propose, lead to improved results in addressing violence and 
delinquency. In particular, after positioning violence and delinquency as ‘multi-
dimensional phenomena’ they note that ‘there is a growing recognition of the need to carry 
out multidimensional programmes combining both control and preventive measures’ (Ibid., 
p. 123). Rivera Vélez (2008) argues that citizen security has expanded beyond narrow 
security institution or specific government entities to join a deliberative field comprised of 
a diversity of social and institutional actors so that politics, economics, and governance 
issues are acknowledged for their inherent security risks, complex relationships, and both 
domestic and international impacts.   
Goldstein (2015) observes that this language has been adopted not only by scholars and 
policy officials but by average citizens as a means to identify their own rights and inform 
their struggle for the guarantee of those rights under a democratic rule of law. However, 
the term has also become significantly associated with policing within these states in a 
neoliberal turn on the interpretation of a narrow set of responsibilities of the state. 
Goldstein observes that barrio residents have used this language to challenge the state to do 
more in the basic provisioning of security (Ibid.). However, citizens also may take this one 
step further: ‘the perceived need to create citizen security seems to authorize people to take 
often violent measures to deal with crime in their neighbourhoods’ (Ibid.). Strangely, 
citizen security as an active concept may create more violent actors in an effort to 
implement security against the specific perpetrators framed by the term. An emphasis on 
rights, responsibilities, and laws in this approach to citizen security preferences security 
solutions to a defined set of issues, of which ‘the criminal’ becomes a primary source of 
risk. Goldstein notes that extrapolation on this approach also allows the state leeway to 
operate in spaces of exception in order to create the demanded law and order (Ibid.). 
Ultimately, this can create justification for the remilitarisation of policing in which security 
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forces use increasing violence against criminal risks (Ibid.). What was a term that emerged 
out of the desire to reference the individual and shore up the democratic rights and 
responsibilities of citizens within a state may prove to be a useful tool for increasingly 
hard-line policies. Indeed, the Latin American creation of a citizen security construct may 
lie at the heart of why these states are able to apply both hard-line operations and 
prevention programming as simultaneous endeavours.  
Perverse state formation and violent pluralities 
This violent space created by citizen security falls within Pearce’s ideas of perverse state 
formation where the democratic state builds its authority through the provision of specific 
types of security (Pearce, 2010). Similar to Goldstein’s interpretation of citizen security 
which presents the constructed violent threat of criminals as a primary security risk, Pearce 
finds that categories of individuals within the state fall outside the rights and 
responsibilities accorded to citizens to become non-citizens and justifiable if not legitimate 
targets of abuse (Goldstein, 2015; Pearce, 2010). Arias and Goldstein (2010) challenge the 
relationship of crime, violence, and democracy, arguing that violent pluralism ‘helps us 
develop a fuller conception of what relationships civil society and violent actors maintain 
to one another and to different elements of the state’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. L494). 
Rather than a failure of the rule of law to which the state is supposed to respond, the 
violence enacted in public spaces may be an evolution from the cultural adoption of citizen 
security concepts. In this approach, Pearce’s non-citizens may still be considered citizens 
but they have different rights in a society that has a growing ‘tolerance for privatised 
violence’ (Ibid., p. L606). It is precisely these relationships that raise questions on the 
governance practices that unite these polity members. 
As this section demonstrates, the evolution of violence and security in Latin America is 
intimately linked with situated conceptions on the nature of the state and its 
responsibilities. A post conflict peace-building enterprise initiated the broadening of 
security definitions in the name of rights leading to the development of a democratic 
security uniquely Latin American (Tickner, 2015; Tickner & Herz, 2012). At the same 
time, the emerging concept of citizen security appears to be a product of this understanding 
of democratic responsibility, becoming a conceptual framework, security measurement 
tool, protest platform, and response structure. As Goldstein concludes, it has further been 
culturally adopted as ‘a language for thinking and talking about security’ (Goldstein, 
2015). Human security has never enjoyed the same level of engagement and remains 
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perhaps too nebulous to be of use in a region where security theory is distinctively 
practical and seeks to solve policy problems (Tickner & Herz, 2012). However, citizen 
security as a governance mechanism also opens the door to specific manners of operations 
and policy directions. Indeed, it may provide the justifications for specifically un-
democratic acts in the name of security governance. It is to issues of governance that this 
chapter now turns. 
2.3 From Government to Governance Hybridity 
Citizen security expands the issues typically considered to be security threats within a 
conceptual framework of transgression against the rights of citizens. Diverse actors 
negotiate what constitutes those rights, who supplies the security to confront those 
transgressions, and what form those actions will take. However, how are these actors and 
the spaces they have created actually governed? What do these concepts of security and 
responsibility mean for policy? This section begins by introducing the government – 
governance continuum. It then discusses governance in multi-level and multi-lateral 
contexts followed by an examination of governance scholarship for Latin America. 
Building on the concepts of citizen security in the previous section, the governance 
discussion concludes with observations on the importance of scale and space in the 
analysis of violence, security, and governance.  
It has become widely accepted that internal and external dimensions of security are 
inextricably intertwined between cities, states, regions and, to some extent, globally. How 
the governance of this security reality occurs in practice remains nebulous. Where 
government was once a narrowly specified assembly of activities with a set of authorised 
participants and privileged interests, the flexibilisation of institutional structures has 
allowed for the notion that the state is only one actor among many operating to provide 
security, conflict organisation, and social services (Boege, et al., 2009). Governance no 
longer represents just a synonym of government and little more than its basic definition as 
‘a new process of governing’ (Rhodes, 1996). In its place, Hufty proposes that  
[G]overnance does not presuppose vertical authority and regulatory 
power as the concept of “political system” and the traditional idea 
of “politics” do. It refers to formal and informal, vertical and 
horizontal processes, with no a priori preference. (Hufty, 2011, p. 
405) 
P r i e s  | 43 
 
Despite the variety of meanings applied to the term ‘governance’ (Rhodes, 1996), the 
‘baseline’ term makes reference to the ‘development of governing styles in which 
boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred’ (Stoker, 
1998, p. 17). The first point of discussion is theory which addresses the necessary features 
that separate it from other conceptualisations. A second aspect to governance is analytical 
in how governance frameworks are recognised in a manner which confirms their existence. 
Are they constructed for purpose or do they emerge organically for specific issues and 
withdraw when those needs are met? Finally, there exists the normative aspect to the term 
which imbues judgement as to whether a particular governance approach is desirable, 
relevant, or significant (Piattoni, 2010). The governance concept became a framework for 
security studies analysis in this research to analyse the spaces important to security 
practice. 
Mainstream realist and liberal approaches tend to deal best in known entities of 
governments or states and the international as represented by IO which limits their abilities 
to deal with the non-traditional security threats that comprise this thesis’ case studies. 
Hybrid and multi-lateral forms of governance allow greater flexibility and also provide 
analysis of practical applications which are not always a priority in the more traditional 
branches. Regional governance, like the international, is competent with its analysis of 
state systems and sovereignty (Oelsner, 2009). As is typical of governance literatures, 
however, regional governance places the state as only one of a range of actors which 
include civil society, regional and supranational organisations, NGOs, and private business 
interests (Grugel, 2005; Phillips, 2001; Oelsner, 2009). In order to properly consider the 
range of individual actors in addition to the entities contributing to security governance in 
Central America, social contestation-sensitive theories also need to be included here. 
Traditional realist, liberal, and constructivist labels tend to minimize these considerations. 
Thus, neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist approaches round out governance theories by 
presenting interests competition, ideological clashes, and relationship dynamics as they 
affect the ‘uneven, unstable and contradictory nature of governance outcomes’ (Hameiri & 
Jones, 2015, p. L.412). Ultimately, none of these sub-sections of global governance quite 
address the complex formal actor interactions observed whilst researching this thesis in El 
Salvador. The manner of operation and contestation perceived was neither as fluid nor 
haphazard as poststructuralists sketch and neo-Gramscian theory is more organised and 
coherent than the diversity of entities working on the plethora of initiatives allow. 
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Power dynamics can never be underestimated in the study of governance but whom or 
what wields that power is hotly disputed. Realist scholar Sterling-Folker is decisive in his 
pronouncement that ‘global governance will always be produced by the choices and 
actions of…relatively powerful groups’ (Sterling-Folker, 2005, p. 23). Groups in this case 
are more likely to be states because other entities are considered to lack authority and 
thereby lack power, rendering international cooperation improbable. Realist scholar 
Morgenthau illustrates the perspective in broad strokes: IO are mechanisms to be 
influenced and directed by states without changing the basic character of the international 
system (Morgenthau, 1967 as discussed in Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 46). Hameiri and 
Jones observe that realists ignore how different entities within the state ‘may have, and 
pursue, different interests’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2015, p. L.866). In contrast, liberal global 
governance scholars argue that cooperation is entirely possible because, whilst power 
matters, the rules and institutions which comprise global governance will provide restraint; 
entities will learn from these interactions and modify their behaviour accordingly (Abbott 
& Snidal, 2009; Karns & Mingst, 2010; Tavares, 2010). A key difference from the realists 
is that undercurrents of domestic politics and vested interest may be essential for 
successful negotiation in international agreements (Linos, 2007). Neoliberalists like 
Keohane (1986) argue that cooperation is in the best interests of individual states and that 
these relationships become more productive over the long-term with regular interactions. 
Still, neoliberals tend to treat the public as a whole or as divided between those who seek 
to disrupt the system and the rest. 
The international regime framework also falls within the greater liberal theory and their 
examination of issue areas where regimes have not developed is illustrative for two 
reasons. First, regimes are perceived as deliberate constructions intended to remove 
specific issues by creating ‘shared expectations about appropriate behavior’ (Hasenclever, 
et al., 2000, p. 3). However, the issue of studying where regimes did not arise indicates a 
lack of sensitivity to the region or topic specific regimes developed in a manner or with a 
structure outside of those conceived in core states. Furthermore, the focus on IO and 
institutions created in a formal capacity tends to limit analysis of state transformation in 
response to changing issues and climate demands. Constructivists acknowledge the 
socially constructed nature of state interests and the accompanying potential for state 
transformation through changing ideas and ideologies of individuals (Adler & Greve, 
2009; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Norm changes, as instigated by 
activist individuals can successfully bring about change to an international issue and trench 
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a new manner of approach whether that is legislation, regulations, or behaviours. 
Institutions remain important in so far as they are the formal locus for the agreed-upon 
norms. Multilateralism is particularly important to this theory and underwrites support for 
contested actions like humanitarian interventions (Finnemore, 2003). Whilst constructivist 
theory is helpful to the overall argument in this thesis, in its acceptance of new forms of 
governance and the importance it places on the influence of individuals in international 
norms negotiations, it is not able to help illuminate inconsistency in results among issues 
acceptance. Hameiri and Jones correctly argue that issues framing and the empowerment 
of experts must be situated within the greater power and resource structure of the 
international (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Karns and Mingst add their concerns that, if 
individuals and experts hold the stated influence with IO or a state, the relationship could 
equally be pursued in a negative manner and contrary to the requests of their constituents 
(Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 52). Thus, Neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist approaches to 
governance are more useful to empirical studies like this one. 
Multiple references have already been made throughout this chapter to the idea of scale as 
a framing reference for interested entity interactions and governance mechanisms for 
security. Scale becomes especially important when referring to new forms of security risk 
or non-traditional security threats which likely expand beyond the bounds of the state 
(Hameiri & Jones, 2015); transnational criminal trafficking of contraband or persons, for 
example. Violence and crime may have nodes of expression that are at once both urban and 
trans-boundary. Furthermore, the multi-actor processes may address non-state actors 
causing governance issues through norms violation but may also include solutions from 
non-state actors as co-regulators or as executing implementation strategies (Jakobi & Wolf, 
2013b). In Latin America, attempts to include non-state actors in the process of non-
traditional security solutioning has realised a small but notable shift away from advocacy-
led action into professional agencies paid to implement regulations, policies, or other 
strategies in what was once a typical government realm. This is not to say that non-state 
actors do not play a role in traditional security activities but rather that these roles have 
evolved. Jakobi and Wolf observe that previously non-state actors are likely to be brought 
in by fragile states where ‘governmental activity is weak, ineffective, or non-existent’ to 
compensate for a particular weakness (Ibid., p. 263). In emerging fields of security, non-
state actors are more likely to be an integral part of the process where ‘state activity alone 
would not be effective’ (Ibid.). As such, not only are we looking at a rescaling of various 
parts of state governance operations but the creation of new spaces which consider 
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delegation a constructive tool rather than a resort measure. At the same time, non-state 
actor delegation has its own set of weaknesses, not least those of long-term commitment 
concerns, limited responsibility to the citizen population, and potential operations overlap.  
Although both globalisation and regional security literatures have expanded the 
understanding of multilateralism to include non-state actors, they generally remain 
horizontal in their analysis and do not include sub-national or urban entities. Sperling 
observes that state responses to a range of challenges, both domestic and international, will 
have an impact on global governance cooperation (Sperling, 2013). However, Felício’s 
description of security governance as moving beyond the traditional security issues to 
‘governance in a network that includes the different actors engaged in security’ is a 
descriptive definition which does not elaborate on the action that draws these actors 
together (Felício, 2007, p. 55 quoted in Lucarelli et al., 2013, p. 2). Lucarelli et al. observe 
that because a single sense of security governance no longer exists in practice, multilateral 
security governance illustrates the need for fluidity among different actors at various levels 
according to the demands of a specific security topic:  
This implies not only a multilevel approach, but also a recognition 
that multilateralism involves the coordinated management and 
regulation of security issues by different kinds of non-state actors, 
such as global and regional organizations or non-governmental 
actors, that operate alongside state actors. (Lucarelli, et al., 2013) 
Although non-state and non-governmental actors feature, power dynamics and competing 
ideologies embodied in individual power interactions are neglected; in this light, 
multilateralism remains more a system or set of process structures. In a liberalist sense, 
multilateralism or transgovernmental networks acknowledge internal state normative 
changes as a function of these operations but place this in a context of interdependence and 
unaccountable expert networks without considering the political implications (Hameiri & 
Jones, 2015; Kennedy, 2005). Even in Smillie’s analysis of human security in multilateral 
security governance, whilst addressing the ‘actual lives of ordinary people’, new 
multilateralisms focus on actor diversity as entities and not individual potential for 
changing the nature of the interactions (Smillie, 2006, p. 11). In answering queries as to 
whether actor individuals actively contribute to the production of governance or whether it 
is something that emerges as unintended consequences (Britz & Ojanen, 2009), 
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multilateralism falls short on both the breadth of potential sources for contributing actors 
and sociological/power dynamics as contributing variables. 
Regional governance theories are sometimes included in multilateralism and have become 
increasingly common in conjunction with global and security governance theories in the 
post-Cold War period (MacFarlane, 2014). Others position regionalism as a kind of 
‘decentred globalism’ (Buzan, 2011) or as ‘regional worlds’ (Acharya, 2014). In Ulrich 
Beck’s terms, ‘debounded’ risks, or in the more common ‘non-traditional security’, there 
are threats which are unable to be contained by traditional, territorial boundaries and so 
must be dealt with either on different levels or within different socio-political spheres – 
which may contain a great diversity of actors (Herz, 2014). Regions in this concept are a 
geographical frame of reference beyond the nation-state formed as a social space for 
‘interactions that generate governance’ but they are also inherently state-led enterprises in 
a wider process involving both state and non-state actors with ‘several locations for 
authority’ (Ibid., p. 237). It is this multiplicity of actors that brings regional governance 
into the realm of multi-level or multi-layered governance. On the one hand, regional 
governance theory – including multilateralism to an extent – has grown as scholars discuss 
the erosion of the concept of sovereignty and see it as a limit on sovereign authority 
through policy and other governing mechanisms. At the same time, regional governance 
has been theorised as a mechanism whereby global governance institutions and core states 
can contribute to governance changes of a, usually, peripheral geographic collection of 
states. Conversely, states included in those regional governance bodies on the global 
periphery may use a regional governing body to leverage power to promote aligned 
interests globally to give them more political heft (Acharya, 2011). Therefore, the latter 
theory allows the collective to manage some interactions with externalities as well as 
structure issues-specific relations within the region (Nolte, 2014). Regions are also porous 
social entities which fluctuate in their official membership depending on national political 
will and bilateral conflicts between members (Weiffen, et al., 2013).  
In Latin America, scholars have questioned whether, in the post-Cold War period, a 
proliferation of overlapping regional organisations, some of which deal only with security 
issues, is still evolving and strengthening security governance in a hybrid approach 
(Sanahuja, 2010) or whether fragmentation and hemispheric disintegration will result 
(Malamud & Gardini, 2012). In support of the first proposal, Riggirozzi and Tussie argue 
that ‘regional governance is currently the result of a mosaic where different regional 
policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation and competition are 
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transforming the cartography itself’ (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012, p. 10). Both Malamud and 
Gardini (2012) and Comini and Frenkel (2014) perceive more problems and potential for 
hemispheric disjuncture in the multiple overlapping memberships enjoyed by various Latin 
American states. Regionalism is discussed not only in terms of cooperation or governance 
architectures but in terms of integration. In Central America, integration ideals are written 
into national constitutions as an idea for which to strive in what Caballero identifies as the 
Central American ‘binary identity’ […]: 
a national and regional identity in which the latter is activated once 
national problems cannot be dealt with domestically […where] the 
inability of a country to find solutions to an issue at the national 
level may trigger the regional identity and thus lead it to search for 
answers at the bilateral or regional level. (Caballero, 2009, p. 56) 
In other words, integration becomes feasible where the situation of crime, violence, and 
security necessitates joint action in the face of individual state weakness or impotence. 
However, in practice, regional activities take on a more functional, collaborative role 
through ad hoc consensus between elites (Malamud, 2002) and bilateral agreements 
between states (Grugel, 2004) but which avoid long-term binding agreements. Discussions 
of new regionalism, which took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Grugel, et al., 
1999; Wyatt-Walter, 1995), considered integration ‘as a state strategy designed to 
minimize risks in the uncertain conditions of economic globalization by promoting 
activities at the meso-level of the region’ (Grugel, 2004, p. 605). 
Approaching this idea from a slightly alternative angle, Caballero (2009) argues that 
individual Central American states will turn to regional integration and the potential 
strengths therein as a means of last resort. However, Nolte questions whether too much 
emphasis is being placed on the spectrum bookended by regional integration and regional 
cooperation within regional governance theories and instead proposes that new concept 
alternatives may be required to address something more structured than cooperation but 
less binding than full regional integration; Nolte proposes regional governance 
(‘gobernanza regional’) as the best fit (Nolte, 2014). Clearly defined,  
regional governance refers to international 
institutions/organizations and normative/ideational constructs as 
well as to the process that creates these institutions and norms. 
Regional governance is essentially, but not exclusively, based on 
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intergovernmental regional organizations. It is not restricted to a 
single organization but refers to the set of relevant regional 
organizations and their interaction patterns. (Nolte, 2014, p. 7) 
As such, Latin American forms of regional governance do not clearly map onto European 
Union structures as structural transfer or copied architecture but reflect an independent 
trajectory where a proliferation of cooperative and competing regional institutions may 
continue political dialogue even in the face of divisions and competition (Ibid.). Regional 
governance debates are also framed within security governance discussions.  
2.4 Operationalising Security Governance 
At first glance, multi-level governance appears to be the vertical edition of multilateralism, 
concentrated on analysing policy- and decision-making strategies across different tiers of 
government. On the one hand, this analysis structure aids in discussing ‘internal and 
external dimensions […which] have become inextricably linked’ (Schroeder, 2011, p. 1). 
On the other, the term is deceptively simple and covers a multitude of agendas and levels 
of characterisations. In giving multi-level governance definition and variables through 
which it can be identified, the theory also poses questions as to its relevance and 
significance ultimately parsing potential state transformations (Piattoni, 2010). Typically 
accepted forms of state transformation through multi-level governance mechanisms 
include aspects of ‘political mobilization, authoritative decision-making, and institutional 
articulation’ and take into account politics, policy, and operational dimensions (Ibid., pp. 
8-9). Thus, not only are the decision-making powers of institutions influenced by experts 
or advocates taken into account as in multilateralism, but the three ‘conceptual planes’ are 
analysed in relation to each other (Ibid.). This results in not only a top-down theory but one 
which incorporates below-up analyses as well as those from within the existing system. 
Issues of coordination, issue-steering, and both institutional and democratic accountability 
are raised as governance in practice. Although the national government retains ultimate 
responsibility for policy, each actor brings their own set of interests, networks, and 
ideologies or discourse-framing to the process (see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 2-1: Overlapping and competing challenges and issues in multi-level governance (Adapted 
from: Smith, 2006, p. 11) 
 
The above diagram is a schematic framework of variables influencing issues-specific 
multi-level interactions. Not only does it illustrate that the challenges of diverse actor goals 
and mobilisation interact with operational coordination and issues-development 
frameworks, it also attempts to place these interactions in a multi-level structure where 
issues interactions take place on multiple levels with a plethora of actors simultaneously 
along with the potential for overlap. These structures are not always organised nor 
formalised and so, as Flemes and Radseck argue for security governance in Latin America, 
these structures are ‘characterised by a higher degree of fragmentation and complexity’ 
today than during the Cold War (Flemes & Radseck, 2012, p. 6). Thereby, they include 
both inter-governmental and inter-entity interactions and relationships where municipal 
authorities have the potential to engage with supranational or IO for direct coordination on 
specific topics (Peters & Pierre, 2002). Furthermore, Marks argued that there was a distinct 
lack of attention to ‘flesh and blood’ actors, thus proposing the necessary addition of ‘real 
life’ through visions, goals, passions, and interests as a third paradigm ‘autonomous 
explanatory force’ in multi-level governance (Marks, 1992; 1993; 1996 discussed in 
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Piattoni, 2010, pp. 17-18). Hooghe focused specifically on multi-level structuring as a 
means for considering regional mobilisations (Hooghe, 1995). Elsewhere, these forces 
have been described as the ‘open method of coordination’ where research and innovation 
for policies can be conducted through ‘an informal organisational framework for mutual 
policy learning’ (Boerzel & Risse, 2001; Kaiser & Prange, 2004) or as a form of policy 
transfer (Radaelli, 2000).  
In many European cases, multi-level governance has not been found to significantly 
challenge the overall pre-eminence of the central state authority even as sub-national 
entities actively join and contribute to a multi-level polity (Scherpereel, 2007). However, 
multi-level governance efficiencies remain questionable and many policy results are non-
binding and so, in the European case at least, its strengths remain greatest when applied to 
the definition of targets or as a basis for policy learning and transfer (Kaiser & Prange, 
2003). A particular benefit of multi-level governance theory is its perspective on polity 
structuring which, taking its basis in cohesion theory also spans different levels of analysis 
with the frustrating result that numerous literatures spanning governance, state 
transformation, international relations, and policy-making need to be included in this 
analysis (Piattoni, 2010, pp. 22-23). In particular, state transformation or restructuring as 
developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001; 2002) and Hameiri and Jones (2015) attempted to 
define new spaces within intergovernmental relations. In summary, multi-level governance 
takes place on several plains. It is an analysis of the theoretical mechanisms of governance: 
‘a diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation 
among formally independent but functionally interdependent entities that stand in complex 
relations to one another’ (Piattoni, 2010, p. 26). At the same time, its analysis must also be 
multi-levelled because the very interactions exhibited by multi-level governance raise 
different types of questions about ‘politics, policy and polity’ (Ibid.).   
Multi-level governance has also proved capable of examining state-society or public-
private relations within a regional context, most typically the EU, as a ‘composite polity’ 
(te Brake, 1997). Tarrow draws connections between the multi-level EU interactions of 
state-society relations with early modern Europe where leagues of cities or city states saw 
jurisdictional overlap with political and ecclesiastical institutions but where ordinary 
people could occasionally ‘exercise influence over their fate’ (Tarrow, 2001, p. 242). As 
such, ‘regional governments, political parties, and even social movements are reaching 
across territories to increase their leverage against both national states and supranational 
authorities’ (Ibid., p. 243).  It will fall to the empirical chapters in this thesis to provide 
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analysis on, (1) whether and in what manner multiple levels of government are 
simultaneously involved in security policy development; (2) to what extent non-
governmental actors both civil and private are included at different governmental levels 
and whether their contributions are given greater weight at one level or another; and, (3) 
whether these processes noticeably impact the outcomes (after Piattoni, 2010, pp. 83-85). 
Multilateralism, regional governance theories, and multi-level theories overlap in their 
attempts to conceptualise governance architectures involving a broad range of actors. Each 
body of literature attempts to make sense of a specific political space as coordinated 
solutions are sought for specific issues. As has been demonstrated, each has its own 
approach to the analysis of contributing entities but it is the multi-level governance 
theories which expand on the social-power dynamics in a manner which will be 
particularly illustrative for the empirical chapters of this thesis. The role of regional 
organisations in multilateral and multi-level structures also has particular consequences for 
a Latin American, and Central American, security agenda and so it is to security 
governance that this discussion now turns. 
2.4.1 Security governance 
Security governance, building on the changes of processes, conditions and methods of 
governance, is a concept but also a tool for analysis and understanding the policy 
developed within and across specific socio-geographic spaces or governance structures. 
Within security governance, as in almost all governance theories, it is immediately obvious 
that it has been developed, on the whole, for the European Union and the trans-Atlantic 
community. Chanona (2011) opens by stating that he is ‘adopting the regional security 
governance model […] for the study of the European Union’ for his work on the 
Organization of American States (OAS); many others have done the same, exporting EU-
style theories and mechanisms into other regional contexts (Hameiri & Jones, 2015). Some 
scholars have gone so far to declare the EU as an ‘ideal case’ for security governance 
theory (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007b; Wagnsson, et al., 2009; Schroeder, 2011). Thus, the 
field is both complicated and limited in the richness of its theory by its EU-style 
governance framework; explaining this further, Hameiri and Jones note: ‘when looking for 
security governance elsewhere, the absence of EU-style multilateralism is taken to indicate 
an absence of security governance’ (2015, p. L.731). Other scholars posit that security 
governance is not a full-fledged body of theory in and of itself but rather a ‘heuristic 
device’ with core characteristics as well as numerous contributing structures or variables 
that can be highlighted or minimised as required (Kirchner & Sperling, 2007b). 
Nonetheless, the field is useful for its engagement with and challenging of the nation-state 
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and associated top-down military security. Security governance allows for greater 
engagement with and framing of the numerous mechanisms which may once have been 
exceptional measures but now figure regularly in a multi-lateral security environment. 
First, security governance challenges realist and liberal perspectives on security 
management in the global arena (Bevir & Hall, 2013). Like other forms of governance 
theory, it expands the circle of actors included for consideration in security discussions and 
also examines the informal and flexible working structures (Ibid.). Security theory allows 
for spheres of domestic security including governments and non-government actors to be 
considered in conjunction with the international sphere and its linkages with NGOs, 
international institutions, epistemic communities, and others (Krahmann, 2003). The 
literature includes dynamics of security policy development and sketches relationships 
between different actors and forums. In a world where the concept of human security and 
universal norms were growing in acceptance, security governance emerged as a sort of 
‘common purpose’ or a ‘normative consensus’ to which a universal good could appeal 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005). From the inside, whereas security policy was the work and 
responsibility of governments, security governance is often used to point at the 
shortcomings of the nation-state, at frail, fragile, or failing states which require other 
sources of authority - usually outside itself - in order to maintain security, and at 
transnational risks too large for the state alone. Globally, security is no longer just security 
studies or international relations; it combines with social science undertakings and includes 
public administration theories and policy development theories in a move towards state 
transformation theories. Thus it remains flexible enough to allow for both governance 
without government but also governance by governments in overlapping contexts (Zuern, 
1998). Thus, within the security governance literature, security is not only contested as a 
concept but the manner in which security is provided and created has been increasingly 
diverse. 
Security governance rose to prominence in the face of increasingly varied security policy 
literature as expanding security issues challenged states as the primary providers of 
security both domestically and in the global realm. It has been explored in both 
globalisation and cosmopolitan theories since the end of the Cold War and particularly 
within responses to perceived growing interdependence of international systems. 
Multilateralism found security governance to be a useful tool in approaching the security 
portion of various inter-cooperative agencies whilst regional, multi-level governance 
literatures added security to the number of issues addressed across vertical networks in an 
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‘enforced cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2006; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006). In particular, 
it has highlighted the fragmented approaches to security taken within the EU and in other 
security communities around the world (Adler & Greve, 2009). Constructivists and 
poststructuralists stress the social meanings and discursive construction of security threats, 
as in securitisation theory, that provides the structure to security threat perceptions and 
resulting policy responses in a manner which rejects the ‘apolitical, neutral description of 
an objective reality ‘“out there”’ (Ehrhart, et al., 2014b, p. 150). However, Ehrhart et al. 
(2014b) argue that this accepted approach to security governance has been too functional 
in its mapping of security arrangements, discussing actors and their contributions without 
identifying its essential characteristics. Instead, they reframe security governance as ‘a 
critical tool’ which allows scholars to better understand the practices of security provision.  
A significant observation is that the majority of security governance literature attempts to 
engage in problem-solving rather than critical analysis; the mapping of trends to respond to 
non-traditional security threats rather than the analysis of its characteristics – its 
prerequisites, structures, and consequences (Ehrhart, et al., 2014b). As one example of this 
security governance as a critical tool, Adler and Greve (2009) take the theoretical 
constructs of ‘balance of power’ and ‘security community’ and focus on their mechanisms 
as structures in regional security governance; they examine the consequences of overlap 
between the two. They explain their rationale as such: ‘by focusing on the overlap of 
different kinds of security governance systems, and the practices that go with them, we 
may be able to get a better idea of the structural determinants of security policies’ (Adler & 
Greve, 2009, p. 62). Out of this, states and non-state actors together have begun to 
construct new practices, both formal and informal, and fragment into ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ for participation in institutions as well as the formation and adoption of particular 
policies or strategies.  
The ‘new security governance’ as termed by Bevir and Hall (2013) is evidenced by the 
changing roles and functions of key security institutions (structure, consequences). 
Additionally, it is evidenced by the changing responsibility divisions between public and 
private actors, networks which now work in conjunction ‘to build policy coordination 
through persuasion and norm-setting’ (Ibid., p. 27). Bevir and Hall argue that the theory 
has expanded beyond the typical EU focus to become global in its scholarly focus, 
acknowledging the strategic partnerships and informal networks at play in diverse regions. 
However, by expanding security governance literature particular concerns arise over 
democratic responsibility and accountability to the citizens and other residents in the 
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geographic or conceptual area for which the governance is responsible. Like other 
literatures on governance, an immediate concern in this section is affording too much 
responsibility and decision-making power to non-democratic entities, expert networks, or 
private entities. Some theorists note with concern the trend towards security governance, 
even those including multiple level networked interactions beyond multilateralism, because 
of the perceived reduced influence. Indeed Lea and Stenson (2007) argue that these state-
responsibility reductions have been associated with the rise of non-traditional governance 
powers ‘from below’ including the appropriation of state security functions by non-norm 
conforming entities like criminals, gangs, and other terror-style operatives. In this way, 
security governance is not democratised influence but rather ‘state displacement’; the 
participation of non-state actors is seen as a weakness rather than with the typical 
assumption of strength in approach diversity. Thus, the ‘assurance, prevention, protection 
and compellence’ positives are balanced with concerns over democratic deficit, limited or 
negative efficiency, and non-norm conforming influences. However, despite the concerns 
of non-norm conforming entities with ‘bottom-up’ influence, most of such frameworks are 
considered positive for their multi-conceptual perspective that allows for issues-specific 
concerns to be addressed and are particularly endorsed by the EU who sees the inclusion of 
a broad range of society-based actors as a means to diversify implementation and oversight 
mechanisms (Aris & Wenger, 2014; Grugel, 2004). 
This section ends with comments on the problems created by security governance with its 
focus on the regional context. In core scholarship, when diminished state responsibility is 
observed, either through actor diversification (liberalisation of state responsibilities) or 
through state weakness (generally considered the domain of the periphery or non-core 
countries), the typical response of theorists is to look for security governance changes at a 
supranational collaborative level (Risse, 2011). Sub-state entities and actors are generally 
considered only in as much as they contribute to state-level dialogues or regional bodies. 
Non-state actors are thought to be particularly relied upon in those cases where regional or 
global institutional mechanisms have not yet been fully developed. The exceptions to this 
are where the governance of violence and crime in addition to security is considered. 
Jakobi and Wolf (2013a) discuss these threats and this diverse actor base in terms of 
International Relations – linking the change to the inclusion of human security concepts – 
and of domestic security governance through the balance of national and individual 
security threats. In particular, the ability of non-state actors to act as social-service 
providers in spaces of limited state power represents sub-state actor responsibilities in 
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numerous security environment examples. It is through their delineation of non-state actors 
that sub-state or urban security gets a toe hold in the wider field of security governance.  
Herr (2013) examines security governance as it reacts to armed conflicts within the 
territory of a single state. She notes how, in the context of International Humanitarian Law 
and other international laws applicable to armed conflict, the main implementation 
mechanisms are still state-centred. As compliance at the territorial state and local levels 
have almost always been difficult to achieve, Herr proposes that the recognition of armed 
combatants, individuals, and groups in some capacity encourages their compliance and that 
the inclusion of non-governmental actors such as NGOs can sometimes bring about 
compliance through their roles as intermediaries (Ibid.). In introducing two forms of non-
governmental actors – non-norm conforming combatants who transform into norm-
implementers and norm setting actors who act as intermediaries or even co-regulators in 
the transformation process – Herr demonstrates just how difficult the conceptualisation of 
non-security actors can be. Within the very small urban security governance literature, 
similar questions are raised as to who authorises security and who should be authorising or 
taking responsibility for security (Froestad & Shearing, 2012). Froestad and Shearing 
(2012) question whether security governance can be established as a local, community-
based enterprise whilst still respecting liberal democratic governance ideals. Indeed, much 
of their questioning challenges the premise that citizens can be ‘legitimately engaged in 
their own security governance independently of state agencies such as the police’ (Ibid., p. 
4). For private security, the answer is yes, with Abrahamsen and Williams stating that 
‘cities are prime sites for the emergence of new forms of security governance that span the 
global-local and public-private divides’ (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011, p. 174). Yet they 
observe that similarly classed security actors can have very different effects in different 
locations, complicating the analysis of multi-actor security governance in their urban case 
studies. Security governance literature engages widely with multi-actor, multi-level 
structures with the majority focused on regional and global efforts to include non-
government actors. Local urban security governance scholars add a focus on knowledge 
and capacity of non-governmental actors emphasising innovative initiatives which contain 
great potential for failure but also for transformative change at the local level. Bringing 
these two bodies of literature together will allow for questions of democratic oversight as 
well as for the potential contributions of local security governance models to national and 
regional policy development to be considered.   
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2.5 Security Governance through Hybridity and State 
Transformation 
Having introduced citizen security as a central concept for understanding the context of 
security governance in Latin America, this chapter now turns to pose questions of what 
does citizen security – security governance look like in the context of policy making 
practice? The contributors to security governance are diverse and ‘violently plural’ ranging 
from traditional state actors, civil society representatives, citizens including non-norm 
individuals from gangs and organised crime, to international organisation representatives 
and foreign governments (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). The spaces in which security 
governance are plotted are contested by those actors in the appropriate scale at which they 
are managed from the contextualised local to a broad regional strategy (Hameiri & Jones, 
2015). What emerges as security policy is a product of those spaces of contestation. From 
one perspective, this process necessarily takes place when state institutions lack the 
capacity to maintain a full monopoly of violence and its management. ‘Fragility’ or 
‘failing’ are typical terms used in this case to reference the inability of a government to 
respond, provide social support, and control violence (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Brinkerhoff & 
Johnson, 2008; Patrick, 2012). However, as Arias and Goldstein (2010) argue, a 
reorientation in approach can liberate discussions from a preponderance of failure 
discourse.  
This section introduces two final theories which can illuminate the security governance 
discussion. First, hybridity allows an analysis to begin from multiple spaces of governance 
simultaneously. Because it represents a framework built from the perspective of the end-
user, it creates a means to combine in-depth research at the local level with a view out to 
national and regional power relations (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 17). Second, a state 
transformation approach (STA) considers the politics of scale where actors contest and 
recreate scales of governance to fit the security problem. This returns to the idea of security 
governance created within a violent plurality, going some way to answer questions about 
the potential development of different types of institutional and non-institutional 
frameworks that may lead to new governance spaces.  
An institution involved in security governance and policy formation in El Salvador, the 
UNDP, describes that country’s citizen security policy as a series of negotiated 
interventions: 
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The set of public interventions brought to fruition by different state 
(national, regional or local) and social actors to confront and 
resolve the risks and threats, concrete or foreseeable, of a violent 
and/or criminal character that injures the rights and liberties of the 
person in a particular space. (Smutt & Carsana, 2012, pp. 18-19) 
First, the above quote confirms Goldstein’s argument that citizen security has shown ‘a 
marked regression to older authoritarian conceptions’ (Goldstein, 2015). Yet, it also 
highlights the tensions found in hybrid political orders (HPO) that arise where diverse 
actors negotiate a set of agreed-upon policies rather see them implemented in a top-down 
fashion. On the one hand, this definition fits well with Luckham and Kirk’s hybrid 
framework. It brings together development and security in a manner which highlights the 
contested nature of the state’s monopoly of violence where ‘diverse state and non-state 
security actors coexist, collaborate or compete’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 1). This 
framework lens particularly focused the consideration of end-users in the national/global 
equation where they critique concepts of human and citizen security for struggling ‘to 
capture security’s contextually contingent meanings in fluid and complex multi-levelled 
regional, national and local contexts’; an activity that cannot be separated from the exercise 
of political power (Ibid., pp. 3; 6). Security, the governance of which is intrinsically multi-
levelled, becomes deeply linked with rights, entitlements, responsibilities, and obligations. 
Therefore, a state hybridity framework is less likely to resort to references of fragility, 
weakness, or failure and less likely to see security governance structures as a one-way 
process (Call, 2008). The focus of HPO theories on the state-sharing of authority, 
legitimacy, and capacity with other entities challenge governance as ‘a collection of 
loosely coordinated and constantly changing processes’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 8). 
Hybrid governance frameworks suffer from both security mismatches and a potential to 
overlook state powers in favour of negotiable governance arrangements. Meagher argues 
that hybrid frameworks may fall into the trap of celebrating chaotic fragmented governance 
(Meagher, 2012) while Goodfellow and Lindemann claim that many perceived hybrids 
may fit better with the description of ‘institutional multiplicity’ (Goodfellow & 
Lindemann, 2013). The scholarship has also favoured African empirical cases for its 
development with a distinct focus on traditional authority structures to complete hybrid 
structures which have limited resonance in state-centric regions like Latin America (Boege, 
et al., 2009; Boege, et al., 2011; Meagher, 2012). For this reason, the state transformation 
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approach (STA), which keeps the state at the fore of transforming policy networks, 
provides a stronger framework for cases such as El Salvador.  
This approach looks at new, post-national governance responses which also go beyond the 
Latin American nation-state case, but which nevertheless provides some useful 
mechanisms for analysis. Specifically, they consider the ‘politics of scale’ where 
government and non-government entities challenge the appropriate level or scale at which 
a security issue should be considered, addressed, or managed. To do this, entities claim that 
existing structures are inadequate to deal with the evolving security concerns and so 
‘construct new modes of regulatory governance at other scales’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2015, p. 
L.1278). Significantly, Hameiri and Jones argue that this does not involve shifting 
authority to other levels of government but rather restructuring or rescaling specific 
components of the state to allow for greater integration or collaboration within new spaces 
of governance: 
The scale at which any issue is governed is not natural or pre-given 
but, because it privileges different societal interests and agendas, is 
always contested. (Ibid., p. L.1297) 
The spaces and scales of security governance in these complex security environments of 
traditional and non-traditional security issues are therefore the product of struggles 
between contending or competing entities resulting in state structural transformations. Still, 
national political elites often remain the most visible and readily accessible component 
entities in the design and implementation of security issues.  
The challenge here is to understand how the formal and informal relationships work in the 
scales or spaces created for that purpose. It has been developed here that the HPO lens 
(Luckham & Kirk, 2013) and STA (Hameiri & Jones, 2015) are illuminating components 
in the study of how security is governed in practice. Specifically, they aid in the 
construction of an analysis framework that perceives multiple levels of security 
governance analysis as being ‘mutually constituted, not merely as separate levels of 
analysis’ (Luckham & Kirk, 2013, p. 10). Both provide alternative interpretations of state 
institutions to move away from predisposed terms like ‘fragile’ to alternative 
interpretations of institutions that work outside a privileged western gaze. Instead, they 
focus on the contextualised knowledges and modes of operation that make these spaces 
distinctive. However, both remain problematic with conceptual gaps. Furthermore, both 
approaches are sensitive to the social contestations that drive governance change across 
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multiple scales, allowing for the context to be considered an important variable. In this 
way, these theories compliment the study of citizen security and security governance to 
give form to places, networks, and actors thinking, talking, and living security and what 
that means in the context of a Latin American state.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The preceding theoretical discussion demonstrates that security governance in a Latin 
American context of citizen security employs a violent plurality of actors to frame its 
concepts, its structural forms, and practices. In discussing the connections between the 
conceptualisations of violence and the shifts in thinking on security, it becomes evident 
that these concepts are not solely constructed but are contextualised in a historical political 
reality. In following the broadening of security in the post-Cold War period through citizen 
and human security, the influence of violence on government institutions and public 
perceptions is illuminated. Particularly, the linking of citizens to the myriad of civil 
society, non-state, traditional, and international security actors becomes important in the 
context of institutional reforms. The evolution of violence and security in Latin America 
are intimately linked with situated conceptions on the nature of the state and its 
responsibilities.  
In introducing the concept of governance, this chapter next emphasises the necessity to 
move beyond arguments of institutional weakness or failure to locate the scales and spaces 
where security is governed in practice. The framework of multi-level or multidimensional 
governance as producing multiple spaces where formal actors collaborate to govern 
security outcomes provides the groundwork for later elaborations on hybridity and state 
transformation theories. For the first group of governance theories, the existence of 
multiple levels of interaction or across sectors does not entail that a state government has 
ceded its responsibilities but that it allows other forums for the governance of evolving 
security challenges that require additional input. However, its formality is at odds with the 
sometimes ad hoc reality observed in the Latin American security context. In other 
multidimensional governance theories, the space is created because the state is weak or 
impotent to address its national security threats. Or, finally, non-traditional security threats 
have become a regional or international phenomenon that cannot be address solely by a 
single state.  
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However, Arias & Goldstein (2010) challenge this perception of fragility arguing that 
rather than a government failure, other types of spaces developed, including those with 
non-state violent actors. Most important: due to the contextual nature of institutional 
hybridity and transformation, new contributions are required from the Latin American 
context – in particular regarding the application of citizen security which remains an 
important Latin American driver. El Salvador presents a unique opportunity for exploration 
both because of its geographical context and because of the policy and programme efforts 
made by the new government to change the traditional approaches to security governance.  
Specific gaps have been identified in the literature including the paucity of security 
governance scholarship addressing how this mechanism functions in practice for multi-
level, multi-lateral formal actor networks within a single country.  
  
Chapter 3 
El Salvador’s Past with Violence and Security: Following 
an evolution of violence in historical context 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the history, dynamics of violence and insecurity, and security 
policies introduced prior to the 2009 presidential elections and victory of the FMLN 
candidate Mauricio Funes in El Salvador. It begins with the foundations of political 
violence in El Salvador’s colonial past leading to a period of dictatorship and, finally, civil 
war that was brought to an UN-negotiated end in 1992. At the turn of the 21st century, the 
security situation had not substantially changed from the immediate post-war period. A 
combination of citizens’ demands and political expediency postulated greater public 
security through the targeting and punishment of those responsible for that violence. In 
result, subsequent presidential campaigns focussed on perpetrator framing and promised to 
respond with hard-line Mano Dura policies. From this point, the rise of gangs and their 
political framing or ‘securitisation’ as a public threat is brought into relief through an 
analysis on violent government responses between 2003 and 2007. This chapter focuses on 
the origins, constructs, and policies addressing crime, violence, and insecurity that were 
introduced, primarily between 1999 and 2007, as well as the actors and institutions 
involved in those decisions. The aim is to provide a backdrop for the empirical reality, 
cultural constructs, and on-going processes of violence deconstruction upon which the 
actor interactions in later chapters are predicated. 
3.2 Origin Narratives 
Armed violence for El Salvador did not originate in its urban spaces but rather on its small 
countryside holdings and its coffee-growing mountain faces. Its history of conflict emerged 
from a population frustrated by unrealised dreams of development, oligarchic 
manipulation, and periodic military takeovers. This section touches on the early colonial 
period including the 1932 peasant uprising and government-led massacre that followed, La 
Matanza. It then examines popular mobilisation contributing to the outbreak of civil war 
between military-government forces and those coalescing opposition coalitions eventually 
forming the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). It concludes with the 
negotiated Peace Accords in 1992 which led to a violent peace. What it represents is an 
historical basis for the state struggle to monopolise the legitimate use of force during the 
early post-colonial state formation processes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(Centeno, 2002; Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Oszlak, 1981). The result is a context of long-
term conflict driven by the ‘systematic exclusion of the “masses, castes, and classes”’ 
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(Kruijt & Koonings, 1999, p. 6). It is a basis for the origins of violence in history replicated 
over generations and with a continuous pattern to the present. 
In 1856, El Salvador’s elite used their control of the government to force mestizo and 
indigenous communal farmers off the mountains through strategic legislation. Those 
farming communities that had been able to resist the initial push were later removed 
outright in the early 1880s through even stronger legislation that outlawed communal 
holdings (Booth et al., 2015, p. 138). Booth et al. quote the 1929 La Patria editor in 
describing the evolving power associated with coffee cultivation: ‘“The conquest of 
territory by the coffee industry is alarming. It…is now descending into the valleys 
displacing maize, rice and beans. It is extended like the conquistador, spreading hunger and 
misery, reducing former proprietors to the worst conditions—woe to those who sell!”” 
(Ibid.; also see, Montgomery, 1982). Societal relations were dominated by violence. 
Landowners feuded through personal peones or small armies ‘so that merely personal 
differences were often resolved violently’ (Holden, 2004, pp. 58-59).  
Vacillating coffee prices and pliable political institutions helped wealthy elites expand 
their controls over production (Pries, 2007). A secondary goal of land privatisation was to 
turn peasants into ‘productive, individualistic entrepreneurs’ according to historian Lauria-
Santiago (discussed in Moodie, 2010, pp. 22-23). In the countryside, the long-term result 
of these privatising strategies was a Marxist-influenced movement demanding land reforms 
more favourable to campesinos or peasants. In urban areas, it created a surge of nationalist 
fervour against colonialist American, British, and Canadian involvement in key industries 
including the energy sector (McFarlane, 1989). Decreasing export demands in the 1930 
Great Depression drove low coffee prices leading producers to cut the already-meagre 
wages of their employees. Rising public frustrations culminated in 1931 with a change in 
government structure from oligarchic government to a military-led institution. The political 
and economic failures paved the way for Augustín Farabundo Martí to lead a peasant 
uprising against the elite.  
La Matanza, the emblematic massacre of some 30,000 individuals, most of whom were 
peasants rather than insurgent activists, took place in January 1932. The event entrenched 
the popular view that state security institutions ‘served to protect the interests of the rich 
against the threats posed by the poor’ (North, 1990, p. 166). It further served to create a 
lasting illustration that the governing entities had little care for the lives of their fellow 
citizens and foreign entities preferred enforced security and stability to civil and human 
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rights (Pries, 2007, p. 104). One observer argued that the repressed movement had been a 
popular mobilisation to ‘release them from [the] slavery’ of low wages and poor working 
conditions (Canadian Commander Brodeur quoted in Nikiforuk & Struzik, 1981, p.7). 
Others have since interpreted the uprising as failed hope for democracy in action; ‘it is also 
a story of the first experiences of popular sovereignty and democratic hopes in El 
Salvador,’ claims Moodie (2010, p. 22). Nonetheless, the event’s power remains strongest 
among those who see it as a founding myth – of class warfare challenging state institutions 
in the pay of the oligarchs or a cautionary tale of what happens to those who organise. Its 
sounding call echoed in the 1960s and 1970s as workers’ unions, religious organisations, 
and peasant movements organised a second time to challenge socio-economic and political 
inequalities among the people of El Salvador.  
Through the mid-20th century, in the aftermath of La Matanza, state-sponsored forces felt 
at ease with the use of violence against civilian populations. In 1967, the National 
Democratic Organisation (Organización Democrática Nacionalista: ORDEN) was 
established with members recruited from the peasantry and working classes. Its purpose 
was to grow support for the government and ruling elite whilst working to suppress peasant 
organisation by advocating members inform on community dissidence (Pries, 2007). 
However, as Booth et al. report, the organisation developed a feared reputation by 
‘murdering organizers of workers, peasants, or political opposition’ (Booth et al., 2015, p. 
143). Hume observes that the participation of as many as 300,000 citizens is indicative of a 
broader trend of violence as constituted and reproduced through social relations (Hume, 
2009, p. 55). Specifically, the activities of ‘bodies such as ORDEN suggests that non-state 
violent actors are not new in the region and the particular patterns and depth of violence in 
El Salvador owe much to the widespread use of civilians’ (Ibid.; also, Lauria-Santiago, 
2005). The government strategies were as much about creating fear and dividing 
populations as they were engaged in the targeting of specific objectives (Hume, 2009).  
Elections in 1972 proved a turning point. The Christian Democrats (Partido Democrática 
Cristiano: PDC) and the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora: UNO) 
were led to victory by José Napoleón Duarte on a democratic reform platform. However, 
the military’s fraudulent intervention inserted Colonel Arturo Armando Molina as 
president in place of Duarte provoked the first significant popular uprising since the 1932 
massacre (Shayne, 2004). Molina (1972-1977) and his successor Carlos Humbert Romero 
(1977-1979) responded with heavy-handed repression, killing an estimated 200 UNO 
supporters in the capital and driving PDC leaders out of the country (Booth et al., 2015; 
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Dunkerley, 1982; LeoGrande, 1981; Prendes, 1983). The death squads that began 
operations in the mid-1970s were alleged to be comprised of ORDEN members operating 
in conjunction with regular security forces (Booth et al., 2015). Operations were such that 
official homicide statistics increased significantly from under 1,000 annually in 1965-1966 
to almost 11,500 in 1980 (Ibid., p. 144).  
The severe repression against civilians convinced many than agricultural and other reforms 
discussed under Duarte’s leadership would not be pursued in the political arena.6 In result, 
disaffected political participants turned to amassing guerrilla groups and grassroots 
community organisations (both rural and urban) to demand economic and social reforms 
through increasingly frequent mass demonstrations. Right-wing groups increased attacks 
on those perceived to be a threat to the established state order. Molina further sanctioned 
this ad hoc campaign of official government action and para-groups to attack ‘subversives’ 
from the Catholic Church and those providing support to documentation of human and 
democratic rights violations (Dunkerley, 1982). These actions in many ways proved to be 
‘the first steps towards the implementation of a “national security” campaign against 
communism’ (Ibid., p. 108). In return, San Salvador’s archbishop, Oscar Romero, 
denounced the training of civilians within communities across the country to kill their 
neighbours (Hume, 2009a). The tense standoff culminated with the assassination of 
Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980. Thereafter, Romero became a focal point 
motivating opposition groups and a challenge to the privileged, wealthy elites with whom 
the Latin American Catholic Church had once been aligned. Instead of dismantling a 
perceived threat, the assassination provoked left-leaning political-military organisations to 
band together, forming the FMLN guerrilla force which promptly declared war. El 
Salvador’s conflict thus has its roots in the immediate unequal social and economic 
structures of the 20th century and, with few available alternatives, factions resorted to 
violence to push for change (Dunkerley, 1982). 
What was to follow was 12 years of civil war. The war itself depended significantly on 
international contributions. After 1979, hard-line parties, the military forces, and elite 
business interests aligned with the government to drive the war effort. They were 
supported with over USD6 billion by the end of the war by successive Carter, Reagan, and 
Bush administrations (Booth et al., 2015, pp. 146-147; Moodie, 2010, p. 34). The Reagan 
                                                 
6
 Government, non-government, labour, and private sectors had met with the National Agrarian Reform 
Congress in January 1970 although campesinos and the rural labour force were not invited and their 
representatives ignored (North, 1985). One priest, Father José Inocencio Alas, presented on behalf of rural 
workers and was kidnapped a few metres from the Assembly shortly thereafter in result; he was later released 
after Bishops intervened with the Minister of Defence (Montgomery, 1983; Prendes, 1983). 
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administration, at least, was aware that these forces were responsible for a large part of the 
conflict-related violent deaths that were grabbing headlines because they requested the 
military, police, and ORDEN reduce their activities during the period the US congress was 
considering military funding renewals in 1983-1984 (Ibid., p. 150). Over the course of the 
war, the United Nations Truth Commission found that up to 80 per cent of the estimated 
75,000 deaths were attributable to these military and paramilitary sources (Comisión de la 
Verdad, 1993; Torres-Rivas, 1997, pp. 209-226).  
In response to the fraudulent political processes and rising military-driven violence, many 
disaffected political participants turned to guerrilla groups and grassroots community 
organisations to push for economic and social reforms (Pries, 2007). The five guerrilla 
groups that agreed to operate collectively from 1980 on under the FMLN increased their 
military capacity along with the strikes and protests effectively. The war allowed guerrilla 
forces to activate a new form of networking with international institutions, media links, 
and civil society organisations. They mobilised counter-consensus activist networks that 
developed a ‘cosmopolitical’ approach to international issues with powers grounded in 
new forms of international laws (Pries, 2007). Successfully applying International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in a non-international armed conflict also meant that the guerrilla 
forces gained more acceptability among foreign governments. Mexico and France 
recognised the group’s legitimacy as a belligerent force. However, international support 
also worked against them. Nicaragua’s backing to the Salvadoran opposition forces was 
used by then US President Jimmy Carter as justification to send another USD 5 million to 
El Salvador’s military forces (Moodie, 2010, p. 34). The conflict continued without 
negotiation until 1989. After a short FMLN siege of the capital, San Salvador, in 
November of that year, during which military forces massacred six prominent Jesuit 
priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter, at the Catholic university, both sides 
recognised they had reached an impasse. The end of the Cold War also changed the US 
stance on negotiations, encouraging El Salvador’s warring factions forward to peace. 
The FMLN factions and the Salvadoran government, led by ARENA President Alfredo 
Cristiani, engaged in UN-mediated peace negotiations over two years. Given that the 
military had directed public security and entities, like the National Guard later charged 
over forcible suppression of protests and labour movements, the negotiations focused on 
the creation of a new public security (Amaya, 2006; Holland, 2013). The FMLN negotiated 
the demilitarisation of the police that would be subordinate to civilian authorities and the 
resulting 1992 Chapultepec Accords outlined detailed measures for the National Civil 
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Police’s creation, composition, and control (Call, 2003; Call & Stanley, 2003; Popkin, 
2000). Wood calls the power of FMLN insurgents in the negotiations as democracy ‘forged 
from below via a revolutionary social movement’ (Wood, 2000, p. 5). Post-conflict 
transition scholarship hailed the peace process as an international success of mediation and 
a healthy example of demobilisation (Allison, 2010; Boutros-Ghali in Moodie 2004; 
Burgerman, 2000; Call and Stanley, 2001; López Pintor, 1999; Montgomery, 1995; Sriram, 
2004). The UN pronounced the peace a Salvadoran success and an example of well-
structured demobilisation. However, analysts of the democratic transition were 
unconvinced as the resulting political settlements and transition processes exhibited 
‘decided mixed results’ (Arnson, 2012, p. 385). Researchers from this period frequently 
recorded the refrain, ‘estamos peor que antes (We are worse off than before [the war])’ 
(Moodie, 2010, p. 13; also see Hume, 2009; Rodgers, 1999). The Peace Accords had 
brought an end to war but they had failed to address the inequality, agrarian reforms, and 
economic disadvantages that had mobilised insurgents against the country’s authoritarian 
institutions (Hume, 2009; Pearce, 1998; Popkin, 2000). Other aspects of institutional 
reform like changes to judicial institutions and criminal laws were less concrete than those 
negotiated for the police, causing confusion and often abandoned before full 
implementation could be achieved (Holland, 2013; Popkin, 2000). Thus, a cessation of 
hostilities may have been achieved but the causes of conflict remained. 
3.3 A ‘Violent Peace’: Salvadoran (In)security  
The construction of peace in El Salvador is responsible in many ways for shaping the 
violence that followed in its wake. Montoya (2010) argues that it remains unclear when the 
political violence that began the civil war actually began and, despite signed peace 
agreements, when conflict-related violence ceased if indeed they have at all. Pearce 
suggests that the persistent violence in the face of the peace process also worsened state-
building capacities (Pearce, 1999, p. 53). Agreement-mandated institutional reforms were 
improperly or incompletely implemented. These spaces, which Koonings and Kruijt name 
‘governance voids’, provide opportunity for modes of violence to continue unabated; 
‘violence is seen as a normal option with which to pursue interests, attain power or resolve 
conflicts’ (1999, p. 11). Indeed, El Salvador is only one of the many in a Latin American 
region where weak democratic institutions, crime, and violence go hand in hand. Post-
peace institutional reforms did not bring the expected panacea, incompletely implemented 
as they were. Amidst the failure and disappointment, common crime, criminals, and their 
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violence became a threat upon which many could agree; that ‘it was worse than the war’, 
was a refrain which united many. This section will examine the failure to build a new and 
more peaceful society before breaking down the measures used to discuss crime, violence 
and insecurity in El Salvador. 
3.3.1 Incomplete reforms and more complete neoliberalisation 
The Peace Accords instituted a broad range of reforms that were heralded as a UN success 
story. Hopes held by the people of El Salvador, however, were far from fulfilled. Redress 
of historic inequalities, improved political participation, agricultural reforms, and 
economic development were only partially achieved or thwarted by entrenched elites that 
maintained a hand on power. Public order was the dominant theme of the peace accord 
reforms of which the National Civil Police (PNC) were considered one of the 
‘cornerstones’ (Call, 2003). In the final agreement were terms through which a purge of 
security personnel would take place, the two legacy security bodies would be abolished, 
and a new civilian police force under civilian control would be established. It also made 
provisions to investigate past abuses and issue a truth report on its findings. Out of a total 
118 outlined items to be implemented with established deadlines, 81 or 68.6 per cent 
referred to demilitarisation activities (Macías & Ramos, 2012). National defence and 
public security functions were placed in separate institutions, limiting their scope. The 
military forces were required to relinquish control over public security mandates and 
intelligence networks entrenched within government institutions were intended to be 
dismantled. They were further required to dismantle existing civilian collaborator networks 
(Cruz, Fernandez de Castro, and Santamaria, 2012). A reformed civil police was given 
control over that public security within the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Legal 
frameworks to cover their areas of responsibility, functions, and operations were 
developed. Donors were also happy to target these institutional restructurings with their aid 
programmes as the efforts had almost immediate evidentiary-bearing results (Call, 2003).  
Nonetheless, the reforms encountered some serious roadblocks. Limited financial 
resources often slowed working processes and strained necessary equipment updates. 
Although the Peace Accords had stipulated that the national police would be responsible 
for public security until the PNC was up and running, the old training school also 
continued to function, producing new members of the soon-to-be disbanded order (Wade, 
2016). This meant that until 1994, the national police received up to a third more budget 
than did the new PNC (Ibid.). Disputes also continued over the nature of the new public 
security model, despite it being one of most detailed sections of the Peace Agreements. As 
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such, the delay of institutional purges and induction of new police and military officials 
significantly impacted both effectiveness and capacity to address basic public security 
functions. When the reforms did take place, Call and Stanley (2001) contend that the 
drastic downsizing of security personnel across the board, from 75,000 to 6,000 played a 
short-term role in increasing crime and violence across the country. Weaknesses of internal 
control mechanisms were partially to blame as the institutions attempted to coalesce 
incoming personnel. The resumption of death squad activities was evidence of the early 
lack of control which the government enabled (Wade, 2016). That it proved reluctant to 
investigate the suspected security personnel behind the killings in 1993 also proved to be a 
major stumbling block. Reforms did impact public perceptions and support for the new 
force institutions but the honeymoon lasted only a short time as by 2000 64 per cent of 
polled respondents felt the PNC was losing the support of the population that had risen to 
45.9 per cent in 1995 (Hume, 2009, p. 66). Responsibility for public order was thus limited 
by internal weaknesses and continuing corruption.  
Relegation of social justice reforms to the last days of the negotiations necessarily limited 
their scope and later proved to be a contributing factor to El Salvador’s post-war violent 
peace. In particular, the neglect of judicial and penal systems seriously affected the state’s 
ability to cope and respond to criminal activity as well as to address entrenched impunities. 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a statement five years into the peace process 
lamenting the ‘persistent deficiencies in the judicial system which have contributed to its 
lack of credibility with the general population’ (Report of the Secretary-General, 1997, par. 
22, quoted in Popkin, 2000, p. 197). The criminal justice system also lacked significant 
reforms and continued to involve drawn-out court cases and extended pre-trial detentions 
which served to exacerbate prison conditions (Popkin, 2000). It was not until 1998 that the 
new penal code designed to modernise the criminal justice system was passed. Even then, 
resources available to various institutions to fulfil functions and coordinate operations were 
insufficient (Wade, 2016). Justice failures were such that some citizens were provoked to 
‘(re)arm’ (Saint-Germain & Chavez Metoyer, 2008). Some of these were fighting forces 
that had been demobilised in the aftermath of peace but whom had yet to be resettled or 
find alternative employment, leading them to resort to criminal activity (Ibid.).  
Aggravating the situation was Cristiani’s progress on neoliberal reforms which brought in 
significant structural adjustments (Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010; Saint-Germain & Chavez 
Metoyer, 2008). The Salvadoran president had begun implementing the economic 
programme when he took office in 1989 with the help of the Foundation for Social and 
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Economic Development (FUSADES). Hume notes that this model was ‘incompatible with 
the goals of peace-building’ (Hume, 2009, p. 63). Nonetheless, Cristiani’s position during 
negotiations was that structural economic reform policies were not up for debate and the 
FMLN did not challenge this stance (Wade, 2016, p. L1041). Whilst the economic reforms 
drew early praise from around the world and promoted impressive short term GDP growth, 
the programme failed to invest those structures that would have facilitated the conversion 
of a population from war to peace (Hume, 2009; Moodie, 2010). It produced new 
dimensions of social inequality in already dire conditions whilst flexible wage and labour 
regulations increased precariousness which kept individuals compliant and led to the 
emergence of the ‘new poor’ – or provided them with new incentive to turn to crime 
(Moser & McIlwaine, 2004). Peace Accord measures which might have mitigated some of 
these issues like a Foro, a space intended for government, business, and labour to address 
socio-economic concerns like labour rights, were defunct almost as soon as they were 
created (Wade, 2016). The instrument had been supported by the FMLN to start debate on 
issues that had motivated them to conflict a dozen years previously. One commentator 
observed that the private sector understood the risks the Foro presented to promote 
transformation debates ‘so it killed it’ (Ibid., p. L1230). Indeed, from a perspective of 
power and opportunity, there were few changes between the consuming control of elites 
and the social order of a large under-paid class from before the war. 
3.3.2 A post-war crime wave 
Galtung (1995; 1998) argues that reconciliation is an essential part of post-war peace-
building. However, peace process reforms and an UN-sponsored Truth Commission failed 
to resolve the underlying issues dividing Salvadoran society. Continuing allegations of 
corruption and human rights abuses within the PNC combined with entrenched economic 
inequality culminated in a space where violence and fear ‘reached the stage of mass 
production and mass consumption’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999, p. 15). Saint-Germain and 
Chavez Metoyer explain that multidimensional analyses of democracy find that ‘on-going 
human-rights abuses perpetuate “societies of fear” rather than “civil democracies”’ and it 
was this situation that emerged in El Salvador (Saint-Germain & Chavez Metoyer, 2008, p. 
210 citing Koonings & Kruijt, 1999; Caldeira & Holston, 1999). Wade notes that empirical 
evidence illustrates that a post-conflict rise in violence is not out of the norm but rather 
expected within a population that has long been divided, is facing a vacuum of institutional 
control, and has a continuing accessibility to arms (Wade, 2016). Thus, that El Salvador’s 
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crime indicators spiked in the aftermath of the negotiated peace agreements, broke the 
hopes of many individuals expecting something more, but was generally to be expected. 
Media reports, public perceptions, and growing support for vigilantism entities meant that 
more than half of the population felt more insecure in the aftermath of peace than during 
the war itself (Cruz & Gonzalez, 1997). Observers and scholars considered and largely 
abandoned the idea that this violence was a direct continuation of the political violence of 
civil war. Rather, this ‘new violence’ appearing seemingly without pattern and targeting 
everyone in a ‘democratization of violence’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 1999; Torres-Rivas, 
1999). Moodie reflects that ‘the violence of the postwar period, apparently unmoored from 
any sense of deep motivation, any possibility of redemption, would become mere scandal’ 
(Moodie, 2010, p. 47). Thus, direct causes of this violence in mid-1990s El Salvador has 
no single answer but rather explanations are nebulously comprised of unresolved conflict 
motivations, continuing socio-economic marginalisation, and a history of the use of 
violence to resolve conflicts. Academic discussions (as discussed in Chapter 2) would class 
these as the historical structural model, the failed democratisation project leading to a weak 
institutions model, and a persistent sociological culture of violence. For El Salvador, the 
post-conflict violence trend undermined popular support for the nation-building project. 
Not only would crime be ranked as the greatest threat facing the country consistently in 
public opinion surveys between 1993 and 1999 but by 1996 almost half of the population 
felt individuals could take justice into their own hands, given the provocation (Call, 2003; 
Moodie, 2010).  
Government and UN national crime statistics confirmed peoples’ perceptions of the period; 
rates of homicide and other violent crimes were increasing. One study reported El 
Salvador’s homicide rate had reached 139 per 100,000 in 1996 although others suggest that 
the figure may have been nearer to 80 (Call, 2003; Moodie, 2010; Wade, 2016). Both 
figures placed the country among the most violent in the world, second only to South 
Africa (Ibid.). However, whilst many Salvadorans blamed continuing structural problems 
for the increasing crime risks in the 1990s, they did not believe strict laws would result in 
crime reductions despite supporting those same laws (Holland, 2013). The wave of 
violence, climbing as it did in the aftermath of El Salvador’s first post-peace presidential 
elections in 1994, also scared the new ARENA government into action. In 1996, the 
national legislature passed a series of emergency measures, including: to quicken legal 
processes against criminals, to allow youth to serve their sentences in adult prisons, to 
increase the harshness of penalties, to reintroduce military contingents in policing 
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operations, and to establish the framework for crimes of ‘illicit association’ (Holland, 
2013). The laws were the subject of much criticism by donor agencies who saw the 
reactionary measures as undermining the post-war judicial reform projects. The 
government bowed to pressure and repealed the measures a few months later but it was this 
first crisis management legislation that provided the blueprint for later attempts at Mano 
Dura in 2003 and 2004.  
3.4 Gangs as Scapegoats: Insecurity, expediency, and 
politics 
Residents of El Salvador identified everyday criminal violence in the country as a 
‘problem […] precisely after the war, when peace was declared’ despite evidence 
indicating endemic violence over long decades (Moodie, 2010, p. 47). The problem 
became ‘violence [which] has a social focus, violence has a face’ (Interview with 
PREPAZ-Official: 2012). This ‘face’ illustrates the everyday violence of the interpersonal 
(Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004; Moodie, 2010), the domestic (Hume, 2009), and the 
delinquent (Arana, 2005; Rodgers, 2009). The saleability of gangs and their potential to be 
the violent risk at the next street corner meant that citizens singled out violent groups as 
their primary villain and one which requires a tough response from state institutions. 
Carothers argues that, in the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, there was a rush to 
structural reforms which were based on a ‘disturbingly thin base of knowledge at every 
level’ (Carothers, 2003). This section will first examine how gangs were constructed as a 
threat in public perceptions. It will then study government gang policies between 2003 and 
2007 to draw out a baseline for substantive discussions in later chapters. This section 
covers both security concepts, the formal and public actors engaging with those constructs, 
and early policy outcomes to present the accepted means and modes of security 
governance prior to the timeframe of this research. 
3.4.1 The construction of a gang presence in El Salvador 
El Salvador’s street gangs were not a post-conflict phenomenon but, rather, appeared as 
early as 1963 (Wolf, 2011). As such, the dominant gangs of the current era, Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (M-18) were present and active during the time of 
the peace negotiations in 1991 (Ibid.). Confirming this established presence, a 1993 survey 
of Salvadorans reported that almost 50 per cent of those polled acknowledge a gang 
presence in their neighbourhood (Wolf, 2011). Over time, spaces had been divided and 
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claimed as aligned territory to be defended against rival gangs. Although gangs began as 
groupings of youth of close residential proximity in typical street fashion, their ease with 
violence, intimidation and criminal activity fomented a ‘threatening atmosphere’ in host 
communities (Wolf, 2008, p. 2). Gang affiliations during the early period numbered in the 
hundreds but turf wars, growing structural cohesion, and the forced return of affiliated 
individuals from the United States after the war, consolidated group identifications.  
Part of this growing structural cohesion emerged as a result of migration between the 
United States and El Salvador following the civil war. Strict migration laws in the United 
States during the 1980s forced many Salvadorans who moved northward to do so in a 
clandestine manner. Those who landed in urban areas like Los Angeles lived, for the most 
part, in marginalised communities with established street gang cultures. MS-13 and M-18 
affiliation grew whilst a strengthened US deportation policy in 1996 meant that members 
were sent back to their countries of origin in the years after the peace accords. Individuals 
who had been children when they left Central America were returned to places of which 
they had few memories or connections. The dominant gang narrative supports the above 
development trajectory although some have challenged the narrative, arguing that whilst 
US-originating gang members may have solidified factions; most groups are home-grown, 
embedded in the community fabric of the marginalised communities in which they reside. 
Whilst some commentators tie the gang problem to historic trends, a government security 
advisor noted that homicides did not rise immediately but that problems really began ‘in 
1996’ (Interview with MJSP PolicyAdvisor: 2012). Nonetheless, in the post-conflict 
period, both local and internationally identified gangs grew in their visible and 
psychological presence in marginal communities and urban informal settlements, thus 
fitting the requirements of a new societal threat.  
Jütersonke et al. (2009) observe another line of argument blamed rapid urbanisation in the 
late 20th century for the rise in criminal violence and gang structure solidification. This 
direction of analysis points to favelas and informal settlements or marginalised urban 
slums for both the situation of greater violence in the city as well as the gang structures 
which emerge (discussed in Jütersonke, et al., 2009). The urban – violence causal 
relationship is also popular with geographers who examine push-pull factors for rapid 
growth of city-ward migration patterns to ‘social and ecological disequilibrium’ (Ibid., 
after Brennan, 1999). Others observe a conflation of on-going social issues and inequalities 
in the local contexts from which gangs emerge along with antagonistic government anti-
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gang policies as the sources of greater gang development and structural solidification 
(Cruz, et al., 2012). 
3.4.2 Gang framing 
As Salvadoran society settled into the post-conflict transition, violent incidents and crime 
indicators rose, inciting among the population and its governing elite a search for ‘new’ 
sources of violence. Furthermore, in contradiction of existing data indicating a wide range 
of causes, politicians were eager to assign violence to easily targeted and identifiable 
sources. Hume astutely observes, ‘Violence does not just ‘happen’, it is defined, 
interpreted and legislated: who and what we fear is constitutive of who we are’ (Hume, 
2009, p. 137). As such, in its management of violence during the 2000s, the Salvadoran 
state was content to rely on ambiguous notions of potential threat rather than systematic 
data (Ibid., p. 136). Gangs thus began to feature prominently in public discourse, political 
strategies and media reporting. These groups became the visible, violent, and ‘anti-social’7 
targets of the post-conflict period. 
One line of scholarship argues that public perceptions of the dominant role of gang 
members in criminal violence influence the selection of security risks as well as the policy 
directions which result. Huhn notes that, over time ‘there is an inflationary trend in Costa 
Rican, Salvadoran and Nicaraguan newspapers to report on crime, violence, and insecurity 
and that these mass media sensationalize insecurity’ (Huhn, 2008, p. 6). Although Huhn, et 
al. conclude that they cannot decide with any certainty ‘whether [media] patterns of 
interpretation are produced and reproduced in other spheres of public discourse’ (Ibid., 
p.28), opinion polls are sometimes observed to follow media trends. Dammert and Malone 
(2006) note that victims are more likely to support Mano Dura  policies whilst Hume 
(2007) contends that perceptions of insecurity can result in significant citizen pressure on 
governments to adopt repressive measures. Misinformation on the part of the media and 
government representatives also aided in consolidating negative connotations later used in 
the formation of strong, repressive policies.
8
 Cruz et al. argue that ‘the media has 
                                                 
7
 Although gang discussions the world over label such activities as ‘anti-social’, Rodgers and Muggah 
challenge the term, arguing that gangs by virtue of their territoriality and institutional continuity are social 
organisations which often have a relationship with their local communities in Central American context 
(Rodgers & Muggah, 2009).  
8
 In fact, a great deal of misinformation exists over the extent and influence of gang-related crime. Hume 
(2009) notes that, whilst President Saca attributed 50 per cent of homicides to gang activities and the press 
attributed a similar or greater percentage, there was little concrete evidence to back up these figures. Hume’s 
research also found that police sources only attributed around 30 per cent of violent action to gangs (Hume, 
2008). The debate is on-going as, in January 2012, President Funes argued during a speech that up to 90 per 
cent of homicides and street violence could be tied to gang activities. A 2012 truce between the two main 
P r i e s  | 76 
 
exaggerated their presence, inflating a phenomenon that is, by its very nature, 
sensationalist’ whilst ‘governments have inflated the numbers of gang members or 
suggested possible links between them and terrorist groups […] in order to justify heavy-
handed policies’ (Cruz, et al., 2012, p. 319). This interpretation of the perception / reaction 
relationship suggests at least a moderate public feedback dynamic with public media.  
Framing gangs as a security risk was facilitated through the statements and support of key 
international actors. Hume (2009) highlights the importance of the post-9/11 terrorist trend 
on public security discourse and observes that, in conjunction with members of the 
international community, there was a conflation of global terrorism worries with the 
national gang presence. Members of the international community, led by the United States, 
fostered these concerns through diplomatic comments as well as through funding for anti-
gang measures, with the US State Department commenting, ‘We consider that maras are 
the greatest problem for national security at this time in Central America and part of 
Mexico’ (Bruneau, 2005, p. 5) whilst US military analyst Mainwaring warns of gang 
connections with international terrorist groups (Mainwaring, 2004). Thus, by the end of the 
1990s and definitely into the early 2000s, the Salvadoran government had attempted 
several haphazard attempts to introduce legislation against youth violence within this wider 
set of inferences. It was not until 2003, however, that formal and strategic repression was 
instigated at the hand of then President Francisco Flores. Central America, state Cruz et al., 
‘declared war on gangs’ (2012, p. 332). 
3.4.3 Government anti-gang policies: 2003-2007 
Following state institutional history, the typical, post-war response from authorities to 
security challenges remained a repressive, hard-handed action – especially when facing the 
country’s street gangs. This has been typical not only of El Salvador but of most of Central 
America where authorities in Honduras and Guatemala also chose to come down with 
swift militaristic operations against criminal groups. This section presents the framing of a 
security concept, the production of laws, and operational outcomes for the ARENA 
mandate of President Antonio Saca. This case represents a clear example of securitisation 
theory where gangs were framed as a risk in crisis for political ends. To entrench this 
discourse, the ARENA government implemented laws and policing strategies which 
solidified the securitised framing with popular support. 
                                                                                                                                                    
rival gangs, however, resulted in a 50 per cent reduction in homicides, indicating that activities may be closer 
to the previously proposed numbers in the media and by Wolf (2011). 
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Table 1: Overview of Government Discourse and Policies, 1999-2009 (Does, 2013) 
 
In 2003, a few short months before the presidential elections, President Francisco Flores 
announced a brash new set of anti-gang laws and policies, known as Mano Dura, and 
framed them as the solution to violence in notorious gang communities. Authority 
positioning of gangs as a majority source of violence and crime over the late 1990s and 
early 2000s smoothed the way for repression as not only the best way forward but actions 
which constituted ‘a matter of state pride’ (Flores, 2003 expressed in Hume, 2009, p. 142). 
Flores announced the plan with fanfare, stating ‘It is time we freed ourselves from this 
plague [of gang violence]’ (Ibid.). The plan had been modelled on a similar contemporary 
policy implemented by then-Honduran President Ricardo Maduro. Honduras’ 
administration authorised joint military-police operations on public streets, devised ‘illicit 
association’ penalties for suspected gang ties, and reduced the age at which children could 
face prosecution as an adult to the age of 12 (Wade, 2016). Flores’ Salvadoran 
announcement was made in one of the country’s most notorious neighbourhoods, known 
for its gang activities; he was accompanied by the police on one side and the military on 
the other (Barrera, 2015).  
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President Francisco Flores at his 2003 press conference and other similar public presentations 
(Source: elsavaldor.com) 
Hume (2009) and Wolf (2011) highlight the strong links between this new policy and the 
electoral advantage it created in the months leading up to the presidential elections. Flores’ 
right-leaning ARENA party had been behind in the polls until the new policy’s 
introduction. Right-left party competition on security solutioning combined with internal 
party politics and elite influences turned security into a tool used to bridge over weak 
economic issues to satisfy dissident factions (Holland, 2013, p. 53). ARENA, with the aid 
of US officials, created a spectre of a potential rift with the US if the FMLN was successful 
at the ballot box (Wade, 2016). Supposedly at risk were the millions of US dollars sent 
home as remittances by migrants each year (Holland, 2013). This reached the traditional 
FMLN base of rural poor and urban marginal classes dependent on the funds they received, 
accounting for almost a quarter of the population according to a pre-election poll (Wade, 
2016). However, just prior to the election, US congressional representatives spoke out, 
labelling the FMLN a ‘pro-terrorist party’, augmenting concerns that former guerrillas 
were prone to align with El Salvador’s criminal elements (Holland, 2013; Wade, 2016). 
The security threat construction with gang violence invoked strong reactions amongst the 
electorate. On the strength of Mano Dura’s popularity among the general public, ARENA 
regained its lead; Mano Dura made winning political sense (Wolf, 2011, p. 58). In this 
perspective, ARENA’s early security goals included crime reduction through a 
comprehensive, preventative approach which included more social involvement and 
international cooperation. In the face of weakening election prospects, it chose instead to 
consolidate the security portfolio under its direct responsibility through Mano Dura making 
it a government-focused responsibility and positioning themselves as the best party to 
direct repressive actions (Ibid., pp. 60-63). 
The FMLN, human rights organisations, and the Salvadoran Human Rights Ombuds office 
(PDDH) voiced critical concerns with the plan to little avail. Indeed, Mano Dura-type 
policies have few supporters in referent literature. Domestic critics, such as Oscar Bonilla 
of the National Council on Public Security in El Salvador (CNSP), worried over the 
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dominance of imprisonment measures in the policies; tactics that resulted in crowded 
prisons without the benefit of rehabilitation (Bruneau, 2005, p. 7).
9
 Carranza also listed 
several fundamental issues with both the first and second anti-gang laws (LAM) (Carranza, 
2004). First, the law reproduced points already contained in the Criminal Code resulting in 
duplication, thus negatively affecting justice transparency. Second, the law could not be 
applied across the board as minor offenders still fell under international agreements like 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and national youth offenders’ provisions. 
Furthermore, the law was considered, and ultimately challenged, as unconstitutional 
because it countered Article 12 of the Constitution – that all accused have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Actions taken to implement the LAM also resulted 
in the oversaturation of the criminal justice system, negatively impacting on both 
individuals and on penal infrastructure. Finally, as Carranza correctly argues, this law was 
solely constructed to enact punitive actions rather than being an integral piece of 
legislation allowing for preventative or rehabilitative actions (Carranza, 2004).
10
 President 
Antonino Saca’s win aggravated existing political polarisations in the country. His term in 
office was framed by various iterations of anti-gang legislation, the re-reintroduction of 
military patrols as backbone components of policing operations, and blaming the FMLN 
for persistent security threats.  
Opinion polls reflect that many citizens continued to support Mano Dura for years after its 
implementation, despite the growing evidence of its ineffective results and counter-
productive impacts. At the same time, when new President Antonio Saca’s government 
proposed even tougher measures through the introduction of Super Mano Dura the 
following year, general support was low. These reforms again granted power to security 
forces to conduct stop and searches without cause, to arrest suspected gang members on 
the strength of their potential affiliations as identified by tattoos and clothing items, and 
strengthened minimum sentencing for convicted gang members (Seelke, 2011). The 
replacement policy was written to overcome the human rights legal challenges levelled 
against Mano Dura but retain profiling and arrest strategies (Wolf, 2008). In time, the 
government dropped Super Mano Dura under the guise of the need for effectiveness re-
                                                 
9
 However, although established to suggest solutions to security problems, CNSP has never had much impact 
in practice due to the presence of many former FMLN members among its senior officials, limiting their 
exposure to ARENA elite. 
10
 Over 20,000 individuals were arrested in one year under Mano Dura although Hume notes that there was a 
percentage arrested on multiple occasions but released due to procedural issues and a lack of proof. Later 
legislation required some sort of proof and also issued harsher sentences which caused an exponential rise in 
the Salvadoran prison population (Jutersonke et al., 2009). 
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tooling. In its place, the government quietly instigated modified policies that targeted gang 
leaders rather than relying on major operational sweeps with mass arrests.  
None of these plans indicated any serious intention to develop a comprehensive gang 
policy beyond a particular favouring of suppression over other approaches (Hume, 2008). 
This assessment was also the basic argument of a 2007 report issued by the National 
Commission for Public Security and Social Peace which called for revision of existing 
meagre approaches. The Commission argued that in order to make any real headway in 
combating violent crime, comprehensive policies were required at the national level that 
were sustainable through the long-term (CNSC, 2007). They called for the adoption of a 
coherent criminal code to improve enforcement procedures; greater and more dependable 
resources; the incorporation of more violence prevention plans and activities into policies; 
and the improvement (strengthening) of related institutions to facilitate greater competency 
in investigations, transparency, and accountability (Ibid.). 
In her study of right-leading politics in El Salvador, Holland concludes, ‘conservative party 
leaders are more likely to implement Mano Dura policies when the left resists militarized 
security policies and defends individual rights’ (Holland, 2013, p.  45). Pearce (2010) 
classifies this method of governance as ‘perverse’ state formation where a state seeks to 
increase their legitimacy through the securitisation of certain groups. Building democracy 
on popular fears, Pearce observes that state actions framed through violence ‘enabl[e] the 
state to build its authority not on the protection of citizens’ rights but on its armed 
encounters and insidious collusions with violent actions in the name of “security 
provision”’ (Ibid., p. 286). The image that emerges is one where multi-actor, multi-level 
security governance is not a given governance evolution in either the European Union-like 
collaboration-building form nor in the weak or fragile state form. Rather, the process is 
flexible and may expand or contract, along with concepts of security, depending on the 
complex interests, ideologies and issues-framing discourse employed by the dominant 
actors of the day.  
In summation of the reasons for which Mano Dura policies emerged in El Salvador, three 
aspects stand out (Holland, 2013). First, crime rates in a post-peace era required control 
measures. Second, public opinion in the aftermath of the peace agreements was 
increasingly concerned about the violence that citizens still perceived in their 
neighbourhoods, communities, and homes. Finally, the conservative ARENA political 
ideology looked positively on criminal repression as a means of response. Political 
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expediency in how security matters help win or lose elections also was an attractive 
feature. However, between 1990s and the early 2000s, Hume (2009) observes that public 
opinion data itself changed in its causal perceptions of violence. Mano Dura proved simple 
and influential. Where in the 1990s individuals perceived economic and social motivations 
behind ‘common violence’ and moderated response demands accordingly, in the 2000s, 
demands for more authoritarian responses were the norm (Amaya, 2006; Hume, 2009). 
Holland maps perception data and finds that bumps in demands for authoritarian responses 
to criminal violence are highest in the aftermath of political promotions of Mano Dura 
policies (Holland, 2013, pp. 49-52). As ARENA activated this political power, they won 
elections. It was in learning from this and applying a modified strategy that the FMLN too 
was able to achieve a victory whilst fighting a campaign against a hard-on-crime party. 
Crime and violence prove to be not just threats to insecurity but powerful tools in 
democratic processes. 
3.5 Conclusion 
How citizens perceive crime and violence has significant implications for how they interact 
with their environment and how they demand that these risks be addressed or governed. 
This is a process constructed through experience, history, and conceptualisation. To inform 
how security is governed requires an examination of how this environment came to exist, 
both in its material and constructed contexts. In this chapter, I have reviewed the historical 
roots of violence and its dynamics in a post-conflict state. I have argued that the processes 
by which this violence is constructed is essential to the understanding of the rise of gangs 
and their framing as a problem central to the security governance of the 2009 society. 
Gangs were not framed as a security risk solely by the government but it does retain a 
primary role in the promotion of that symbolic threat construction; its responses, central to 
the continuation of a deeply divided society. However, through this historic analysis, I also 
draw in the importance of non-state actors in the construction of unequal power 
relationships and entrenched repression. Citizens were important components of a system 
that targeted violence not only on political opponents but on society’s public. This reflects 
a democratising trend in Salvadoran experiences with violence long before the ‘violent 
peace’ of a post-war criminal wave of violence. As Hume notes, ‘It is therefore important 
to draw out the contradictions between public perception of crime, policy instruments to 
challenge it and the measurement of actual violence’ (Hume, 2009, p.77). The discussion 
therefore has remained focussed on the traditional and leading alternative forms of 
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violence typically reflected in official and public dialogues. However, as illustrated above, 
the boundaries between different indicators and definitions of violent risks both normative 
and ideological become blurred; the spaces between crime, perpetrator, victim, problem-
solver, non-existent. It will fall to subsequent chapters to tease out how participants 
identify and apply these structures to their security governance efforts in El Salvador. 
Chapter 4 
Mapping Actors and Organisations  
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4.1 Introduction 
Hope accompanied the election of the new FMLN government in 2009. It represented the 
successful transition from one post-war political party to another. Taking power was also 
symbolic of the successful transformation and reintegration of the ex-guerrilla party into 
the polity. The government was headed by President Mauricio Funes, a journalist during 
the war who had remained unaligned politically until he declared his intentions for office. 
Having plotted for almost two decades the ideological policies they would pursue in office, 
the FMLN party began exploring their options on solutions to the significant post-war 
violence that continued to plague the country twenty years on. Rolling on hope and a belief 
of new beginnings, they declared a focus on the preventative strategies that would address 
the root causes of violence and eliminate the unsuccessful hard-line Mano Dura legacy left 
behind by the previous conservative ARENA governments. Part of the fashion in which 
they intended to distinguish themselves, was through a broad consultation process from the 
grassroots to create the first security policy of their new government. However, on taking 
office, they further realised that they had little experience with the structures of 
government and the processes of governing.  
In this knowledge gap, arose opportunity. First, they adapted their consultation plans to 
create working groups that would contribute expertise to the processes of security 
governance. Working from a base of broad citizen security ideologies, the party set about 
recruiting individuals, civil society, and international entities to join their security 
governance spaces at the community, municipality, departmental, and national levels. 
When, two years into their mandate, the region began to look for alternative strategies to 
mitigate region-wide security issues, the region became one more level of consultation and 
collaborative security governing. Second, acknowledging the moment of hope that had 
brought them to power and the space a steep learning curve might give, they seized on the 
moment to experiment with new approaches to security. Prevention policies had never 
gained significant traction in El Salvador. Guided by ideological strategies devised for 
their election platform and taking on board recommendations from civil society at work in 
the field, they set to work.  
This chapter introduces the broad structures and actors involved in security governance in 
El Salvador both prior to and during the FMLN administration. The next section expands 
on the number of formal actors involved in security governance in El Salvador. Thereafter, 
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the chapter turns to the introduction of non-norm conforming actors that contribute to a 
violent plurality in security governance. The third section presents actors involved in a new 
regional level security strategy and their necessary contributions to national and sub-
national security processes. The final section lays out the more fluid and dynamic sub-
national and municipal sectors, highlighting the numerous actors from other governance 
levels that chose to work directly with small, territorial jurisdictions when pursuing the 
implementation of particular projects and programmes. Mapping the complex 
collaborations and competitions undertaken by diverse actors involved in security 
governance in El Salvador is the first step to understanding how citizen security structures 
hybrid spaces of governance in multi-level context. In order to understand why, and for 
whom, security, the active entities building security must be addressed.   
4.2 National Actors 
This section outlines the working relationships of formal security actors at the national 
level in El Salvador (2009-2014). Under the former ARENA government, civil society 
participation had been limited to a few select organisations ‘whose ideology was 
acceptable to the interests of capital’ (Cannon & Hume, 2012, p. L.1183). Not only did the 
incoming government intend to change the ideological approach to governance, it intended 
to shift the power balance involved in governance to give a greater role to civil society 
against the traditional control of elites over key state institutions. The FMLN government 
attempted to balance the influences of elites through consultation structures formed of 
‘moderate elites’ and broad NGO and private sector elements (Ibid.). In order to redress the 
perceived failure of previous governments to include civil society and epistemic 
communities from collaboration on security, the government undertook to invite civil 
society and other non-state actors to roundtable discussions and private group discussions 
with the new Justice Minister (Interviews with Flores, 2012; Guillén, 2013; Quinn, 2012; 
Rikkers, 2013; Rodriguez López, 2013). Several noted that they had been encouraged by 
the early invitations to consult but that the process was extremely political and not always 
the ‘best’ entities were the ones who were listened to over the medium term (Interviews 
with Guillén, 2013; Jimenez, 2012; and, Rodriguez López, 2013). Competition for the ear 
of the new government and participation within specific policy-making circles, expressed a 
desire to ensure that the best information reached decision-makers, remained a common 
theme among all consulting actors. 
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Although these efforts were accepted by pro-Funes actors, more traditional FMLN party 
backers were conflicted. On the one hand, when the FMLN arrived in power, they had little 
governing experience and needed to keep on workers, including vast swaths of civil 
servants, from the previous administration to help them run things. On the other, FMLN 
party faithful were concerned about issues of loyalty as well as the potential reluctance of 
employees to implement a radical change programme.
11
 The FMLN’s internal divisions 
also affected how the next four years were to play out. Most notably, the President’s 
supporters and personal appointees were at odds with party faithful who had different 
visions for government interests, issues-framing discourses, and outside support networks. 
Internal party politics were further strained by external actors who had traditionally played 
a large role in the governance of the Salvadoran state.
12
 The United States was particularly 
against the appointment of the first Minister of Justice and Public Security (M-MJSP), 
Manuel Melgar, due to his previous role as a guerrilla commander accused of involvement 
with the death of a number of US soldiers stationed in San Salvador during the civil war. 
Linked to weaknesses in security programme implementation early in the mandate as a 
result, Melgar was replaced around the time El Salvador signed a ‘Partnership for Growth 
with El Salvador’ with the United States in November, 2011.13 Thus, multi-actor 
contributions to security governance at the national level have both empowering and 
limiting impacts on security conceptualisation and operations in El Salvador.  
A noticeable change implemented during the transition from the Tony Saca-led ARENA 
administration to that of Mauricio Funes was the institutional split instigated to deal with 
repression and prevention files under different command structures. The FMLN 
government took hold of both the security and violence prevention cabinets (Gabinete 
Nacional de Prevención de la Violencia: GNPV) as a means to put new emphasis on 
alternative approaches to addressing violence as a star ideology in their new approach to 
security governance. It further invited the Ministries of Health and Education and these 
members became important working components of a restructured security dynamic. 
                                                 
11
 Their fears were not based on political conflict histories alone but on the basis that a labour stability law 
had been introduced directly prior to the FMLN taking office – a move largely perceived as ARENA 
attempting to maintain influence and control over the institutions of government (Cannon & Hume, 2012). At 
the same time, the FMLN was proud that they could be seen to support a ‘progressive’ institutional 
framework where civil servants could be trusted on sufficient political neutrality to support the government 
of the day (Interviews with MJSP and DGME Officials, 2012; 2013).  
12
 One interview subject close to the subject matter stated an oft-echoed refrain that by 2010, the government 
was that of Mauricio Funes, not one governed by the FMLN (Interview with PNC, 2012). 
13
 The political turmoil surrounding Melgar’s appointment and US disapproval was such that, at the time of 
his resignation, online newspaper El Faro reported that the move was a mere ‘formality’ as bilateral 
cooperation had come to a standstill. FMLN party secretary at the time, Jose Luis Merino, noted that the US 
had even turned down a basic request for intelligence on drug traffickers based in El Salvador because of 
Melgar’s continuing presence as M-MJSP (El Faro, 2011; Merino, 2011). 
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Working in conjunction with the GNPV as the primary consultative and supporting body 
for the prevention file and designated with the responsibility to oversee violence 
prevention programmes was the National Council on Public Security (Consejo Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública: CNSP). It had been developed in 1998 out of a suggestion from the 
United Nations to create an advisory body at the highest level to support the president in 
the development of security policies (Interview with Ventura, 2012). Partially comprised 
of the same institutional entities as the GNPV but with a greater operational support 
mandate, the CNSP had been left to fend for itself during previous administrations, and 
regularly made up budgetary capacity through international sponsorship (RESDAL, 2011; 
van der Borgh & Savenije, 2014). Responsibilities included administering national and 
departmental observatories on violence and crime which have produced important studies 
and diagnostics on topics of security including institutions and operational deficiencies 
(Ibid.).
14
 Within these two cabinets, the most present actor is the Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública: MJSP). The responsibility of 
the MJSP covers not only security policy but oversees the police, migration and border 
directorate, and prison services. 
Competition and conflict over the division of responsibility and labour on popular files 
between the different units, directorates, and ministries was also fraught with political 
manoeuvring. As an advisor to the MJSP, when asked what the role of the Ministry was in 
the creation of security policies, responded: 
In Article 35, the powers of the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security are described and they are to formulate the policies of 
security and of prevention. […] In the topic of security, it is not 
difficult to realise that this ministry is responsible; in the subject-
matter of prevention, it has been made more difficult. A political 
consensus has not been achieved in the sense that prevention needs 
to work in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security. This has generated territorial issues. Diverse 
governmental organisations, within the framework of their 
responsibilities, say that they carry out prevention and this creates 
                                                 
14
 ANSP director Jaime Martinez Ventura explained that it was the CNSP that proposed the development of a 
community policing philosophy to address study findings of investigation deficiencies, discipline and internal 
control problems, and institutional capacity. The project was scuppered by Flores in 2000 and replaced with 
the Ley Organica de la PNC which he considered to be a grave regression in the police’s institutional 
development (Interview with Ventura, 2012).  
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for us a domestic issue that to some extent has consequences in the 
scope of security. (Interview with MJSP Policy Advisor, 2012) 
Bringing the idea of prevention into the MJSP as a companion component to repression in 
security was not as easy a political task as initially assumed. What helped ease the way for 
prevention as an equal conceptual, if not operational, component was the introduction of 
the aforementioned divided institutional structure (the prevention and security cabinets) in 
2010 and the eventual appointment in 2012 of Douglas Moreno, former Prisons Director, 
as vice-Minister of the MJSP. Moreno’s primary responsibility was to oversee the 
conceptual development and coordination of prevention dossiers (El Mundo.com.sv, 
2012). This appointment also helped to smooth the development of the General Directorate 
of Social Prevention of Violence and Culture of Peace (Dirección General de Prevención 
Social de la Violencia y Cultura de Paz: PREPAZ). PREPAZ had been created in May 
2010 in the security restructuring but struggled to acquire the budget to cover its purported 
responsibilities. The director’s role was to facilitate an alliance between the central 
government and local municipalities ‘to work on the issue of citizen security. But 
fundamentally, [work] began with the strongest component, that is prevention’ (Interview 
with Flores, 2012). Although the MJSP remained central to the development, coordination, 
and steering of the security portfolio, the repression and prevention division of resources 
and responsibilities became a significant bone of contention among formal actors.  
As a function of the nature of the security file and the objectives to expand contributions to 
outside actors, the MJSP encouraged a range of relationships to accomplish their goals 
from the elaboration of security policies and strategy directives to the implementation of 
programming through the establishment of local community violence prevention councils 
comprised of local civil society in conjunction with local government and security 
officials. A PREPAZ official explained that their department looked at their role as 
facilitators through which they attempted to establish constructive working relationships 
with other entities throughout the country (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012). As 
such, PREPAZ was often presented as a highlight for security relationships and an 
exhibition of the new manner of coordinating and implementing positive prevention 
policies in place of the traditional governance dependence on repressive measures 
(Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). These ideologically-driven 
relationships promoting prevention were often described as resource facilitators and as 
sub-national institutional support mechanisms; capacity-building [training seminars] on 
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technical aspects of policy development and programme implementation was key (Flores, 
2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012).  
The PREPAZ director explained that consultations with ‘experts’ whether from 
international organisations or small NGOs working in a local community were a fact of 
everyday work in an office whose responsibilities traversed the realm of governance from 
policy to project on multiple jurisdictions: ‘on the one hand there are the experts, 
academics or theorists, that help and on the other hand, on the operational level they need 
to look to prevention councils. Now, every prevention council also responds to the needs of 
the municipality’ (Interview with Flores, 2012). Going even further, Flores argued that this 
work could not be done without the efforts of the population:  
[…] the state government has the constitutional right of 
responsibility for security, but we know that we have to realise this 
with the population, with the people. Therefore, we want to give 
the people space, to the subject, to the citizens so that they can be 
involved. (Interview with Flores, 2012) 
The sentiments thus reflected say much more about the workings of PREPAZ, a joint 
policy and operations coordinating directorate, than they do about the whole of security 
governance, or even about ideology within the MJSP. Nonetheless, other sectors were 
attempting to adopt various approaches to a greater diversity of actors, demonstrating that 
operational or coordinating changes and ideological, issues-framing discourses were not 
mutually exclusive but symbiotic with both innovative and regressive features. 
4.2.1 Police as security governance actors 
Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) are typically considered a tool of the democratic 
system, responsible for operations but with limited influence over policy. Most police 
officials, when interviewed, made reference to the civil war, previous authoritarian 
regimes, and the incomplete institutional reforms. A persistent concern was the manner in 
which a police history as authoritarian actors impacted on their ability to interact with other 
security actors. It also affected the way they could do their job in local communities and in 
discussions with the civil society organisations with which they worked. Struggling to right 
these issues, members of the PNC emphasised the arduous journey they had been 
undertaking to improve actions taken within their legal directive to ‘protect and guarantee 
the free exercise of the rights and liberties of the person’ (Ley Orgánica de la Policía 
Nacional Civil). First, in keeping with policy directives to strengthen institutions, the PNC 
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continued to implement internal reforms and improve working relationships with other 
sectors of society. Collaborations to improve interactive relationships took place at every 
level of operation; the PNC was both the beneficiary of training relationships and 
considered itself to be a collaborative partner on the development of new modes of 
policing including the introduction of a community policing philosophy. INTERPOL, the 
Regional Commission of Police Chiefs (RCPC), and international delegations provided 
frequent training exercises, inter-agency cooperation on operations, and information-
sharing mechanisms including the slow growth of criminal databases for the region.
15
  
With the new administration, the PNC was asked to expand its responsibilities from 
combating crime and conducting investigations into criminal acts to building relationships 
with communities across the country. The move was both political and operational. In 
building relationships with local community actors, the intent was to include community 
perspectives in operational policing strategies in practical ways. Argueta argues that in this 
manner the community becomes ‘an important actor’ and cooperates in the resolution of 
security problems (Argueta, 2011, p. 157). At the same time, it was intended to build trust 
with communities at a time when the PNC suffered from historically low levels of trust.
16
 
Partially in recognition of this huge gap in public trust, the police set out community 
policing as a means through which to regain direct contact with local populations through 
the territorialisation of strategies, operations, and important community relationships. The 
community policing ideology consulted community policing best practices in the 
‘developed countries’ of Japan, France, and the United States (Ibid.); each country 
contributed directly to implementation efforts at some point during the process.  
The inclusion of community experience and their contributions to local adaptation of 
operations was further intended to contribute to new security governance efforts. PNC 
Director Landaverde observed that the police had also been tasked with the role of 
contributing operational experience and best practice to the formation of national security 
policies going forward (Interview with Ramirez Landaverde, 2013). Elaborated in the PNC 
Institutional Doctrine, important relationships would first allow for practical collaboration; 
community policing relations included local governments, the leadership of regional 
delegations, and with the central government across portfolios from the Prosecutor General 
                                                 
15
 Arévalo Herrera (2011) argues that the presence of foreign police officers can bring a richness of focus but 
it can also be negative as each emphasises that ‘their own social reality is the best’. 
16
 In 2009, at the beginning of the FMLN’s first term in power, only 20.7 percent of respondents stated they 
had confidence in the National Civil Police (IUDOP, 2009, p. 4). In September 2012, almost 70 per cent of 
polling respondents stated that they had little or no trust at all in the police to pursue criminals although they 
had up to 72 per cent faith in the work of the military (IUDOP, 2013). 
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(Fiscalía General de la República: FGR), the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de 
la República: PGR), and the Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuraduria de la Defenca de 
los Derechos Humanos: PDDH) in order to analyse and elaborate existing plans (PNC, 
2010).  
However, a continuing slip between repression and prevention ideologies was a constant 
worry between actors collaborating on security governance. PREPAZ officials were 
reluctant to offer a policy role to police within their department in result. Instead, while 
lauding the importance of a ‘police with proximity to the community’ as well as the role 
the police played in the justice system, they saw the policy role as operational within the 
network of actors working at all levels of security governance to seek out prevention 
programming options (Interviews with Flores, 2012; 2013; PREPAZ Official, 2012). For 
PREPAZ, the police contributed amply in their support for the reinsertion of former 
criminals and on the attention to victims as well as through continuing institutional reforms 
to improve their interoperability and trust. Operating in the same vein, FESPAD worked to 
train police through workshops and the publication of a manual on the application of penal 
code procedures so that they could provide better support to cases in court (Interview with 
Guillén, 2013). Police involvement in security governance from a purely operational 
capacity over the early years of the FMLN administration was a contentious action 
initiative, especially among those who distrusted the institution over historical corruption 
and repression tendencies. However, as it turned out, adding porous walls to police 
structures to allow them both greater freedoms to consult on policy directions and to allow 
non-government entities to submit recommendations, advice, and guide changes on 
national and community levels did not result in the greatest changes to actor participation 
numbers during the first administration. 
4.2.3 The military as a persistent stop-gap in security governance 
The security governance challenge of military participation arose in the spaces between a 
community policing strategy and citizen demands for stronger operations to reduce 
criminal violence. Military officials did not contribute to most security governance 
structures as such. Nonetheless, they remained a contentious associated actor involved in 
security implementation. The FMLN, along with many civil society organisations and 
epistemic communities, had roundly condemned military deployments on the streets as a 
substantive policing tactic. However, the Funes administration reintroduced military actors 
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to public security shortly after taking office.
17
 On the justification that the police were ill-
trained and there were insufficient numbers to address the scale of the problem (Participant 
Observation, 2012; Interview with Ventura, 2013), 2,500 soldiers were deployed to the 
streets as a stop-gap measure (Ayala, 2009). Uniquely, the military was given permission 
to carry out searches, make arrests, and operate road checkpoints – all activities of which 
are generally considered to be the purview of policing institutions. The military was further 
extended into public security functions when they were deployed to support prison guards 
in May 2010.
18
 This move was again framed as a temporary stop-gap measure to shore up 
security whilst the new government set about prison reforms and eradicating corruption.  
Figure 4-3: Military Support in Public Security: 7,900 individuals (up to 2014) (Adapted from: 
RESDAL, 2014) 
 
By 2011, about 8,500 military personnel were deployed around the county to support 
police in public security efforts leading to an overall 57 percent increase in military troops 
to 17,000 personnel accompanied by a $25 million augmentation in the salary budget 
(RESDAL, 2011). But, instead of operating solely in conjunction with the police, as had 
been promised, the military often ran their own patrols and initiatives including the 
provision of border surveillance at some 62 locations. They also took control of some of El 
                                                 
17
 Decreto No. 70 de la Casa Presidencial, 30 October 2009. 
18
 Rehabilitation programmes including the Mesas de la Esperanza which relied on the participation of gang 
members, family members, NGO including FESPAD, and government representatives were neglected in 
result. 
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Salvador’s most notorious prisons from the outside. The prison security deployment 
remained in place, straining working relationships between prison officials and military 
personnel over several years, partially in consequence of poor military training for prison 
posts.  
The use of the military as a tool in guarding prisons or community patrols appeared to have 
a positive influence on public perceptions of the government’s capacity to handle security 
(Wolf, 2012b). Civil society actors worried about displacement; the militarisation of 
security governance presented as a dangerously regressive step in security building for a 
country with a history of authoritarian rule (Interviews with Aguilar, 2012; 2013; Guillén, 
2013). What emerged from the haphazard approach of introducing the military into the 
security governance fabric was disorientation on the part of other participant actors. 
Community policing and multi-actor consultations and strategy developments were 
underway and emphasised as a new manner of operating for a kinder, gentler government. 
The unilateral deployment of military to the streets in response to violent incidents was a 
mark against the integrity of violence prevention actors and observers. Mirroring how 
involvement in prevention policy development had been a contentious issue among certain 
strong prevention factions, the military participation occupied a similar position for NGOs 
and certain government institutional units who regarded it as a step confirming that the 
military still controlled the ultimate direction of citizen security in the country and limited 
their hope for a new approach. 
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Picture 4-1: Members of the New Reaction Special Forces, a unit of the Army created to fight the 
gangs, train during a simulacrum in an Army base outskirts of El Salvador, San Salvador (Source: 
Manu Brabo / MeMo, 2015) 
4.2.4 Violent officials 
Within the 2009 to 2014 timeframe of this research, significant changes within key state 
security institutions changed the dynamic of actor relations. In November, 2011, the first 
FMLN M-MJSP, Manuel Melgar ‘stepped down’ after two and a half years in office. 
During that time, homicide rates had remained high and bilateral relations with the United 
States on security had deteriorated significantly
19
 although most other foreign bilateral 
relations had continued as usual. When Melgar resigned, former Attorney General, Romeo 
Melara Granillo, issued a statement saying that the next Minister must be able to exercise 
‘inter-institutional cooperation that would fortify investigations [and operations] carried 
out by the ministry’ (Voices on the Border, 2011), a clear accusation that the FMLN had 
been alienating certain historic allies. Melgar’s replacement was General David Munguía 
Payés, a School of the Americas alumni, who resigned his military position to take up the 
post.
20
 It was the first time since the signing of the Peace Accords that a military official 
                                                 
19
 A Wikileaks diplomatic cable from July 2009 indicated that US diplomats saw Melgar’s appointment as a 
complication for bilateral security operations (law enforcement) but that the move originated from within the 
FMLN rather than Funes himself (Allison, 2011). 
20
 The Salvadoran Constitution bans military personnel from holding civilian posts. The long-term result of 
this appointment was a Supreme Court challenge that ultimately ended in the General’s return to the military 
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had been put in charge of El Salvador’s domestic security, a step which was largely greeted 
as a regression in El Salvador’s post-conflict state-building efforts.21 His appointment led 
to many angered individuals within police ranks because they saw the move as the overt 
militarisation of the police force and several high-ranking commissioners including the 
Chief of Police Intelligence (Centro de Información Policial: CIP) and the Sub-director of 
Public Security, resigned (Interview with PNC Official, 2012). Accompanying this 
appointment was that of another former
22
 member of the military leadership, Francisco 
Salinas Rivera, as Director of the PNC. 
From the outside, among civil society organisations, the move appeared to confirm their 
fears of remilitarisation. As Defence Minister, Munguía Payés had overseen the 
deployment of military personnel to urban neighbourhoods in an attempt to quell 2010 
gang activity and he singled out Mexican drug cartels as national and regional risks which 
were using Central American military bases as a source for weapons.
23
 At the outset, it 
appeared that it was from Mexican and American approaches against cartels and other 
transnational criminal organisations, the ‘War on Drugs’, that Munguía Payés was going to 
take his lead. Declaring that he would achieve ‘concrete results’ including a 30 per cent 
reduction in homicides during his first year in office, he set about creating special anti-
gang police units trained jointly by the Salvadoran military and US security personnel 
(elsalvador.com, 2011). He also proposed a specialised judicial track of prosecutors and 
judges designated solely for gang members. Military influence on security structures was 
assured through the further appointment of the new directors of the PNC and the State 
Intelligence Organisation (OIE: Organización de Inteligencia del Estado).
24
 The 
                                                                                                                                                    
to again head up that Department. Many did not have a problem with the general personally as he was seen as 
a moderate, without war-time accusations of human rights violations, and had supported Funes in various 
capacities prior to his election; Meglar had been a FMLN loyalist. 
21
 FMLN party members alleged that Munguia Payés’ appointment was approved by Funes not only in 
appeasement to US demands but also as part of a trade with ARENA officials and members of the private 
business sector (Participant Observation, 2013).  
22
 Salinas Rivera resigned from active duty hours before his appointment to head the PNC to avoid 
contravention of the constitutional restrictions on military personnel in civilian posts. 
23
 In 2011, six soldiers were arrested after attempting to steal more than 1,800 grenades for drug trafficking 
organisations – a move taken after what Munguía Payés stated was eight months of intelligence work (Stone, 
2011). Other arrests were made during rifle, uniform, and military equipment sales both to los Zetas of 
Mexico and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia) indicating that the efforts were not limited to thefts but organised trafficking of old or badly 
tracked weapons systems (Corcoran, 2011). However, the problem is not unique to El Salvador with US 
weapons systems sold to Honduras showing up in Mexico, according to WikiLeaks diplomatic cables. Weak 
institutions in Guatemala and an effective loss of control over up to 40 per cent of their territory meant that 
los Zetas are more likely to source their weapons from that country than El Salvador but the problem does 
exist throughout the region. 
24
 Eduardo Alfonso Linares, a former guerrilla leader in Chalatenango and director of police in San Salvador 
had been appointed OIE director in June 2009. As a FMLN party faithful he was replaced in December 2011 
after Munguía Payés took office. His replacement Ricardo Perdomo, a former Minister of Economy in the 
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composition of the citizen security governance spaces had taken a significant regressive 
turn. 
4.2.5 Non-norm violent actors  
What followed four months later was a militarised solution that differed from boots on the 
streets. In March 2012, Munguía Payés confirmed media reports from El Faro that a pact 
had been agreed upon between the lead command structures of the country’s two main 
gangs, Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the two Barrio 18 (M-18) factions (Martinez, et 
al., 2012). From the beginning and throughout the process, it was difficult to identify 
exactly who was responsible for what outcome and even who was a participant in the 
process itself. First, the police were credited with increased efficacy in law enforcement 
efforts against key gang factions: ‘coordination, the efficiency of the police, and the 
intelligence work’ (Martinez, et al., 2012). Then, as the movement of imprisoned gang 
leaders from maximum to medium security facilities was reported, it was acknowledged 
that there were more entities involved (Ibid.). National Prisons Director Nelson Rauda 
avoided answering questions, stating that only the Minister of Justice and Security, David 
Munguia Payés, was authorised to speak on the nature of the prison transfer and its 
supposed results (Ibid; Interview with Rauda, 2013). Next, two individuals stepped 
forward in an attempt to clarify the storyline: Raúl Mijango, a former guerrilla commander; 
and Monsignor Fabio Colindres, ostensibly a representative from the Catholic Church, 
introduced that a truce had been brought about by the gangs themselves to lower their 
negative impact on society. However, a military slant became obvious as it was revealed 
that Mijango was a former Munguía Payés advisor and Colindres a military chaplain, 
elements of the military structure negotiating a formulaic military. Nevertheless, Mijango 
continued to reinforce his narrative that he and Colindres had decided on their own to see 
what the gangs would be willing to agree to and that gangs would never have acceded to 
government involvement in the negotiation process (Interview with Mijango, 2013). Initial 
communiques issued by the gangs themselves also rejected media allegations that the 
government had been instrumental to the negotiation of an agreement (MSX3 and Pandilla 
18, 2012). They stated, ‘we reiterated to all of society that, yes, we have been part of the 
problem but we ask you today to let us be part of the solution…’ (quoted in Pries, 2013a). 
                                                                                                                                                    
civil war Duarte administration, had no formal experience in security, intelligence, or law enforcement. The 
move meant that Perdomo was likely to be heavily supported by his second in command, active duty Colonel 
Simón Molina Montoya, who had been Munguia Payés’ intelligence advisor at the Ministry of Defence. It 
was also alleged that Montoya was a significant player in the country’s shadow or parallel power structures.  
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Despite the staying power over the first year of the SGT, most actors at the national and 
regional levels were reluctant to join in the new security governance space. One NGO 
worker close to the issue argued: ‘How can we support something we have no 
understanding of? There has been every explanation under the sun – for a week or so there 
were even reports from the government that the truce emerged from none other than the 
“miraculous hand of God!”’ (Interview with Rikkers, 2013). International community 
members including several embassy representatives had been cautiously optimistic when 
the SGT initially emerged but within months argued that although they had been ready to 
join in the process but its lack of transparency, including whether the government was 
involved or not, limited what they were willing or capable of contributing (Participant 
Observation, 2012; 2013). Throughout efforts to expand and solidify this multi-level truce 
structure, the lack of clarity from government actors limited the number of others who 
were willing to engage. 
After six months, Munguia Payés, Mijango, and Colindres cautiously floated that the Truce 
was not the ‘work of a miracle’ nor was it developed by or at the behest of the Catholic 
Church as had sometimes been alleged,
25
 but rather that it was a ‘process carefully 
designed from the Office of the Ministry of Public Security, with the endorsement of 
President Funes’ (Martinez & Sanz, 2012). The belief suggested that Mijango had begun 
the negotiation process in January 2012, two months following Munguia Payés’ 
appointment, and Colindres had been brought in as a Church representative after leading 
bishops had refused to enter the process (Ibid.).
26
 A week later, in September 2012, 
President Funes again denied the existence of a plan to officially treat with gang factions 
and claimed the administration had not had knowledge of the initiative (Lemus, 2012). As 
such, government announcements designed to guarantee a long-term strategy to build on 
the window of opportunity the SGT provided were just as quickly dropped or ignored as 
the responsible government persons were criticised on multiple sides from Truce 
detractors. During this first year, it appeared that the only international entity willing to 
take a risk on the initiative was the Organization of American States (OAS), through 
Secretary General Jose Miguel Insula and Secretary of Multidimensional Security (SMS) 
Adam Blackwell. They held meetings with gang leaders, arranged for special ceremonies 
                                                 
25
 Blackwell has since remarked that it appeared that others within the Catholic Church were jealous over 
Colindres’ involvement in the negotiation process (Blackwell, 2015). Although it did not immediately push 
the rest of the institution to jump in, elements were significantly involved in the territorialisation of the SGT 
as well as in new rounds of talks in 2014-2015 after the original SGT had failed (Ibid.).  
26
 Martínez and Sanz brilliantly catch one potential justification for the Truce to appear to be headed by a 
member of the church: ‘there are people that when you put a priest in front of them, or at the Church, and it is 
like they disconnected part of their brain: they stop asking questions’ (Martinez & Sanz, 2012).  
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of truce acknowledgement, and presided over a partial disarmament of the treating parties 
which included several weapons drop events as official guarantors of the process 
(Speaking Notes from Blackwell, 2015). Their participation in the Truce was officially 
welcomed by gang negotiators who sent an official communication to the OAS to request 
ceasefire oversight (OAS, 2012a).  
The OAS was seen by some to take an eager role in the Truce as a means of shoring up its 
influence in the region and returning to the importance it enjoyed during the multi-lateral 
peace negotiations realised at the end of the Cold War. It initiated a multi-sectoral 
Coordinating Technical Commission to support its actions in the process in keeping with 
its evolution over the last decade
27
 but again the Salvadoran government was relatively 
ambiguous about the initiative. Truce negotiators Mijango and Colindres had not reduced 
their involvements, however, and in November 2012, they facilitated a second phase of the 
Truce which brought the agreement to the people through a mechanism of territorialisation: 
where municipalities were to be designated ‘Special Zones of Peace, through the 
Salvadoran application of the concept of SANCTUARY MUNICIPALITIES’ (Interpeace, 
2013). Interpeace came on board in a facilitating capacity to help with the implementation 
of the next phase of the Truce as a trusted independent party and local social infrastructure 
was pulled in through the very nature of ‘territorialisation’ (Interview with Mijango, 2013; 
Participant Observation, 2013; Speaking notes from Blackwell, 2015). Through the OAS’ 
facilitation of the Truce process to include various operations, the implementation of a new 
Humanitarian Commission, and the implementation of a reintegration work programme, 
the international community became open to further involvement. 
The EU supported the Truce process largely through a specialised foundation set up to 
transition the process through the next steps of rehabilitation and provided funds for 
Interpeace’s involvement (Ibid.). Through Interpeace, the EU further provided technical 
assistance and ‘transferred mediation and dialogue knowledge to El Salvador’ (Blackwell, 
2015). It was through these international organisations that the real connection to 
municipalities was established. Through them, local governments including Salvador 
Ruano (Ilopango), Oscar Ortiz (Santa Tecla), and Roberto Aquino (Sonsonate) became 
                                                 
27
 The 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas gave renewed power to the idea of multi-dimensional 
security in the Americas in the OAS-led incarnation of multi-level, multi-actor security building. The 
expansion has been pursued with great vigour and is becoming increasingly accepted by member states; as 
Adam Blackwell notes, both Mexican General Naranjo and Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have confirmed the need for the different tools, 
diversity of actors, and institutions encompassed by the OAS’s multi-dimensional efforts (Speaking notes 
from Blackwell, 2015).  
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more closely involved as members of the Technical Committee on the Coordination of the 
Process to Reduce Violence (CTC), and generated greater confidence in the potential for 
lasting results (Interpeace, 2013). From within, the gangs’ key figures such as Viejo Lin in 
prison or Marvin Gonzalez in Ilopango, gained visibility not only within the process but 
internationally as figureheads of a novel process. Furthermore, the process would not have 
advanced as far as it did without the direct intervention of female family members of gang 
members who forced the issue that enough was enough (Blackwell, 2015) and local 
Violence Prevention Councils who, sometimes for the first time, met directly with gang 
members. A 2013 systematisation workshop with participant municipalities found that the 
process had increased inter-institutional connections both horizontally, between local civil 
society, government, and security operators, and vertically between different levels of 
government (Interpeace, 2013). In particular, multi-level inter-institutional technical 
committees allowed for greater communication and responsibility articulations between 
diverse local entities under the leadership of the municipal government (Ibid.).  
At the same time, NGOs and civil society organisations with long-term experience 
working with gangs felt that they had been side-lined from the whole SGT process as a 
result of its concentration under military-aligned structures. NGOs FESPAD and SSPAS 
had both similarly advocated for open discussions with gang structures before 2009 and 
even begun a new initiative, the Mesas de la Esperanza (Tables of Hope), where family 
members of gang members worked towards the improvement of prison conditions 
(Interviews with Guillén, 2013; Rodríguez López, 2013). Former Catholic priest, Antonio 
Rodríguez López, had been brought in by the Funes government in 2009 to open new 
approaches to the criminal violence associated with gangs but the relationship broke down 
(Interview with Rodríguez López). FESPAD director Silvia Guillén was particularly 
discontented with the treatment the Government had given Padre Toño stating that when 
he brought a truce proposal to the attention of the government in 2010, the government had 
him investigated by the Prosecutor General (Interview with Guillén, 2013). She continued 
that then, when the government decided on a Truce, they had not come to those 
organisations with a long history of gang work and advocacy, ‘they permanently 
disqualified us and told us that we were friends of the gangs’ with Munguía Payés stating 
publically that FESPAD had been ‘penetrated by the gangs’ (Ibid.). 
The inclusion of gang members as legitimate actors in a process of hybrid security 
governance was significantly contentious. Many international bodies, including foreign 
governments, stated that they could not participate in any section of projects linked to the 
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SGT because it would appear that they were ‘negotiating with terrorists’ (Participant 
Observation, 2012; 2013). Civil society actors worried that work programmes designed to 
facilitate small business ventures for demobilised gang members was favouring criminals 
over the ‘legitimate’ needs of patient poor individuals already in line: what was to stop 
gang members from forcing local communities to buy only from their bakery as the newest 
form of extortion putting others out of business, questioned others (Interviews with NGO 
Technical Expert, 2013; Rikkers, 2013). Some security officials saw the work of the 
parallel state in the Truce where organised crime had made agreements with these shadow 
government directors to bypass institutions for control beyond law enforcement (Interview 
with PNC, 2012). The parallel state, remnants of the state intelligence community 
established during the civil war and forgotten after the Peace Accords, was said to have a 
vested interest in the management of criminal organisations and, as such, even those who 
had supported talks with gangs were against the manner in which this ‘militarised’ truce 
had come about (Interviews with PNC, 2012; Guillén, 2013; Participant Observation, 
2013). A member of the PNC alleged that it was clear in the manner that the Truce had 
come about that it had been developed by parallel structures rather than official 
government institutions (Interview with PNC, 2012).
28
 
In this way, the Salvadoran Gang Truce had substantial actor-shifting effects on 
Salvadoran security governance spaces, beginning at the national level. It introduced a 
range of new actors but also side-lined long-term civil society actors with expertise in the 
subject matter. That the process was conducted with changing narratives and actor 
frameworks also helped to discredit the process among citizens and potential civil society 
actors, ultimately leading to its downfall. The inclusion of new actors like SGT negotiators 
Mijango and Colindres served to further problematize the process due to questions over 
their true allegiances. The inclusion of gang members in the multi-actor fabric, aside from 
those accusations of parties ‘negotiating with terrorists’, led to fears that gangs had 
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 To clarify, the individual stated that ‘a good part of the proposal was in the hands of the military police and 
of parallel structures. When speaking about parallel structures, they are not visible, and they do not 
necessarily respond to an institution.’ The group was alleged to be comprised of a few military personnel, 
colonels, and the [actual – 2012] director of the police. Continuing, they explained that ‘in this country, the 
problem of parallel structures is that at a given moment, they could assume a role that they really should not 
take and in some cases, affect the institutions or even become the institutions that drive other types of 
situations’. They compare the emerging situation to that during conflict era death squads established to 
exterminate political opponents and who were sometimes integrated in security details. It was based in this 
history that the individual was distrustful of the peace process because official accounts only highlighted the 
actions of two individuals [Mijango and Colindras] when in reality there were other people involved 
including military intelligence or those who had left military intelligence and who were now participant in 
parallel structures representing neither the police nor the army. They concluded, ‘if [these individuals] are not 
in service of an [official] strategy, then this is a risk within the manner in which [the truce] has been 
negotiated’ (Interview with PNC, 2012).  
P r i e s  | 101 
 
solidified political capital through the process. In particular, that violent activity could be 
used to hold countries and populations hostage to their demands and gain a seat at the top 
tables of government. Indeed, through this flexible security governance space created by 
the gang truce, gangs were able to establish themselves as actors with diplomatic ties to 
international organisations and local mayors alike. There were the fears among certain 
sectors of the actor network that gangs without ideology and little interest in country 
stability could use new found political capital to establish criminal enterprises with long 
reaches to protect themselves from prosecution. The SGT demonstrated that gangs have 
the command structure to operate more sophisticated criminal organisations and that they 
have the coherence to act at a negotiation level with security institutions.
29
 
4.3 International actors 
This section will first present international actors as they operate within state-level security 
governance structures. It will then introduce the regional Central American Integration 
System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana: SICA) structure and the actors 
involved in security governance from the region. Within the national security governance 
framework, numerous foreign countries, entities, and international organisations make 
substantial contributions. They provide practical advice and expertise and have the 
potential to influence ideological shifts in specific policies or how operations are 
implemented. PREPAZ, as the violence prevention directorate within the MJSP, was 
particularly involved from 2009 in structuring international involvement with the ministry 
on the development of prevention strategies – a target focus for many international actors. 
Director Santiago Flores was said to have provided greater structure or coordinated 
interactions for international cooperation efforts involved in direct support for communities 
but which simultaneously provided general policy support to the government (Interview 
with PREPAZ Official, 2012). Some countries like China and Taiwan were interested in 
providing specific resources, such as vehicles, to the ministry for security activities linked 
to repressive police and prisons actions but were not at all interested in contributing to 
violence prevention; however, these were generally in the minority (Ibid.). Some countries 
like the United States, Canada, Germany, and Spain would work directly through their 
                                                 
29
 The FMLN administration had been interested in including diverse actors in its multi-level spaces of 
security governance. First, they arranged negotiations in a manner that offered plausible deniability. Instead 
of using civil society or even non-security government actors as had been originally discussed in their 
security governance planning sessions before the election, the structure provided was purely military, likely 
as a means of backing up violent actors with security actors if something went wrong. The experiment to 
engage gang entities in security governance lacked the boldness required to be transformative. 
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Embassies as well as through associated agencies or representative NGOs (USAID/DEA, 
IDRC/CECI, GIZ, and AECID respectively).  Whilst Canada was limited in its ability to 
contribute to multi-lateral institutions due to domestic restrictions, EU countries had 
greater flexibility in the multiple directions they could be involved in but preferenced 
violence prevention and collaborative efforts at the regional level over repressive projects 
at the national level.  
Germany, always an interested party in Central American states, had undergone changes in 
its approach to security over the 2000s. Their long-term strategy had focused on 
environmental or climate initiatives, energy production conversions, and employment 
programmes as a holistic, human security approach; the changed approach focused 
preference on a regional emphasis in citizen security building projects (Interview with 
German Official, 2012). This did not mean that they stopped working bilaterally with El 
Salvador but rather that they had decided to move into a regional direct approach with a 
regional programme to capacitate government officials at the provincial or departmental 
level instead of attempting to influence security changes from the top, as with their 
programme PROJOVENS (Ibid.). A German Embassy official explained this changing 
approach as a two principle strategy: first, an ‘abiding solidarity’ with the people of 
Central America; and second, as a part of Germany’s commitment to support budding 
regional integration efforts (Ibid.). In this way, they worked with the state to identify their 
target municipalities in combination with historical German Agency for International 
Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fùr Internationale Zusammenarbeit: GIZ) working 
relationships in particular departments or municipalities and came out with a list of 
departments and municipalities that balanced the two (Interview with Esmail, 2012).
30
 In 
order to ensure that their own working definition of prevention was central to programme 
development, they identified four Ministries with whom they would work and run training 
for both government and large-NGO staff (Ibid.). Diagnoses were conducted for the 
Education, Justice, Youth, and Labour Ministries to bring national policies to the 
departmental level and through them, implementation for municipal manifestations of 
national ministry responsibilities (Ibid.). The training programme for government and 
NGO staff included the National University in order to allow trained individuals to receive 
a University certificate and to build continuity into the programme. Esmail’s justification 
was that the more people trained at various levels and with various types of actors, the 
                                                 
30
 Esmail explained they had chosen three departments with five municipalities in each department. 
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more likely it would be that tools would be disseminated and adopted for long-term 
institutional change (Ibid.). 
The United States presented a very different approach to Germany in its ideology, focus, 
and operations. Instead of the predominant violence prevention focus of the former, the 
United States had a two pronged approach with the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funding community projects and prevention initiatives whilst the 
DEA, INL, and security institutions, through regional strategies like CARSI, worked more 
directly with police and military forces to combat criminal elements. However, one 
programme which paralleled the sub-national approach adopted by the Germans was a 
police strengthening strategy involving the reconstruction of police holding cells, police 
proximity to schools, and a police-youth soccer league project (Interview with Rose, 
2013). Prison reform was a focus for the United States to improve conditions for prisoners. 
First, they worked with the government to improve electronic documentation and prisoner 
tracking. Second, they worked with departmental police departments to build a new system 
of holding cells which had long been overcrowded. The thinking was that improved 
conditions were important for the whole system, although not falling directly into 
repressive or prevention programming but rather into intelligence; a cooperative 
intelligence unit within the prisons was pushed by the US to catch ‘low-hanging’ 
intelligence fruit (Ibid.). Rose noted that the new government in 2009 wanted to try a new 
approach differing from repression but the problem got worse, especially in the prisons and 
it took time to re-establish a constructive working relationship (Ibid.).  
Another feature of the relationship between international organisations and foreign 
governments at the national level was its fluidity of idea transfer between consulting 
entities and government officials. Although the process was not structured or based on 
specific selection criteria, a diverse group was able to contribute to national policy 
development as trainers, baseline data contributors, and as monitors, evaluators, and 
implementers of policies and programmes. International organisations like the UNDP, the 
UNODC, and the IOM perceived their roles to be the production of policy proposals for 
consideration by the government as well as the technical formation required to improve the 
implementation of government policies that aligned with their organisations’ objectives 
and goals. Organisations were also involved at the other end of the programme spectrum in 
operations, implementing related projects at the local level. Institutions involved in the 
actualisation and implementation of projects developed on the basis of government policies 
were those like private companies Research Triangle Institute International (RTI) and 
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Creative International (both US companies). They were contracted as a reliable 
intermediary by foreign governments and donor bodies that needed to prove to their 
shareholders that donor funds were being monitored along international standards. RTI 
director Guillermo Garcia noted that their speciality was working in a local, territorial, and 
participatory manner based on 15-20 years of experience in the Salvadoran context 
(Interview with Garcia, 2012). Garcia explained, ‘we work in these areas through non-
governmental organisations that are the topic specialists. We facilitate the resources with 
which the non-governmental organisations work’ (Ibid.). RTI saw its role as a coordinator 
and a facilitator to advance perceptions on what constituted prevention as well as to ensure 
that their projects were properly addressed by the ministries in question. After particular 
projects wrapped up, RTI also made mention of how the equipment, including trucks and 
computers, involved would be donated to the government (Interview with Garcia, 2012). 
RTI was also a participant in roundtable consultations on security policy formulation. 
Regional and international banks were also engaged in security policy development and 
consulted on programme implementation. The Inter-American Development Bank (BID) 
was cautious in its articulation of the role it played, officially limiting itself to an advisory 
position (Interview with BID Official, 2012). However, it was also noted that the Bank had 
strict guidelines as to the types of projects for which it could provide technical assistance 
and financing, indicating that projects might change scope to increase potential for bank 
loans. Furthermore, the BID only worked at the national level due to the nature of funding-
loan structures and preferred to support prevention programming developed nationally for 
local projects with concrete results; one example provided was that of the recuperation of 
public spaces. A BID representative emphasised the line that the Bank had to walk 
between systematisation, modernisation, technification, and increased efficiency on the one 
hand and requests for facilitation of repression and arms purchases, for example, on the 
other (Ibid.). In other words, the BID was careful to emphasise that they hold discussions 
with the government during and after policy making takes place with the intent to provide 
technical expertise. Their particular concern in each case was to ensure that policies would 
have the capacity to be operationalised with material, trackable outcomes as well as to be 
in keeping with their own investment guidelines (Ibid.). The idea, the BID official argued, 
was to ‘build together’ (Ibid.).  
What begins to become clear in the above section, however, is that there are relationship 
divisions not only due to practical operational necessities but due to the ideological 
foundations from which they set out their objectives and goals. Problematising these actors 
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in multi-actor, multi-level security governance is that most of the contributions which they 
offer are ad hoc and exist without long-term guarantees of continuing responsibility. Thus, 
it falls to the government to enact the coordinating structures, the accountability 
mechanisms for their citizens, and the steering of programming to make sure they are in 
keeping with the established policies and objectives. Running security governance through 
flexible working relationships may allow for faster response with coordinating actors in the 
short term but lacks medium- to long- term guarantees to Salvadoran citizens that 
programmes are developed for their best interest, with the right actors, and the proper 
mechanisms. Supplementing badly funded, potentially fragile government institutions with 
a security governance multi-actor network becomes fraught when accountability and 
oversight mechanisms are hindered by the same scarce resources within those same 
institutions.    
4.3.1 Regional actors 
The Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) as developed by the Central American 
Integration System (SICA) was the most visible and ‘new’ of the regional efforts to 
address their complex security environment in cooperation and collaboration with other 
states on the isthmus. Although the SICA’s function has always been more diplomatic and 
economic than policy-directed, practical, or operational in nature, one of its intended 
functions from the end of the Cold War period in the region was to act as a broker in 
regional security. To that end, it perceives of itself as an increasingly important regional 
body for the collective improvement of the isthmus. The idea of collaborative security 
remained almost entirely conceptual until 2007 when the ESCA agreement was adopted by 
the regional countries’ Heads of State and supported by the SICA governing body during 
the XXXI Reunion Ordinaria in Guatemala. The actors involved in the ESCA included 
diplomatic headquarters personnel, seconded civil servants from member countries, 
government representatives from national governments, as well as occasional key 
municipal mayors. Unique to the process was a ‘Group of Friends’, select international 
organisations, foreign states, and funding bodies, who had been invited or asked to join the 
process. Most were not new to working in Central America but rather had been involved in 
financing and implementing programming as well as influencing policy development at 
other levels of government over the decades. Although these entities were there to observe, 
they thereafter took on a greater coordination and facilitation role with growing influence 
over strategy content and function. The selection was made in an attempt to solidify 
international support for a ‘new approach’ to regional security.  
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Figure 4-4: Structure of the SICA's Security Strategy 
 
The SICA was meant to act as a tool of the member states and make representation to the 
international community, much in the manner of a regional security community organ. 
Building on the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Central American states 
suggested a shift towards new modalities of funding in which recipient governments would 
have more decision-making freedom based on their own established objectives and 
priorities (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012). Member-states also promoted the ESCA to the 
international community as a harmonising effort which would reduce inefficiencies, 
overlap, and repetition of project efforts (Ibid.). By collaborating on security governance at 
the regional level, participant parties would be able to share best practices and coordinate 
efforts for efficient implementation, thereby allowing more coverage on a wider number of 
projects. Some member states were more eager to move the ESCA process forward than 
others; for example, Nicaraguan representatives were said to have travelled through 
hurricane conditions by car to make sure that they were present at every meeting whilst 
Costa Rica and El Salvador would sometimes substitute representatives with lower-level 
officials or not show up at all (Interview with SICA Official, 2012). Nevertheless, all 
member-states frequently engaged in positive rhetoric on the overall value of the ESCA.  
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The General Secretariat of the SICA assumed a facilitating or coordinating role in the 
process.
31
 Within the SICA, the Regional Democratic Security Directorate is that with the 
most control over the ESCA although the Border Security Directorate is also integrally 
involved. The Democratic Security unit was headed up by Erich Vílchez who treated the 
process as his own legacy contribution to regional integration: security troubles had ‘made 
possible regional integration – because this is a Secretariat of Integration, not a Ministry of 
Security’ (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). As the regional project coordinator, Alexander 
Chacon V. explained, the SICA was ‘a moderator of the processes but the substantive 
decisions of the subjects fall to the decision of the countries. The Secretary General has 
facilitated the process as the technical support to the work of the Commission of Security 
of Central America’ (Interview with Chacon, 2012).  The Secretary General was also 
described as a go-between for the cooperating organisations, the donors, and the friendly 
countries to generate visibility for the ESCA (Ibid.). However, the structure and 
responsibilities of the SICA and its Democratic Security Unit changed in 2011.  
SICA personnel during these negotiations were comprised of seconded state civil servants 
and international organisational experts along with individual experts hired to implement 
specific activities. Within the Democratic Security Directorate, there were seconded 
members of the UNODC and the IOM to help with the technical tasks brought into the 
office as a result of the ESCA. Their primary function was to support the elaboration of the 
ESCA thematic pillars and provide the technical support to develop project documents 
therein; thereafter, they were supposed to help get the projects off the ground through the 
facilitation of member-state adoption mechanisms (Interview with Loya Marin, 2012). 
However, given that there were insufficient personnel to cover all activities, many ended 
up covering multiple components of the ESCA or collaborating with outside entities who 
had agreed to take up responsibility to enact specific topics.  
The distrust of the international community further affected the working potential of the 
SICA to build the ESCA. Many saw the SICA as a long-term diplomatic body with little to 
no experience in the administration, monitoring, or evaluation of a regional strategy like 
the ESCA which required project budgeting and reporting. Steps were taken to mitigate 
these fears but not all responded positively. First, Spain, as a primary donor and further 
administrator of some part of the EU funds, was provided offices directly within the SICA 
                                                 
31
 The General Secretariat executes executive functions through the Secretary General who is appointed by 
the collective Heads of State of SICA members. The agenda is coordinated between the Secretary General 
and the President pro témpore. The Presidency rotates geographically between the Heads of State member 
states on a six monthly basis. 
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headquarters to increase oversight of all operations (Interview with Democratic Security 
Official, 2012). Second, each component of the ESCA was assigned administrative 
members from the group of friends which would oversee and guide both the development 
of the topic-specific projects, coordinate donor responses, and push the whole system 
forward. The United States took the leadership for the ‘combating crime’ pillar; Germany 
took on the coordination of the violence prevention committee; Spain committed to guide 
the institution strengthening framework; and the BID to coordinating the rehabilitation, 
reinsertion, and prison security component. The SICA argued that the projects needed to be 
diverse in their implementation and oversight so that no single actor could claim a specific 
project or activities therein (Interview with Vílchez, 2012). They were envisioned as 
‘macro-activities’ defined by the Central Americans [member-states], coordinated by 
donors through multi-lateral meetings but maintained as multi-actor frameworks (Ibid.). 
The reality was much more difficult to manage. Some countries, like Canada, were 
restricted through national laws from allocating funds to a regional diplomatic body like 
the SICA. Other countries were supportive of the process in principle, like Germany, but 
chose to designate programmes that they already had in progress as constituting their 
‘donation’ to the regional effort – thereby effectively bypassing the strict requests of the 
SICA member states. 
Although state representatives made mention of local experts, this did not appear to include 
civil society organisations and NGOs whilst even more traditional police bodies felt there 
was a paucity of consultation. Some member-state government officials stated it was 
unnecessary for police or other security institutions to be involved in the development 
process because their function was purely operational in nature (Participant Observation, 
2012). Outside of the meetings, observing security officials argued that the ESCA was 
likely to be weakened because it had not consulted with them in any meaningful manner 
and thus there was perceived to be a disconnect between ESCA aspirations and operational 
realities (Ibid.). The regional INTERPOL director was more blunt, arguing that the 
Regional Commission of Police Chiefs had established experience in regional security 
coordination and not to consult with these bodies would mean that the ESCA was 
weakened by a lack of operational perspective (Interview with INTERPOL, 2012). As a 
result, security officials generally remained sceptical that the ESCA could function with 
any degree of efficacy over the long term. 
There was a sensitivity or defensiveness among government officials when acknowledging 
the lack of consultation with civil society. The Tegucigalpa Protocol (1995) setting out the 
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parameters of the ESCA provided clear requirements for a consultative council of civil 
society entities. The difficulty, noted one MJSP official, was putting that consultation into 
action (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). First, coordination was required among 
member countries in the selection of entities which was an overtly political process. 
Second, relatively parallel organisations had to be chosen across member states to ensure 
consistency of approach which was difficult given the aforementioned fraught relationship 
specific governments had with specific organisations. There were also significant financial 
considerations involved with member-states unwilling to divert funds away from projects 
or other favoured activities to add one more level of negotiation. Civil society 
organisations were also considered by some government officials to be advocates first and 
foremost of their own platforms and methodological constructions, some of which had 
already been considered by national and regional entities. Others tossed off civil society 
usefulness stating, ‘in many cases, there are good proposals and in other cases, ethereal, 
idealistic and unaffordable’ (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012).  
Furthermore, some government officials were not keen to add what civil society and 
private organisations had to contribute to the process. RTI Director Guillermo Garcia 
argued that regional processes needed to be fed from base, that the strategy needed to be 
more grounded, and that there needed to be greater recognition that individual components 
or projects could not necessarily be homogeneous across the board (Interview with Garcia, 
2012). FLASCO director Carlos Ramos found that Central American presidents were 
looking for a security in the region without really understanding what the definition of that 
security was and whether it was a security for which they were sacrificing democracy. The 
periodic distrust exhibited by Salvadoran civil society organisations over the potential 
power influences at play in the ESCA might also have played in a role in their limited 
consultation (Interview with Aguilar, 2012). In particular, some like IUDOP Director 
Jeannette Aguilar were worried whether one more interregional tool might just be one 
more way the United States could direct economic and security policies within individual 
Central American states (Ibid.). 
4.4 The Municipal: Actor or end-users? 
Local security governance structures are the most difficult to characterise due to their 
diversity of actors, policies, functions, and operations. In an attempt to best draw out local 
dynamics, three municipalities were selected based on their political allegiances, 
programme experience in violence prevention, and participation in national and regional 
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security governance initiatives, as already discussed. Although government officials 
working in national ministries oversaw the development and implementation of security 
policies, many of the programming and project implementation tasks fell to local 
government officials working in conjunction with local and national NGOs as well as 
international organisations and foreign governments through their specialised agencies. A 
focus point for the FMLN government, although not a new idea, was to source policy ideas 
and programming innovations from local municipalities to feed into national security 
governance plans. From the end of the civil war, municipalities have been relatively free to 
interact with the international community and build violence prevention strategies as suited 
their objectives and political will. The nation’s largest municipal violence prevention 
programme was run by the UNDP and supported by the Pan-American Health 
Organization (OPS: Organización Panamericana de la Salud), the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA: Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidads), the 
International Labour Organization (OIT: Organización Internacional del Trabajo) and 
UNICEF (Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infacia). With cross-Salvador coverage, 
it involved follow-up exchanges on best practices because, as UNDP Democratic 
Governability Director Marcela Smutt argued, there was a great need for better linkages 
between the different points of state, ‘between the central level and local governments, 
between the state and civil society’ (Interview with Smutt, 2013).  
Believing as Smutt did that there were important developments that could best been seen at 
the local level, the FMLN began public consultations prior to the 2009 presidential 
elections in order to build a consultative security and violence prevention policy (Interview 
with Smutt, 2013). They were building on a process that had begun in 2002 when the first 
programme efforts were made to build violence and crime prevention mechanisms from 
the local level. From that point, the UNDP argues that it has been the municipalities which 
have been leading on the development of citizen security (PNUD, 2009b). Through 
Dialogue Roundtables (MD: Mesas de Dialogo), the FMLN crossed the country seeking 
contributions of community leaders and civil society. The party’s outputs considered not 
only their own ideological leanings but the 2007 results and recommendations offered by 
the previous administration’s bipartisan Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana 
y Paz Social. Contained in the National Policy for Justice and Citizen Security (Política 
Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia: PNJSC) is the role of prevention 
as an important function of building security. The document also considers the role of the 
Ministry for Justice and Public Security (MJSP) as one which facilitates inter-institutional 
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coordination as well forms alliances with public and private central or local actors 
especially for prevention tasks as in the example of the Municipal Councils for Violence 
Prevention (MJSP, 2012a, p.32). As such, although bottom-up processes are considered in 
national policy, the very nature of their conceptualisation and implementation from the top 
as well as being administered by the MJSP’s PREPAZ unit compromises grassroots 
contributions. Despite ideological conviction on the part of the governing party, it appears 
that the challenge of allowing local innovation which can be scaled up remains 
compromised in the practical processes of security and prevention initiatives. As such, they 
formalised existing citizen security councils or instigated new councils where none had 
previously existed around the country. In the communities of Ilopango, Santa Tecla, 
Sonsonate, Sonzacate and Acajutla, local committees were formalised with the help of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during the period 2009-2012. The 
Municipal Committees of Citizen Security and Coexistence were created to implement and 
follow security policies and priorities. Specifically, ‘these committees are those in charge 
of the design, the development and the supervision of the policy, as well as the strategies 
and the municipal plans for citizen security and coexistence’ (Smutt & Carsana, 2012, p. 
41).  
With the launching of the FMLN government security policy, Municipal Councils for 
Violence Prevention were officially adopted within the Security and Social Peace 
Commission operating under the Strategic Affairs Secretariat. The Councils were to 
promote civil society collaboration and the conversion of municipalities and communities 
into territories free from arms as a first step to greater ‘convivencia’ or coexistence 
(PNUD, 2011). Although viewed primarily as an ‘operative’ mechanism, Violence 
Prevention Councils were also intended to facilitate the larger structures of security 
governance, according to their individual capacities (Interview with Flores, 2012). 
Specifically, explained PREPAZ director Santiago Flores, who was in charge of 
implementing the bottom-up consultative approach, each Council was comprised of those 
actors unique to that municipality so that larger cities might have greater capacities with a 
wider range of public, civil, and private business actors, but that all would be a reflection 
of their community dynamics (Ibid.). Councils often further divided into diagnostic and 
planning committees with the latter more directly linked to the national level. The make-up 
of these councils changed depending on political will, elections, and bilateral working 
relationships. For instance, FESPAD had maintained a close working relationship with 
Soyapnago, Apopa, Ciudad Delgado, and Ilopango over a decade during which they 
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provided support and training to earlier iterations of municipal violence prevention 
councils. When municipal elections took place in 2012, and ARENA mayors were elected 
in Apopa, Mejicanos, Ilopango, and Soyapango, several relationships broke down. 
FESPAD Director Maria Silvia Guillén explained how the Mayor of Ilopango was able to 
slowly continue the working relationship after a space of time but that the Municipal 
Government of Mejicanos completely closed the door to FESPAD’s participation in 
Violence Prevention Council work (Interview with Guillén, 2013). Guillén explained that 
there were distinct working opportunities with each government but the door had to be 
opened by the local government – sometimes pushed open by community groups who 
wanted to work with larger national organisations like FESPAD – and that not all 
municipalities were equally open to multi-actor working relationships on security. 
Furthermore, international organisations like the UNDP, entities like the EU, or foreign 
government agencies like USAID were sometimes more acceptable counterparts to local 
organisations than national NGOs or civil society organisations which were perceived to 
hold political allegiances, specific agendas, and represent a potential competition for 
funding.  
Figure 4-4: Salvadoran security governance actors 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter starts from the point of a new government in El Salvador. The challenge is to 
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diverse security actors. In particular, the history of the FMLN as an ex-guerrilla party 
rising to power with the help of a president that was not of the old guard created rifts in the 
approaches used to structure new security governance spaces as well as the actors that 
should be participant therein. First, at the national level, institutional reforms to facilitate 
new actor approaches to security are contrasted with the novel event of a national gang 
truce. In both cases, the government was found to work through traditional actors who 
were pushed to innovate with new policy formation approaches or mechanisms of 
dialogue. This is in contrast to the initial motions of the party which promised to 
incorporate a greater diversity of actors in all security governance efforts. With the Truce, 
gangs constituted a new and unwieldy non-norm conforming actor, problematizing 
traditional working relationships and throwing into question the reliability of programme 
planning based on this unknown variable. However, in cases, actor and institutional 
accountability mechanisms were relatively minimal.  
 At the regional level, a new strategy to address security as a region made significant 
structural changes to the donor-recipient relationship as well as impacting on traditional 
bilateral state relationships. However, the roster of actors involved did not change in and of 
themselves. The difference was that the SICA was repositioned to act as a middle-man in 
collective bargaining. As such, it was accountability that became a troubling factor for the 
international community as many voiced concerns over SICA’s experience and reliability 
in administering a large strategy across the isthmus. State accountability was also a 
concern for security institutions and civil society organisations that were marginalised in 
the process because SICA lacks civic or democratic oversight, relying on the democratic 
election of member-state representatives. Finally, local security governance bodies are the 
most diverse and difficult to quantify. They lack the entrenched coordination and steering 
mechanisms of national governments, instead relying on a combination of actor interests, 
local political network mobilisation, and issues-framing discourse to structure policy 
objectives and strategic plans for violence prevention. As will be demonstrated in 
following chapters, it is here in municipalities that the most visible change mechanisms can 
be accomplished over short periods but where accountability can also be subject to local 
strong personalities. What local security governance actors demonstrate is a decreasing 
hierarchical framework being transformed into one structured around needs and 
requirements of the jurisdictional subject matter. 
The above structure and actor mapping exercise provides the groundwork for 
understanding the violent pluralities and hybrid governance theories that illuminates new 
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security governance spaces operating at multiple levels in El Salvador. Within the decision 
to place (recently) former military officials at the head of important civilian security 
ministries, for example, the violent plurality becomes evident not as something located just 
within criminal actors like gangs but across the security governance spaces in El Salvador. 
The hybridity of state and non-state actors in both formal and informal scales of 
governance further highlights the complexity of negotiating policy formation and 
governance outcomes. In particular, it begins to reveal the contested nature of these new 
space formations. It situates El Salvador’s experiences of institutional change firmly within 
the Latin American context that requires we understand its challenges and lived 
experiences in ‘a more nuanced and sophisticated way’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010, p. 
L707). However it is also in the emerging structures of security governance that the deep-
seated citizen security concepts of the assorted actors become increasingly evident. It is to 
these security concepts that this thesis now turns.  
Chapter 5 
Security Concepts in Policy 
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5.1 Introduction 
Security governance literature provides ample insight into how issues are framed, 
confronted, and managed. However, the varied actors involved in those processes of 
security construction are significantly complex and have been less fully explored. Building 
on the actors introduced in the previous chapter, this thesis now turns to issues of security 
concept construction for policy building. Whilst some priorities are clearly defined by the 
individual institution, risk identification tended to be aligned more closely with guiding 
perceptions – whether that was institutional or personal in nature. Balsacq argues: ‘the very 
existence of a security practice depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it is 
the most appropriate way to secure what they commonly value’ (Balzacq, 2015, p. 3). Few 
concepts are more important to this context than that of citizen security, as has already 
been discussed extensively. However, it is worth noting once more that the following 
security concepts here have been largely structured within the expansive and regressive 
strands of citizen security. Furthermore, citizen security engagement with violence situates 
crime and criminal activity as its main opponent. From that point, causal concepts of 
history, the neoliberal project, and a culture of violence also emerge.  
Employing a multi-actor based model of security policy development, this chapter will 
take into account not just the arguments of elites in identifying security challenges but also 
a wide range of other, non-dominant, actors from industry, NGOs, the international 
community and local agents. As discussed in Chapter 4, the security community in El 
Salvador is very small but even so, not all actors have lines of communication to others but 
rely on certain actors as conduits (Hoogensen Gjorv, 2012). In the development of security 
concepts in policy and strategy, it is important to elaborate on how these divergent groups 
perceive the security they are attempting to influence. In the next section, the problems of 
measuring contemporary violence in a space where much perception is actually based on 
‘myth’ are introduced. Even when adopting a standard approach to measurement 
indicators, the sources and manner in which reporting mechanisms are constructed can 
speak to the underlying hegemonic processes that typically construct violence and security 
analysis. Next, international and municipal security perceptions are presented as the multi-
level contributions to security governance spaces. Thereafter, the balance of the chapter 
will discuss the FMLN’s written policy development – how it is reviewed and assessed. 
Here, combat and prevention-orientated slants to actor perceptions are analysed to assess 
the manner in which actors are able to contemplate each form of security; the concept of 
‘trust’ in security building is an important part of this scrutiny (McSweeney, 1999). 
P r i e s  | 117 
 
Outside of the main written policies of the FMLN administration, reactions to those 
policies will be considered under the themes of policing, community empowerment, 
regional strategies, and a national gang truce. Finally, this chapter concludes by returning 
to the influence of citizen security in its observations that security governance between 
2009 and 2014 invoked both combat and prevention actions simultaneously; as entities 
competed for strategic dominance, but also in an attempt to be true both to the 
transformative approach undertaken by a system struggling with violence and respond to 
the demands for security from a population living under threat. 
5.2 Measuring Risk in El Salvador 
More than two decades after the signing of the Peace Accords, El Salvador remains a 
country driven by fear, crime, violence, and aspirations of security. However, 
understanding of what comprises that security varies widely. Whilst homicides are the 
most common measure for security, other variables may be used in conjunction, such as 
disappearance, gender and familial violence, theft, perceptions of victimisation, or trust in 
security providers (state, police, military) or definitions may be broadened to include 
inequality and quality of life measures but each come with their own set of limitations. 
What is certain, violence and crime are complex concepts measured in many different 
forms, occasionally with conflicting motives and consequences. This section will first 
examine public opinions on the greatest problems facing El Salvador. It will then proceed 
to present the chief measurements which have become standard in baseline studies on 
security in the country since the end of El Salvador’s civil war. It will close with some 
reflections on the limitations of these measurements as a presentation of the ‘actual’ 
situation in the country during the period of study. 
5.2.1 Indicator producers 
There are two major sources reporting on perceptions of the greatest issues in El Salvador, 
perceptions of security and associated trust in the public institutions of state and civil 
society. First, is the University Institution of Public Opinion (Instituto Universitario de 
Opinión Pública: IUDOP) based in San Salvador.  The second resource is the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project out of Vanderbilt University in the United States. In 
addition, the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel 
Ungo: FUNDAUNGO) is a small institution in El Salvador that provides academic studies 
related to development and democratic governance which has accumulated territorial-level 
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data on violence and public perceptions. IUDOP and LAPOP have both carried out surveys 
in El Salvador since the end of the civil war assessing life quality perceptions. Evaluations 
are based on questions that are subjective to the individual respondent including their 
interpretations, feelings, and value ascribed to the concrete reality of their lives (See Table 
5-2; Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2013). The table below presents the important 
psychological construction of perceptions that affect judgements, values, and emotions; for 
this case, how security perceptions are constructed. 
Table 5-1: Psychological Construction of the Perception of Insecurity (Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987 
presented in Observatorio de Seguridad Pública, 2013, p. 13) 
Level of 
Reference 
Type of Perception 
Judgements Values Emotions 
General Evaluations of 
security or the risk 
of other crimes 
Concerns over the 
crimes others 
experience 
Fear / anxiety for 
the victimisation of 
others 
Personal Evaluations of 
security or the 
personal risks from 
crime 
Personal 
intolerance, 
concerns over 
crimes done to the 
individual 
themselves 
Fear / anxiety over 
personal 
victimisation 
 
5.2.2 Measuring perceptions 
In 2002, FUNDAUNGO and IUDOP collaborated with the National Council on Public 
Security (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica: CNSP) and with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo: BID) in funding a baseline study 
on the perceptions of citizen security at multiple levels (CNSP, 2002). Here they found that 
at the turn of the millennium, people felt the most insecure in the bus, the market, parks 
and plazas, and in city centres (Ibid., p. 17). The feeling of insecurity in city centres 
persisted across the country with the highest incidents in San Salvador, La Union, San 
Miguel, and Sonsonate (Ibid., p. 18). As a result of this insecurity, people were changing 
their daily habits, closing small businesses, and converting residential streets into closed 
access corridors (Ibid., p. 21). Among all adult (18 +) age groups, about 50 percent were 
afraid of home invasions (Ibid., p. 24). Already in 2002, the report noted that the most 
common crimes reported in their survey were those associated with gang activities. Almost 
75 percent of Salvadorans were thought to have been accosted by a gang member 
(pandillero) with a request for money—with up to 16 percent experiencing the additional 
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pressure of a fire armed demand--whilst 1.3 percent acknowledged reporting their 
victimisation to the police (Ibid., p. 37). In this way, only a decade out from civil war, 
individuals were identifying the main violence in their lives as that associated with 
criminal violence and individual victimisation rather than the more traditional political 
violence of the civil war period and the 20th century. 
Moving forward a decade, the 2012 LAPOP report noted that given the significance of 
‘extremely high crime rates’, the effects of crime victimisation, and perceptions of crime—
including fear of insecurity associated therewith—are important for understanding society 
dynamics, as well as their potential impacts on democratic governance and stability 
(Córdova Macías, et al., 2013). They further posit that these factors could affect the trust 
and tolerance citizens feel towards one another and in communities. Perceptions of 
insecurity and crime victimisation for the neighbourhood in which individuals resided were 
requested, response levels indicated that El Salvador came sixth in Latin America and 
Salvadorans felt more insecure than in Honduras by far (43.8 percent versus 32.1 percent 
reported in Ibid., p. 110). Insecurity perceptions also had a notable concentration in large 
cities and the capital over the national average reflecting an important urban phenomenon 
(Ibid.). However, over time, the LAPOP study did not find a significant change in 
insecurity perceptions which appeared to vacillate between a low of 41.5 (2008) and a high 
of 49.7 (2010) over the period of 2004-2012 (Ibid., p. 112). However, similar to corruption 
reports, insecurity perceptions do not necessarily correspond to periods or areas of high 
incidence or reported victimisation rates. 
IUDOP surveys posed questions on the perceived importance of an issue in addition to 
perceptions of insecurity for the country over the course of two decades. To compile data 
on problem prioritisation, ‘economic’ reporting numbers were compiled from the 
categories of unemployment, poverty, high cost of living, and economy whilst delinquency 
was comprised of petty crime, insecurity, violence, and maras/pandillas. 
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Graph 5-1: Public perceptions of principle problems facing El Salvador, 2001-2014 (Source: 
CNSCC, 2014; IUDOP, 2001-2014) 
 
As illustrated in the above Graph 5-1, whilst economic concerns have long dominated 
insecurity in terms of risk prioritisation, 2009 appears to be a jump-off point for a new 
trend of insecurity fears in El Salvador. At first glance, when these concerns are broken 
down by the most important problems for the country versus those more immediately 
related to a local municipality in which the subject resides, there appears to be little 
difference (See for example Graph 5-1 for the year 2012). However, a closer look at the 
data terms amalgamated within ‘insecurity’ demonstrates that people are slightly more 
likely to pinpoint a source of insecurity like gang criminality rather than use the 
generalisation ‘violencia y delincuencia’. At the local level, ‘renta’ or extortion becomes a 
larger response (up to 2.3 percent versus 0.6 percent at the national level) although this 
could arguably be considered both an economic and a security concern. Another insecurity 
concern category which emerges at the municipal level is narcotrafficking. Intrafamiliar 
violence is a small statistically insignificant concern on both charts (0.3 and 0.4 for country 
and municipality respectively) despite it being empirically significant. This may indicate 
that although familial violence has become a policy issue for officials and of note for 
policing, it remains contested within individual perceptions.
32
  
5.2.3 Measuring indicators 
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result. Another possibility is that familial violence is considered something that can be endured, thereby of 
lesser importance to individuals than overt external threats. 
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There is basis in fact for persistent perceptions of violent crime in El Salvador and Central 
America: ‘[v]iolence still reigns over Central America’ (Cruz, 2011a, p. 1). In El Salvador, 
this has meant that it has remained near the top of world list of most murderous countries 
for the better part of a decade.
33
 This section presents data produced by state agencies as 
official reporting indicators of criminal violence whilst making notes of a few of their 
many limitations due to justice system faults, individual distrust of institutions, and gaps in 
the existing legislation. Due to the sheer range and complexity of crime statistics, this 
section will be limited to homicides and familial or gender based violence, covering the 
dominant data points for repression and prevention strategies. Homicides are the most 
widely tracked and accepted data on violence and crime. At the same time, within 
prevention-driven circles, familial and gender-based forms of violence are considered as a 
starting point to the entrenchment of violence in communities. Furthermore, as Hume 
(2009) discusses in some detail, knowledge of violence is based more often on myth than 
on facts, not helped by the notoriously unreliable nature of statistical reporting, and 
influenced by the contestation of what is considered a security issue. There continues to be 
value to scrutinising data numbers in triangulation with other sources to illustrate the 
persistent situation in El Salvador. 
Despite concerns over collection and registration mechanisms and the limitations to the 
typical reporting institutions – the Legal Medical Institution (Instituto de Medicina Legal: 
IML) and the National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) – homicide figures are 
the most relied-upon of all criminal statistics for their deep impact on society alone. 
Furthermore, because of their serious nature and physical evidence of the dead, intentional 
homicides tend to be recorded with greater care (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000; discussed in 
Hume 2009, pp. 71-72). Additionally, this data allows for cross-national and international 
comparisons on violent crime. On the other hand, from a technical standpoint, numbers of 
unreported or unregistered homicides and disappearances - where homicide victims are 
hidden and remain undiscovered for long periods – are likely to be somewhat lower than in 
other categories of unreported crime; individuals are more likely to go to the police despite 
issues of mistrust over a missing person than an incidence of extortion or robbery.  
Thus, to start, Hume highlights Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) homicide 
figures from the 1960s and 1970s which reported murder rates of about 30 per 100,000, 
setting an historical precedent for long-term violence (Hume, 2009, p. 69). Moving to the 
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 In August 2015, the national homicide rate rose to 91 per 100,000 for the first time in over twenty years 
and surpassed the rate of what was previously ‘the most murderous country in the world’, Honduras.  
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post-civil war period, there was a sharp spike in homicides during the immediate aftermath 
of war. However, this number was significantly reduced and figures remained at just under 
40 homicides per 100,000 during the first three years of the new millennium, as can be 
observed in Graph 5-2 below. Following government policy changes and a gang 
crackdown, these numbers began to rise again sharply. Graph 5-3 shows the increasing 
intentional homicides between 2004 and 2011. 
Graph 5-2: Homicides per 100,000 in El Salvador, 2001-2014 (Source: IUDOP, 2014; DIGESTYC, 
2014; PNC, 2015) *Incomplete reporting figures, January to August 2015 only. 
 
Given the aforementioned reports of 30 per 100,000 in mid-20th century El Salvador and 
the trends of the post-war period, it is evident that homicides have been a relative constant 
form of criminal violence in El Salvador. An IUDOP report argues that the official 
statistics available demonstrate that, with the exception of an immediate post-war increase 
to 138.2 per 100,000 in 1994, the country has experienced a relatively continuously 
elevated rate of homicides when compared to global rates (Aguilar, 2014). Despite the 
recording of these deaths, it does not illustrate the increased brutality with which these 
incidents were committed with increased practices of mutilation, decapitation, stoning and 
burning as well as increased evidence of torture and suffering to victims prior to death 
(Ibid.). Fluctuations in data are also not always immediately evident; for example, in 2009, 
a sharp increase in recorded homicide cases were not necessarily representative of 
temporal increase but rather the result, at least in part, of an important discovery of corpses 
in pits and clandestine graves (Ibid., p. 5). Furthermore, these figures do not illustrate who 
the targets were, for what reason they were targeted and by whom. As observed in Graph 
5-3 below, 2011 documented that almost half of victims are men under the age of 34 
(2,031 out of 4,360), 69.8 percent of all homicides are committed with a firearm, and 
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individuals are most likely to be killed in the street, in a public space or in their own homes 
(22, 20, and 9 percent respectively) (FUNDAUNGO, 2013). Based on 2009 figures, that 
year El Salvador’s population lost 22 months of life expectancy as a result of homicides 
(UNDP, 2013). During this same year, over a quarter of homicides took place in the San 
Salvador department (1,445) with a rate of 83 per 100,000 and only Sonsonate had a higher 
rate at 109.2 per 100,000.  
Graph 5-3: Intentional Homicides by Sex in El Salvador, 2005-2013 (Source: FUNDAUNGO, 2013; 
IML, 2014) 
 
As values for measurement, Argueta and Huhn (2014) argue that there are several key 
limitations with crime data. First, these data are not a reflection of ‘real’ criminality but 
rather document the work of institutions in the recording of data; they are not scientific but 
rather working reports of state institutions. Second, they argue, as already mentioned 
above, that criminal data is obscured by reliance on individual reporting; obscured are the 
numbers of unreported cases or those which remain undiscovered or unconfirmed by the 
police. There is also an important delay between the reporting of a crime and its 
acknowledgement or rejection as an event by the courts and so these statistics change much 
more with the passage of time than intentional homicides. Police presence and institutional 
competence are also important influences on diverse crime recording and verification 
numbers. Finally, there are important distinctions between recorded crimes and the 
recorded victims including to which authorities a victim might go address their experience 
(e.g. police vs. hospital for a rape). Similar to the above described crime values there may 
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be other evidence to collaborate reports, with sexual crimes and intrafamilial violence, the 
victims’ testimonies are perhaps the only evidence available. These types of crimes are 
also the most likely to go unreported. As can be seen in Table 5-2, numbers differ widely 
between reporting agency.  
Table 5-2: Register of Reports and Medical Recognitions of Sexual Assaults, 2009-2013 (Aguilar, 
2014, p. 29) 
Year Reports Medical-Legal 
Recognitions 
 Police 
(PNC) 
Prosecutor 
General (FGR) 
Medical-Legal 
Institute (IML) 
2009 2,074 3,328 2,260 
2010 2,495 3,167 1,992 
2011 2,287 3,540 1,992 
2012 2,589 ND 1,913 
2013 ND 3,599 1,972 
 
Intrafamiliar violence is another important, indeed an essential, value to discuss in 
conjunction with criminal violence indicators. Not only is it a criminal value in its own 
right but it serves to further illustrate what some have pointed out lines the base of societal 
violence in the country. Hume (2009, p. 49) argues that questions posed by feminism go to 
the heart of collective violence in all its forms: ‘violence is a profoundly gendered process 
that is intimately linked to dominant ways of performing masculinities and femininities’. 
Amidst the data for violence in El Salvador, many often neglect to mention that whilst men 
generally represent the vast majority of violence victims, statistical reports of femicide and 
sexual violence ‘conceal complex patterns of victimization and suffering’ (Geneva 
Declaration Secretariat, 2011, p. 113). Furthermore, whilst the social and economic costs 
of conflict, crime, and violence on lost productivity and labour market access is often 
discussed in general or male-focussed terms, the implications of intrafamiliar violence, 
femicide, and gender violence (including LGBTQ) are ‘rarely considered’ (Ibid., p. 113). 
El Salvador had the highest murder of women rate in the world at 12.0 per 100,000 
between 2004 and 2009 but fell to fourth in 2007-2012 (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Geneva 
Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Yet, the disparity between male and female victims of 
homicide grows as overall homicide rates rise meaning that though fewer women are killed 
as a percentage, they are nevertheless ever more likely to be attacked in the public sphere, 
attacks taking place ‘in a general climate of indifference and impunity’ (Ibid., p. 3). This 
image of female homicides as a percentage of overall violent deaths in violent situations 
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demonstrates that although some indicators can be of significance to illustrate insecurity, 
they are difficult to document with frequent inaccuracies especially in relation to their 
classification: homicide – female, femicide, intrafamiliar violence, gender violence, 
collateral, or a ‘culture of violence’.34 What is a fact: homicide is the leading cause of 
death for young women in El Salvador through 2015.  
Women are not only collateral victims in the violence of men; they are often sexualised 
targets for hate crimes, especially in precarious situations (Freedman & Jamal, 2008). The 
most extreme form of violence against women, femicide – the killing of women because 
they are women – has become complicated to distinguish from overall patterns of violence 
within the understanding of its original definition. Russell, an early discussant of the 
femicide concept, first considered the term as one used to refer to the ‘sexist murders of 
females by males’ which needs to be distinguished from those cases when the gender of 
the victim ‘is immaterial to the perpetrator’ (Russell, 2008, pp. 1-2). In other words, 
motivation is important and should be distinguished from a conflation with women caught 
up in violence.  
5.2.4 Other contributing indicators to security analysis 
As public security concerns have expanded beyond the immediate physical safety of 
individuals, so to do the variables which may provide its baseline and evaluation. This 
means that understanding these ‘other’ aspects of insecurity is important to appreciate the 
narratives at play in El Salvador’s formal security sector. Given that evolving definitions of 
public and citizen security have included variables from inequality to economics to 
healthcare and associated social services, this leaves security assessment efforts with a 
much more complex and potentially unwieldy evaluation framework. Some of the most 
common variables include demographic transformations, measurements of inequality and 
access to economic production, and government competence—including corruption 
indexes, effective provision of essential services, justice effectiveness, and citizen access 
to/confidence in the democratic process. Many of these measurements fall under the 
category of development, demonstrating the intertwined nature of security in its many 
forms. 
Inequality and economic potential are inescapably knotted in El Salvador and both provide 
important variables to illustrate the risks and responsibilities between individuals and their 
                                                 
34
 Indeed, Fernandez (2012) found in a study of suicide in Argentina that misidentification can lead to the 
obscuring femicides and partner homicides when incidents are recorded or mislabelled as suicide. Also see 
the Interpeace study on women and gangs for dynamics of violence and related deaths (Tager, 2013). 
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country. Growth across Latin American countries is uneven and large parts of the 
population are left behind. El Salvador has never been one of the strongest economies in 
the region and its performance between 2000 and 2015 has been lacklustre. Various 
estimates, including those produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB) have predicted El Salvador’s annual GDP growth to be between 1.8 and 
2.0 percent in 2015 – a range within which it has remained for much of the post war period 
(Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, 2005-2015). It is telling that 57.2 percent of 
Salvadoran rural residents cited the economy as the greatest problem they faced in a 
national investigation but only 29.8 percent of urban residents felt the same (Observatorio 
de Seguridad Ciudadana, 2013, p. 19). Evidence that the economy is generally ranked 
lower than violence and insecurity emphasises the strength violence maintains in popular 
perceptions. Nonetheless, the two issues coexist within a security policy environment.  
In 2012, Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, called on El Salvador to address 
its socio-economic inequalities as an essential component of its on-going peace process. 
The 2013 Human Development report reiterates the continuing inequalities between urban 
and rural areas which continue to affect individual lives (PNUD, 2013a). Not often 
measured in the above figures is the impact of Gender Inequality which plays a significant 
role in the well-being of a society and its security. When measured, values may include 
reproductive health (maternal mortality and teen pregnancy rates), empowerment (access 
to education and political participation), and economic activity (labour market access for 
women). The Human Development Report 2014 makes the point that the Gender 
Inequality Index (GII) can be interpreted as the negative impact on human development 
due to gender inequality in these categories or variables (UNDP, 2014, p. 4). In 2015, El 
Salvador held a ranking of 0.441, which placed it 85 out of 149 countries on the Gender 
Inequality Index ranking (Ibid.). This was in result of its relatively high proportion of 
women representatives in the Legislative Assembly (LA) but was negatively affected by 
maternal deaths, as well as lower penetration points for women when compared to men in 
secondary education attainment and labour market penetration. As discussed in relation to 
gender violence, women have often been relegated to peripheral spatial and social spheres, 
throughout history, and their subjections to violence and inequalities marginalised or 
ignored with a distinct influence and impact on the physical security of their person, their 
families, and their communities. In this case, as with so many others, personal and public 
spheres have remained divided to their detriment but, as will be demonstrated throughout 
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this thesis, non-traditional security entails not just different types of threat from the local to 
the transnational but from the political to the home. 
What these experiences of gender violence, human rights violations, and persistent 
inequality demonstrate is that they have a real and lasting impact on individual and 
collective lives. Furthermore, poverty and gender inequality both contribute to and are 
products of the insecurity which continues to manifest itself across the country. Some 
advances have been made on both counts over the last decade to reduce inequalities, close 
income gaps, and increase access to social services in El Salvador but in relatively limited 
numbers. Indeed, one of El Salvador’s most important resources continues to be its large 
expat community, heavily concentrated in the United States. Despite the precarious nature 
of the migration venture, over the decades of the 21st century Salvadoran families have 
continued to adopt a ‘transnational economic strategy’, sending family members abroad to 
improve finances and prospects for the entire group (Coutin, 2007, p. 122). These 
precarious support-lines have been hailed in recent years by IO and financial institutions as 
potential sources for economic growth and micro-development of local communities as 
well as individual family units. As Coutin quotes one Salvadoran analyst, ‘This country is 
addicted to migration and to remittances. And it always needs a larger dose’ (Coutin, 2007, 
p. 122). These actions are also not without personal costs; migrants producing the desired 
remittances and their families pay their own price for access to American jobs including 
family breakups, dangerous journeys leading to potentially dangerous work, and increased 
risk of extortion or other threats for remaining family members. As such, remittance-based 
planning for Central American governments like El Salvador hold real risks for individuals 
who attempt to take advantage of migration opportunities.  
5.3 Conceptualising Security in Multi-actor Governance 
Within the multi-actor, multi-level security governance community there is disconnect in 
approach with regards to the conceptualisation of security and how to deal with it 
(‘problem-solving’). After 25 years of post-conflict, violent peace, it has become evident 
that perhaps it is not only the manner of approach but the manner in which security is 
conceptualised at its base that guides results. Violence is an endemic phenomenon at every 
level but the form, function, and potential interventions differ widely from actor to entity. 
Historical, spatially situated understandings of the Central American complex security 
environment come up against formulaic perpetrator-victim, consequences, and fix-costing 
strategies. Furthermore, the new post-conflict peace has become a contested space of 
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criminal violence and new conflicts over violence monopolies between criminal factions 
and state security actors. Thus, this analysis of security concepts needs to address the 
spaces created through governance structures, issues responses, and actor ideologies at 
every level in order to draw out linkages between actors, concepts, and operations. 
5.3.1 Security concepts among international elites: Building 
agreement among states and international actors 
This section provides a very brief overview of SICA security concepts. It observes that 
SICA member states did not come to agreement on guiding concepts of security but rather 
the structure allows for a significant number of concepts to be addressed therein. It 
concludes that rather than address concepts of security held by any number of the large 
number of stakeholders, the projects implemented as addressed in Chapter 6 are more 
illustrative of the security concepts put into practice.  
Defining security as a region was never going to be an easy task. Member states 
experienced criminal violence differently. To start, non-norm conforming actors in the 
northern triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala had higher incidence 
of gang organisations than did the relatively low-crime Costa Rica and Nicaragua. All were 
transit countries for transnational criminal organisations but not all saw manifestation of 
the same modes of operation.
35
 Furthermore, the goal was to establish a strategy that was 
not focused solely on combating violence but a holistic approach that would address 
democratic security with balance, attending equally to prevention, institutions reform, and 
rehabilitation, reinsertion, and prison security. The Democratic Security Directorate 
Director, Erich Vilchez, positioned the ESCA as a ‘transformative’ opportunity for the 
Central American isthmus – given the chance for its implementation (Interview with 
Vilchez, 2012). But in addition to a communal definition of security risks facing the 
isthmus, member states also had to agree to a set of regional projects that would emerge 
from that definition. What resulted was a mix of ideologies, traditional mechanisms, and 
expensive projects for which member countries lacked funds.  
                                                 
35
 For example, Honduras has a prevalence of go-fast boat landings and clandestine air strips in its sparsely 
patrolled forests. Nicaragua sees most of its transit activities take place in its autonomous zones along its 
eastern seaboard. El Salvador’s main transit point is in the Golfo de Fonseca – a waterbody complicated by 
bordering jurisdictions Honduras and Nicaragua and ongoing bilateral contests over marine borders. Costa 
Rica has seen a slow rise in the number of trafficking incidents within its borders but its primary experience 
of the criminal trafficking trade is with the money laundering activities taking place in its casinos and loosely 
regulated banking sector. 
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It headed its initiatives with a thematic pillar to combat crime and violence. As the most 
commonly accepted and employed of the ESCA components, it was the most 
straightforward to be agreed upon. Indeed, the 2011 Conceptual Framework professed a 
need to ‘deepen the solution of the structural causes of violence’ through the reconstruction 
of the socio-economic fabric to address phenomena of migration and disintegrating 
coexistence in a strategically difficult geography (SG-SICA, 2011, p. 2). At the same time, 
it defined the problems of violence and insecurity in a traditional manner as the 
consequences of illicit trafficking and other crime scourges including: crime and violence; 
narco-trafficking; organised crime / maras and pandillas; illicit migrant trafficking and 
trading; and, the trafficking of small and light arms (SG-SICA, 2011, pp. 3-4). The ESCA 
was ultimately intended to ‘improve citizen security and arrest the influence of organised 
crime’ although the general objective focused on individuals: ‘to strengthen security and 
wellbeing of the person in the Central American region which will allow them to reach 
their human development objectives’ (Ibid., p. 5). Costing the plan indicated that member 
states lacked sufficient funds through the SICA to implement this wide-ranging plan and so 
they expected additional support from the international community, not least because there 
was an ill-hidden feeling that the international community, especially the United States, 
was at least a little bit to blame for the security mess on the Central American isthmus. 
Within the SICA Democratic Security Unit, the definitions of security generally followed 
the official statements provided within the ESCA agreements. According to Director 
Vilchez, the most important priority was that which was contained within the Democratic 
Security Framework, namely, ‘to propel, promote, protect, augment the security of the 
person, of Central Americans and their wellbeing, and help Central America to consolidate 
as a region of peace, democracy, liberty and development’ (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). 
In this definition, the goal was not just security but greater integration within the region on 
a range of diverse issues from socio-political issues to natural disaster preparedness and 
response (Ibid.). Others within the SICA were more precise when establishing the base 
security concepts from which they were working. Border Security Coordinator Werner 
Ovalle saw the issue from the point of view of risks and government response actions 
(Interview with Ovalle, 2012). On the question of indicators, Ovalle saw security as 
comprised of the ‘aspirations’ of government actions whereas insecurity represented the set 
of problems or issues generated by society (Ibid.). Here perceptions were also thought to 
play an important role in the region because communications media had the power to shape 
both aspirations and perceived insecurity for a population. Furthermore, it was because 
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national institutions were not able to collaborate or communicate with other national 
institutions in many cases that the SICA was needed to facilitate coordination at another 
level of governance in order to overcome nationally-entrenched risks and institutional 
weaknesses. 
5.3.2 Security concepts among municipal entities 
The third level of interaction is between local actors and the actors including state and 
international entities that join at the municipal level to implement security at the site of the 
end user. International actors tend to interact with municipal entities within the practical 
terms of project and programme implementation. As has been previously discussed, state 
institutions like the MJSP made an effort between 2009 and 2014 to derive national 
policies from the municipal level to be scaled up and generalised for a whole state solution. 
This section observes the key concepts of security presented by municipal actors working 
in the subject matter. It concludes that despite early efforts, there remained a gap between 
national and local concepts of security entailed for citizens and for communities. 
First, local Violence Observatories had been established in municipalities throughout the 
country to provide information to strengthen policies and action plans undertaken by local 
administrations. They were used to exchanging information between institutions and 
sectors, making multidimensionality a common working function. Indeed, as an 
Observatory official explained, the manner in addressing violence prevention was an inter-
institutional responsibility (Interview with Ibara, 2013). Coexistence and citizen security in 
this local context entailed the recuperation of public spaces. It meant youth dialogue to 
include them in recommendations made to authorities. And it meant that youth 
programmes were also essential to the concept of security – with an emphasis on 
community engagement, job training, and academic advancement (Ibid.). In Santa Tecla, 
this encompassing concept of security had been developed over a period of ten years. The 
destruction of the town in a 2001 earthquake had led it to rebuild along the lines of 
sustainable development which formed the base out of which prevention programming 
arose (Interview with Martinez, 2013).  
A Santa Tecla Policy Advisor noted that over the ten year period of rebuilding, they had 
gone through three versions of a municipal prevention plan (Interview with Rodriguez, 
2013). All of these, Rodriguez explained, had been developed within an increasing culture 
of participatory citizenship – citizenship that was built through quality public spaces, 
investment opportunities, and promoted ‘neighbourliness’ (Ibid.). Indeed, it was 
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relationships with others that proved to be key to municipal definitions of prevention: 
consultations and action plans had to be developed through a culture of participation where 
residential councils could bring their recommendations to the municipal councils for 
consideration. Santa Tecla officials felt this multi-level programme development even at 
that local level had proved to be the most constructive manner to create and implement 
prevention that would address real risks, concerns, and perceptions of insecurity 
(Interviews with Ibara, 2013; Martinez, 2013; Rodriguez, 2013).  
Sonsonate, on the other hand, been working with prevention programming for a much 
shorter period than had Santa Tecla (Interview with Cruz, 2013). Coming from a more 
recent and persistent situation of elevated homicide rates and incidents of violent crime, 
they defined their concepts of security through the groups of citizens they were trying to 
secure. Whereas Santa Tecla saw their security in terms of space, Sonsonate identified the 
need for protective structures – both physical and institutional. For woman, they identified 
built market structures to remove informal businesses from the streets where they were at 
risk of extortion for their place on the sidewalks (Ibid.). For youth, the importance was to 
create safe passage to obtain access to schools. Thus, community policing played an 
important role in security concepts. As police officers formed positive relationships with 
local communities and provided a physical presence near school buildings during high-
traffic periods, youth could access schools previously challenged by gang extortion rackets 
(Interviews with Sonsonate PNC, 2013). These contrasting perceptions of security 
demonstrate that context is important to perceptions formal actors hold and are likely to 
moderate policies and outcomes discussions accordingly. 
5.4 Hope and Violence: Salvadoran security governance 
responses, 2007-2014 
This section will outline the policy developments undertaken by the FMLN during their 
first term in office. It will argue that whilst attempting to implement a new approach to 
security governance in the country, it maintained basic commitments to citizen security 
and traditional state protection mechanisms.  
Table 5-3: Legislation governing security 2009-2014 
Policy Title (Spanish) 
Five-Year Development Plan 2009-2014 Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo 2009-2014 
National Health Policy 2009-2014 Política Nacional de Salud 2009-2014 
National Justice, Public Security and Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad 
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Coexistence Policy Pública y Convivencia 
National Social Violence Prevention Strategy 
in Support for the Municipalities 
Estrategia Nacional de Prevención Social de la 
Violencia en Apoyo a los Municipios 
National Youth Policy 2011-2024 Política Nacional de Juventud 2011-2024 
National Women’s Policy Política Nacional de las Mujeres 
National Policy for the Integral Protection of 
Youth and Adolescents 
Política Nacional de Protección Integral de la 
Niñez y de la Adolescencia 
Mental Health Policy Política de Salud Mental 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Policy Política de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva 
Policy of Civic Participation in Public 
Management 
Política de Participación Ciudadana en la 
Gestión Publica 
Social Education Plan Plan Social Educativo 
Institutional Strategic Plan 2009-2014 for the 
PNC 
Plan Estratégico Institucional 2009-2014 PNC 
“Seguridad y tranquilidad, con participación 
social” 
Gender Equity and Equality Institutional 
Policy for the National Civil Police 2011-2021 
Política Institucional de Equidad e Igualdad de 
Género de la Policía Nacional Civil 2011-2021 
Prisons Policy of El Salvador Política Penitenciaria de El Salvador 
 
A 2007 report issued by the National Commission for Public Security and Social Peace 
(Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social: CNSC) called for the 
revision of existing meagre approaches towards security and anti-gang policy. The 
commission argued that, in order to make any real headway in combating violent crime, 
comprehensive policies were required at the national level that were sustainable through 
the long-term (Comisión Nacional para la Seguridad Ciudadana y Paz Social, 2007). They 
called for the adoption of a coherent criminal code to improve enforcement procedures; 
greater and more dependable resources; the incorporation of more violence prevention 
plans and activities into policies; and the improvement (strengthening) of related 
institutions to facilitate greater competency in investigations, transparency, and 
accountability (Ibid.). 
Presidential hopeful Mauricio Funes requested specialists, including the future director of 
the National Academy of Public Security (Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública: 
ANSP), Jaime Martinez Ventura, elaborate on the initiative and develop a proposal that 
could be acted upon after a successful election (Interview with Martinez Ventura, 2012). 
The proposal was to be passed off to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) 
for expansion as a national policy in the case of an election. Included in the intent behind 
the national policy was a more integrated approach on security issues which intended to 
build on the emphasis of international donors and multilateral organisations on prevention 
to redefine the security agenda. Expectations were generated among NGOs, organisations, 
and community bodies that there would be great change in multiple sectors of the country 
(Aguilar, 2014). Arguing that previous ARENA governments had limited policy 
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documents on security to a few rare PowerPoint presentations, the FMLN approached their 
potential government formation with published documents in hand.  
One of the more developed documents released in the lead-up to the 2009 elections, 
Politicas de Justicia y Seguridad Publica by Oscar Fernández Orellana was the most 
complete of the FLMN’s guidelines prior to taking office (Fernández Orellana, 2009). 
Arguing that a FMLN government would have to face a transcendental shift in the manner 
in which social violence was addressed, and citing the need to move beyond the dichotomy 
of Hobbes and Rousseau, the document proposed a new means of viewing the problem:  
The left must assert that the safe society is not that which punishes 
and denounces most or how the security indicators and police 
effectiveness are handled. […](Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 9) 
Security was to be considered as a social and cultural construct, “related to and subject to 
the distinct social actors and the development of the people” (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 
16). Within this context, the document specifically defines security as:  
The social situation that guarantees and allows the full exercise 
and protection of each and every one of the rights that are 
vested in the people, individually and collectively and fulfilling 
civic [citizen] duties. (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 19)  
They argue that this security is situated within the fundamental political objective of a 
democratic government, democratic state, and social law oriented to the defence and 
guarantee of life and personal good as well as the provision of dignity and human 
necessities (Fernández Orellana, 2009, pp. 18-19). To improve security for Salvadorans, it 
was proposed that justice prevail over security and that improved standards of justice and 
equality would precede improved security (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 21). Yet at the 
same time, the indicators or measures of success that they cited were those of the old 
means of governing violence and crime in the country: 
The effectiveness [of the policies] should be measured in the fall of 
crimes committed, of victims and of damages, and above all in the 
sensation of insecurity. (Fernández Orellana, 2009, p. 9) 
Although the primary reference was again to indicators of violence and feelings of 
insecurity, the manner in which the document proposed an FMLN government would 
operate did included some new modes of proposed operation including coordination with 
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local institutions and social organisations, in the manner of a network oriented towards the 
client citizen rather than a hierarchy (Ibid., p. 10). The police system was also to be 
decentralised and send resources for ‘close policing’ to both urban and rural municipalities 
(Ibid.). Above all, their emphasis was to work as a public service in the manner of 
education or health.  
True to the spirit of consultation, the document was based on an FMLN-organised Social 
Dialogue process, Dialogo Social Abierto (DSA) worked to build a potential government 
platform on a range of topics not limited to security but rather focused on 32 thematic 
roundtables and 6 ‘espacios especiales’ participation groups which included professionals, 
NGO specialists, foundation directors, associations, unions, universities, community 
(campesino) leaders, religious groups, and artists among others. When counted with other 
territorial dialogues, over 6,000 individuals were estimated to have contributed to the 
process in some format. Aguilar argues that the common denominator in the process and 
resulting proposals was the considered necessity of an ‘integral treatment of the topic and 
the necessary impetus for institutional reforms oriented to the professionalization of 
entities within the security branch’ (Aguilar, 2014, p. 64). 
In this and other documents that the FLMN prepared in the lead-up to the 2009 presidential 
elections, security was discussed and defined in line with consultations that they held 
across the country. However, the recommendations remained ill-conceived as a plan of 
action which could be implemented within an election timeframe. Even the willingness to 
de-villainise, de-mediatise, and re-conceptualise gangs as marginalised actors within the 
greater state issues of poverty, inequality, and political powerlessness was couched in 
idealised terms rather than concrete actionable points. They did not plan any special 
actions directed at particular issues like the gang problem as previous governments had 
sought to do and, as such, it appeared to many observers that the security issue was to be 
approached in a non-securitised manner. In the official election document for the FLMN 
Presidency, Cambio en El Salvador para vivir major: Programa de Gobierno 2009-2014 
(Government Programme), they defined the government responsibility towards security as 
‘a long-term strategy to combat in depth delinquency, organised crime, impunity, in order 
to attack, again at depth, the causes that generate these phenomenon’ (FMLN, 2009, p. 86).  
They also emphasised first, out of the crosscutting issues for the new government, its social 
and democratic nature was that of human security (FMLN, 2009, p. 8). The focus of the 
Government Programme on social reforms and a new policy focus on social and economic 
P r i e s  | 135 
 
policies appeared to confirm that they were truly interested in addressing what they 
considered to be the root cause of the violence and insecurity gripping the country. 
The FMLN government had, as opposition, criticised the Mano Dura approach but in 
government they were faced with the requirements, necessities, and demands of 
governance. Government officials widely acknowledged at the time and thereafter that the 
party had not been ready for the realities of taking the reins and that the first couple of 
years were filled with ‘sleeping soldiers’.  The previous planning documents and even the 
Government Programme presented little in the way of a roadmap for strategy, 
programming, and projects to manually address the security problems they had 
ideologically defined. Furthermore, the formulation of the policy was slow. Some policy 
points were implemented over the first year of the Funes administration but a preliminary 
strategy document took eight months to be published. In some cases, members of the 
administration blamed the steep learning curve, others the challenges of implementing vast 
and radical institutional reforms as promised during the campaign. The transformation of a 
repressive security approach into a model democratic society that comprehensively 
addressed insecurity in a consultative fashion was not to be undertaken lightly by a party 
new to governance, especially one concerned about the continuing organised criminal 
presence which was entrenched in the structures of state (Aguilar, 2014). 
Officials presented existing and developing policy strategies in two distinct categories: 
policy solely oriented towards law enforcement or criminal investigation and policy which 
seeks long-term prevention solutions through community building and youth 
programming. The policy breakdown into security and prevention categories originated 
from the 2009 policy brief structure and recommendations. They compared new issues 
framing as well as new roles for key actors in the security sector in light of the increased 
value placed, at least in theory, on prevention. In attempting to build a stronger, more 
sympathetic security policy, one of the first re-conceptualisations for a government 
institution is the position of the police force in security activities. MJSP officials argued 
that the removal of the National Civil Police (Policía Nacional Civil: PNC) from the 
prevention side of security programming in favour of specialised ‘social agents’ in the new 
division of labour would help cement a new approach to a security policy with reduced 
emphasis on repression (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). On the other hand, Cotto as 
an active director of the PNC, argued that the police still had an important role to play in 
prevention policy as they were the body best able to identify security risks through the 
geographic spaces of violence that produce them (Interview with Cotto, 2012). 
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A further indication of how the Funes government intended to proceed with regards to 
security policy in the first FMLN government came in the establishment of a two-pronged 
cabinet framework to address the issue in 2010. The first was the Security Cabinet that 
integrated civil servants from the MJSP, the PNC, the Directorate of Prisons, the General 
Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería: 
DGME), and president of the CNSP. Also included were the SAE, the SSDT, and the 
Ministry of the Defence. Not only was their responsibility more repression-directed 
security initiatives but they took the strategic decisions for the 2009-2011 when it came to 
immediate reactionary responses to violence and criminal incidents. Although the eventual 
resulting national security policy was intended to provide a united voice, many even within 
the Security Cabinet were not of a like mind and clashed over the greater participation of 
the army in territorial states of emergency. Typically, the military and more militant police 
members were in favour of more frequent declarations of states of emergency whilst civil 
servants working across departments, despite their ideological disagreements, would often 
lean towards the social prevention measures officially adopted as policy. Some of this 
conflict dissipated when Manuel Melgar was replaced by the recently former general 
David Munguía Payés in November 2011 who had greater influence with president Funes. 
Nevertheless, for a government that had presented itself as one fundamentally different 
from previous mandates, it was an inauspicious start. 
The second cabinet was focused on the prevention of violence (Gabinete Nacional de 
Prevencion de la Violencia: GNPV). As previously noted, former governments had 
resorted to repression as their primary response mechanism for security and, in result, 
almost all prevention mechanisms had been delegated to the CNSP, which was primarily 
internationally funded, and so it was an early struggle for the new FMLN government to 
institute coordination between departments and units with a claim on the prevention file as 
a relatively new means of addressing these issues (van der Borgh & Savenije, 2014, p. 13-
14). The GNPV through the MJSP integrated CNSP participants including PREPAZ, the 
Social Investment for Local Development Fund (Fondo de Inversión Social para el 
Desarrollo Local: FISDL), the Subsecretariat for Territorial Development and 
Decentralisation (Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización: SSDT), and 
the National Youth Directorate with the Ministries of Education, Health, and the PNC. 
Other members included the Presidential Technical Directorate, the Salvadoran Institute 
for Women’s Development, and the Ministries of Economy and Works. However, this 
cabinet received less media attention and enjoyed a lower profile than the Security Cabinet 
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as they were not called on to react in an operational capacity to immediate threats such as 
the 20 June 2010 gang attack on a public bus in Mejicanos, a suburb of the capital San 
Salvador.
36
 The cabinet’s activities were first laid out in the National Policy for Justice, 
Public Security and Coexistence (Politica Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Publica y 
Convivencia: PNJSC) as a whole of government action and then further elaborated upon in 
the National Strategy for Violence Prevention (Estrategia Nacional de Prevencion de la 
Violencia: ENPV). Both efforts attempted to address FMLN criticisms of previous 
ARENA administrations by developing a more comprehensive and long-term security 
policy. 
Despite these fundamental disagreements over the implementes of new definitions and 
actions in policy measures, most were relatively positive concerning the direction in which 
the MJSP was heading on security policies. They agreed that there was greater coherence 
and capacity in security and prevention policy balances in terms of policy talking points, 
budget, and operations and that those developments had progressed further than usually 
portrayed in the media (Interview with Flores, 2012). Moreover, in the opinions of 
prevention policy officials, prevention policies between government institutions at the 
national level and the diversity of governmental and civil society actors at the local level 
were also afforded greater equality (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 
2012). Although meetings at this level were not observed, comments from several 
consultants appeared to corroborate these assurances, noting the growth of locally focussed 
programming through multi-level alliances. In particular, a number of programmes were 
highlighted which were based upon a four-sided relationship structure between political 
actors, government officials, the Municipal Council of Violence Prevention and local 
mayoralties (alcadias). Flores noted that the stronger relationship structure within 
institutions and between levels of government in developing and implementing prevention 
programming had facilitated greater competency and better results in target communities 
(Ibid.). 
Conceptually, Flores and others’ description of policy change entails a shifting 
consideration from national security to public security and citizen security. Public and 
citizen security necessitates in this explanation an alliance between local and central 
government actors as well as space for consultation and resulting contributions from civil 
society (Interview with Flores, 2012). In this vision, it would entail that MJSP’s prevention 
                                                 
36
 The Mejicanos attack, which left 14 dead and 17 wounded, ripped through the first year of the Funes 
administration with a profound effect on security policy.  
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department, PREPAZ, in conjunction with the Ministries of Health, Education, and 
Employment, join with municipalities and their civil society partners to create plans of 
operation and develop diagnostics for action (Ibid.). As Education Director Sandra Alas 
explained, these governance spaces were strictly by design: 
The shift we are working towards is to reverse the national to the 
local or community standardised or guidelines approach. Instead, 
we are taking the context based in local level realities to define 
policies at the national level. […] As the Ministry of Education we 
too are willing to insist on an approach that focuses on 
strengthening coexistence as a prevention strategy. It has become a 
central axis for the Ministry in its education policy. […] We had a 
school system that expelled its members, a school that does not 
have partnerships or an orientation towards families and our 
analysis framework demonstrated that for many years, for decades, 
the school was divorced from the community and this too generates 
violence […] Violence is a multi-causal but obviously education 
and the school as an institution has a fundamental role therein. 
(Interview with Alas, 2013) 
Whilst PREPAZ officials confirm that this practice of consultation is already in practice, 
other government officials are not as fond of consultations and note that the very nature of 
public civil society consultations denotes that, whilst they may present many good policy 
recommendations, most are unfeasible and un-actionable (Interview with MJSP Official, 
2012). As a result, a notable tension continued to exert pressure on the policy 
developments and directions of Salvadoran public policy throughout the first mandate. 
Nevertheless, there were several on-going interventions or programmes which featured 
prominently as examples of progress. First, despite the numerous occasions in which the 
2009 Security Policy was referred to as an impotent document due to its lack of 
implementation, the 2010 Violence Prevention Strategy was built upon it and, through that 
medium, maintained a clear commitment to local violence prevention programming. 
However, this is not to dismiss the very basic issues the 2010 Violence Prevention Strategy 
encountered when first put into action. A SSDT official noted that inter-institutional 
coordination for government departments was one of the greatest hurdles the FMLN 
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government faced when first developing the Strategy (Galvan, 2010).
37
 However, the 
Strategy and resulting projects did come to fruition. Aspects of both the policy and the 
strategy were also continued and elaborated in the most recent Plan Quinquenal (Five-Year 
Plan). It was here that the Municipal Councils of Violence Prevention were established to 
aid in ‘effecting tangible results’ (Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012).  
The government began with this Strategy of bilateral, technical-led programming in about 
60 communities chosen for their poverty, violence, and levels of risk (Interview with 
Flores, 2012). Again, based on the four-point model, activities were initiated in 
conjunction with the mayoralties, the police, and the communities themselves to ensure 
that programming was based in a vision of prevention but reflected local differences 
including political and religious dynamics and always included, at its base, the importance 
of local community development (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 2012). 
They also worked to include or build on existing programming such as that work 
conducted through FISDL and the Temporary Income Support Programme (Programa de 
Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso: PATI) as well as NGOs, mayoralty, or institutional activities 
in an attempt to avoid duplication and apply existing best practices (Ibid.). Other multi-
levelled prevention programming which often received mention included PROJOVENS
38
 
(financed by the EU and implemented by the CNSP); Prevenir
39
 (a Northern Triangle 
programme financed by Germany); again, PATI (financed by FISDL and jointly overseen 
by the Prevention Cabinet and Youth Secretariat); and, the community-based Crime and 
Violence Prevention Project (CVPP) (financed by USAID and jointly monitored by private 
company RTI International and the Canadian Centre for International Studies and 
Cooperation: CECI). The idea of working at multiple levels of government from the 
regional to the local as well as the incorporation of a wide range of actors was highly 
popular and often received special mention from officials and consultants who sought to 
abandon a national-level down focus to policy and programming.  
                                                 
37
 Galvan observed that with regards to the Strategy, “it was easier to coordinate the activities of 40 NGO 
dedicated to prevention and work with youth and municipalities, than with the 5 or 6 institutions of the 
government” (Galvan, 2010, p. 3). 
38
 The objective of PROJOVENES is to promote social cohesion and mitigate violent risks with a special 
focus on youth. It began with an investment of €11.1 million in 57 communities working with individuals up 
to the age of 25. In August 2009, the project received a further €14.1 million investment to expand to 79 
communities, a raised age limit of up to 35 (RESDAL, 2011). 
39
 Prevenir is a GiZ-monitored programme which concentrates on municipalities, formal and informal 
education initiatives, and improved training to bring youth into employment with a special focus on the “ni-
nis” or neither job nor education which sit at 20 per cent of youth according to the GiZ director in charge of 
citizen security (prevention) initiatives  (Interview with Kuechemann, 2012).The project, set to run between 
2010 and 2017, is conducted in conjunction with the SICA as Germany is a leading international supporter of 
Central American regional integration efforts as well as with the Secretaria de Inclusion Social / Direccion 
Nacional de la Juventud (DNJ) in El Salvador to coordinate local and national level efforts. 
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Despite all the positive comments provided across the board for efforts to build and 
strengthen this multi-level, multi-faceted prevention programming, weaknesses were 
acknowledge on some level. Both the 2009 Security Policy and the 2010 Strategy required 
further revisions and new versions to better address the changing situation as well as to 
encompass learned lessons and new best practices (Interview with Flores, 2012). Some 
consultants thought that more emphasis needed to be placed on the actual programming 
and establishing those activities with direct benefit to communities, and especially youth, 
as an immediate priority rather than continuing with yet further planning meetings, 
coordination meetings, and workshops. Nevertheless, the key concern among consultants 
and officials alike was the timeframe in which they had to operate in order to demonstrate 
concrete and tangible results. Working with a (more) limited budget than crime fighting 
and penal efforts and in coordination with a greater number of participant parties, some 
expressed concern that all efforts at a long-term strategy would be at risk of being cut off 
before progress could be effectively demonstrated (Interviews with Jimenez, 2012; Quinn, 
2012).  
Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on prevention programming was somewhat at odds with 
the continuing reality in El Salvador. Financial reports indicated that in 2010, Justice and 
Public Security as a total consideration received total spending of US$619.6 million, of 
which the MJSP received 53% or US$330.9 million (RESDAL, 2011).
40
 Within the MJSP 
in the 2012 budget, “public security” including policing received the lion’s share at 
US$246.2 million whilst “prevention, participation and social reinsertion” received a 
meagre US$2.9 million (MJSP, 2012b).
41
 As such, despite protestations that prevention 
was rising in government importance, financing reveals that little has changed over the 
course of the 2000s. In fact, just a month prior to revelations of the gang truce negotiations, 
Insight Crime announced, ‘the Iron Fist Returns to El Salvador’ where responses to 
insecurity ‘sound less like innovations than a return to the failed policies of the past’ 
(Stone, 2012). Of particular concern were the appointments of former military personnel to 
public security posts and that the military itself had been expanded 57 per cent under 
                                                 
40
 In 2011, the units under the responsibility of the MJSP included the Migration Directorate, Penal Centres, 
the National Civil Police, the Academy of National Public Security (ANSP), and “others” under which 
PREPAZ would seem to fall. 
41
 According to the official budget, Prevention, Participation, and Social Reinsertion is comprised of: 
prevention and citizen participation (strengthening municipal community networks); intermediate centres 
(application of the youth penal law and facilitating the rehabilitation of minors); the toxicological institute 
(aiding public security through anti-drugs programming); and the national anti-drugs commission (inter-
institutional coordination on drugs consumption prevention) (MJSP, 2012b, p. 3). Despite its massive budget, 
the responsibilities falling to Public Security are comprised solely of administrative, policing and inspectors 
duties (Ibid.).  
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Funes’ leadership (Ibid.). News that the gang truce was not, as initially announced, an 
independent initiative dreamt up by the gangs themselves but rather a strategic government 
plan initiated by the current Justice Minister when he took office in November 2011 may 
indicate that Stone’s (among others) analysis may have been premature and that the 
government is indeed more amenable to structural changes, long-term plans, and 
prevention activities than they believed. Certainly, El Salvador’s position on the Regional 
Security Strategy (ESCA) is one of the most prevention-oriented, with officials noting that 
the main pillars of the ESCA appear to be taken almost directly from the Salvadoran 2009 
Security Policy (Interview with Ortiz de Zelaya, 2012). Prevention in security planning 
remained fixed and, despite its financing woes, of key importance among officials and 
consultants alike.  
In contrast, it was only a much narrower group of individuals who highlighted combatting 
crime projects. Of course, as combatting crime involved targeted activities, specialised 
operations conducted by professional security operatives, and ran greater risks of 
immediate violence, this is to be expected. Nevertheless, community policing programmes 
include some forum for citizen participation and building community-PNC confidence as 
well as building dialogues for community consultation. Other programmes mentioned in 
this sector included Joint Community Support Groups (GCAC), a police-military initiative 
across the country that shares responsibility for patrols, detentions, joint operations, and 
other anti-crime activities. A similar operation called Comando Zeus conducted the 
aforementioned activities in 19 municipalities with the highest criminal incidences. Thus, 
through an observation of on-going projects and programmes, roles and responsibilities of 
individual actors again emerge and demonstrate the differences in practice as well as in 
theory between combatting crime and prevention initiatives. 
5.4.1 National Policy for Justice, Public Security, and Coexistence 
(PNJSC) 
 
Table 5-4: Frequently used terms in Salvadoran security governance 
Term Definition 
Citizen Security A social situation which allows the free exercise 
of rights of all persons and the certainty that 
when these rights are violated or threatened, 
individuals may count on protection from the 
relevant institutions and authorities. As such, it 
is not just the protection against delinquency but 
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rather against all circumstances that injure or 
threaten the free exercise of the rights of the 
person. 
Convivencia: Coexistence These are the shared norms for all citizens, 
assumed in a culture of solidarity, respect, and 
mutual promise with the city for wellbeing 
within a more harmonious society 
Violence Prevention These are all of the actions directed towards the 
reformation of violence-generating factors into 
spaces of security and coexistence through the 
multitude of projects and programmes 
developed in that cause. 
Gender Violence Exercise of violence that reflects the 
asymmetrical power relationships between men 
and women that perpetuate the sub-valuation 
and devaluation of the feminine in comparison 
to the masculine 
Intrafamiliar Violence Exercise of violence that reflects the 
asymmetrical power relationships between 
masculine and feminine as well as adult and 
child. 
 
The PNJSP distribution draft emerged sometime between late 2009 and May 2010. The 
policy elaborated on a range of newly- or re- considered contributing factors to criminal 
violence and was presented as a “policy of state” to be fully explored in both context and 
application (MJSP, 2009). The document is presented as arising from “a collective and 
diverse vision – with the important participation of citizens” and set about to include 
ranging contributors as well as subjects (Ibid.). As such, those involved in creating the 
document set about with the goal to ensure that it related to the work of the whole of 
society and that it promoted inter-institutionality and inter-operability between the diverse 
institutions of state and civil society alike (Ibid.). Furthermore, the intent of this document 
was to restructure the nature of security prevision in the country along broader lines: “the 
new government conceives of public security as an integral part of human security” (Ibid., 
p. 7). Security risks to the state of El Salvador and its citizens were thus considered to 
include: the precarious and unequal socio-economic development; migration and the loss 
of family and social fabric; sexist and violent social patterns; political corruption and 
patronage; institutional weaknesses; one-dimensional focus and treatment of the 
phenomenon [of insecurity and violence]; the geopolitical nature of the fight against narco-
trafficking; conflicts of criminal groups – gangs; and, the highly available circulation of 
firearms (MJSP, 2009). In other words, this policy document was an attempt to fulfil 
Funes’ stated goal to “consolidate the peace and promote social coexistence” (Funes, 
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2009). It also represented one of the most intensive processes of consultation on 
Salvadoran security in the 21st century (MJSP PolicyAdvisor, 2012). 
The PNJSC is first and foremost a document for citizen or public security. Latin America 
has long focused on citizen security as a human security-like means to shift national and 
state-centred policy to a more complete focus for the individual as encompassed in its 
citizenry.
42
 Following this, the Salvadoran government attempted to build a state security 
policy that embraces local citizenship perspectives in a manner which seeks to share power 
and change the direction of policy substance contributions to a bottom up activity. As 
previously noted, the FMLN was committed prior to its 2009 election to the presidency to 
engage with local communities and a diverse group of non-dominant actors through 
Dialogo Social Abierto or Open Social Dialogue roundtables. Thus, the resulting PNJSP 
presents an opportunity to examine both (1) the contributions of local communities of real 
security concepts to a national policy; and (2) to what extent the resulting document, in the 
spirit of citizen security, managed to balance repression demands with prevention 
aspirations. The Minister’s introduction to the PNJSC states: “This policy assigns equal 
importance and force to the actions of prevention, repression and rehabilitation, there 
constituting a coherent and harmonic whole” (MJSP, 2010a, p. 8).43 Indeed, one of the 
PNJSP’s explicative points answering why there is so much violence in El Salvador argues 
that a mono-dimensional treatment and focus of the security environment left insecurity 
management in a reactionary position which was ill-equipped to apply the law and resulted 
in financial spending without strategic planning (Ibid., p.15). Although the PNJSC was 
presented as both policy and a strategic document which could be operationalised, the 2010 
draft remained unpublished until after the MJSP had switched ministers in November 2011 
and was never fully implemented. Nonetheless, the PNJSC highlights the thinking of the 
FMLN members and representatives, after significant national consultation, over how they 
                                                 
42
 Both the SICA and the OAS have made reference to citizen security in declarations and protocols since the 
end of the civil war period of the 1980s. The San Salvador Declaration in 2011 promised to develop citizen 
security as “a component of public security” and obligated member states to strengthen “peaceful 
coexistence” recognising that “the individual is at the center of citizen security, […] and should therefore be 
a partner in the definition and implementation of ways to build more secure and sustainable communities and 
societies” (OAS, 2011, pp. iii-iv) In the 2012 Hemispheric Plan of Action, the OAS presented specific 
objectives to develop citizen security public policies among member states, “based on national realities, 
taking into consideration citizen and community participation,” as well as to “identify scientific methods for 
objective assessment of citizen security and of the specific risk factors in each state, addressing the different 
needs of its population” (OAS, 2012b, p.2). 
43
 Although the Minister’s remarks appeared in the draft policy over a year to Munguía Payés’ taking office, 
that the PJSC was published relatively unchanged entails that there was little immediate intent to change the 
overall direction set in the first government from the time they took office. Translation from: Esta política 
asigna igual importancia y esfuerzo a las acciones de prevención, represión y rehabilitación, pues constituyen 
un todo congruente y armónico.  
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felt the country could be run for increased security and, importantly, it attempted to 
balance prevention and repression strategies in a manner which spoke to their ideological 
hopes and dreams for the country. 
Alongside a general discussion on the structural weaknesses of the MJSP itself, the PNJSC 
highlighted not only the problems within the institution of the PNC but of its General 
Inspectorate for oversight and its academic training institutions.  Over all, there was a 
general critique of the conditions of ministry politicisation which had allowed the political 
manipulation of sector institutions, not least that of the PNC, without the development of 
institutional management oriented to the design, formulation and implementation of public 
policies (MJSP, 2010a). The PNC, including its oversight and training instruments, were 
accused of having lost the confidence and credibility of its citizens with too much power 
on repression whilst unable to pursue its own internal criminal activities (MJSP, 2010a, pp. 
19-21). In result, the policy argued, the police were unable to fulfil their function as 
support to the population because of an accelerated deterioration of its image (Ibid.). 
Training, it was further noted, had not helped the situation due to a significant emphasis on 
authoritative and militaristic responses that deemphasised the civil essence of the PNC 
(MJSP, 2010a, p. 23). Abuses perpetrated against trainees—which weakened the forces—
and an institutional power for the sake of power structure were observed as long-term 
issues that had weakened the police throughout its institutional structure although the 
policy stopped short of linking these issues to their activities on the streets.  
Both in its critiques of the institutional weaknesses as perceived by the incoming 
government and in the legal and institutional responsibilities it highlighted as the basis for 
its reorientation of the public security file, the PNJSC presented the government’s 
determination to provide a positive security function to the Salvadoran population. It strove 
to increase the capacities and capabilities of the country’s security institutions to produce 
security through just practice and increased trust between the population and its security 
structures. First laid out in the Government Programme Plan 2009-2014 (FMLN, 2009) 
and later reiterated in the PNJSC were the five pillars intended to improve action balance 
between repression and prevention as well as build trust with the Salvadoran population. 
They were founded under the premise that actions taken were to be part of an integrated 
system with full citizen participation within the responsibilities of the appropriate 
institutions and that such actions would be undertaken in a sustainable fashion (MJSP, 
2010a). Among the five pillars as specific policy objectives included:  
P r i e s  | 145 
 
1) The control and repression of common, organised, and gang crime through an 
increased management capacity and territorial control; 
2) The prevention and reduction of the factors and causes that propagate violence and 
crime, identified as the resources and potentials of the community and including 
pacifist conflict resolutions; 
3) The implementation of a new penal model developed to guarantee order, security, 
and control of penitentiaries in a manner which favours rehabilitation and social 
reinsertion effectiveness; 
4) The promotion of the role of the victims of crime in administration and judicial 
spheres; and  
5) The practice of an efficient strategic direction of public security that strengthens 
relations between those institutions responsible for the public security file and to 
improve the implementation of existing laws through an improved judiciary. (Ibid.) 
 
These thematic concerns were to be realised through a wide range of programmes, within 
the guidelines of department –specific polices: 23 strategies with 113 lines of action 
(MJSP, 2012a). A balance between repression and prevention could only be created if the 
institutions upon which the operational end relied were also reformed. Controlling crime 
entailed the improvement of investigative and intelligence techniques. Improving trust 
meant cleaning up and increasing access to the judicial system. Efficiency in programme 
implementation required better institutional coordination, management procedures, and the 
ever present requirement to consult and implement the recommendations of local 
communities. Within the PNJSP there was also specific acknowledgement of the numerous 
academic and expert studies which had made recommendations on the security file and 
with which the ministry intended to consult as it pushed forward to operationalise its policy 
objectives. However, between the draft and its official publication, the PNJSP removed 
specific references to consulting and financing parties. In particular, reference to the 
UNDP and its Spanish funding partner AECID were removed in favour of more general 
references to international experts and the UN’s Joint Reduction of Violence and 
Construction of Social Capital Programme. As previously mentioned, the PNJSC also 
sought to incorporate many of the recommendations made by the CNSCPS in 2007. 
Ultimately, the efforts exhibited through the PNJSC represented an important step in the 
country’s security history; its planning and strategic state vision the first of its kind in the 
post-war security sphere. Unfortunately, the official release of the PNJSP was delayed on 
numerous occasions and was increasingly side-lined as reactions to specific circumstances 
involved a return to repressive and military measures.  
5.4.2 National Strategy for Violence Prevention (ENPV) 
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In the first year of government, the FMLN administration created a series of Municipal 
Councils for Violence Prevention and several policy lines for specific MJSP units that put 
a specific emphasis on prevention as a replacement for Mano Dura as promised during the 
election campaign. As discussed in the previous section, the first years of the 
administration were a contradictory mix of aspirations to a prevention-driven policy whilst 
resorting to repressive, militarised tactics in the manner of the strongest Mano Dura 
operations in an attempt to gain control over a deteriorating security situation. 
Furthermore, both policies and actions over the first three years appeared to prioritise the 
prevention and repression of criminal violence and gang activities over the prevention of 
social violence, as defined by interfamiliar, sexual, youth, and neighbourhood conflicts 
(Angel Estrada, 2012). Despite the important efforts made to outline prevention options 
based in citizen trust-building, they did not significantly appear in practice nor were there 
meaningful budget modifications to support supposed prevention activities (FESPAD, 
2012). It was not until 2012, that the GNPV was truly up and running on the part of the 
executive; its basis for operation was the National Strategy for the Social Prevention of 
Violence in support of the Municipalities (ENPSV) which had been developed by the 
Presidential Strategic Business Directorate (Secretaria de Asuntos Estrategicos de la 
Presidencia – SAE) with the participation of executive institutions and civil society 
organisations (MJSP, 2012c, p. 6). Building on the ENPSV was the National Strategy for 
Violence Prevention (ENPV) of 2012. The process was guided by the General Directorate 
of Social Prevention of Violence and Culture of Peace (PREPAZ) which took the place of 
the General Directorate of Citizen Security (DGSC) in 2009 with the new government. 
PREPAZ’ stated role was to guide prevention policy development and ensure that citizen 
security operations were oriented to community organisations and municipalities.  
With the PNJSC, PREPAZ gained importance within the MJSP and took responsibility for 
the territorialisation of security policies and inter-institutional coordination mechanisms. 
As Galvan (2010) of the SSDT / SAE explained, the ENPSV (2010) served to coordinate 
the more than 40 NGOs dedicated to prevention and youth work in the municipalities with 
the implicated government institutions. The following ENPV (2012) was intended to 
improve on the gaps in the ENPSV as well as to take into account the changing security 
situation. In particular, the ENPV was to: 
 Place a new institutional emphasis on the importance of violence prevention; 
 Create a new national system of violence prevention; 
 Re-organise related institutions to deepen the responsibility to prevention-related 
elements; and  
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 Promote the adoption of related policies and laws that would facilitate prevention-
related activities like citizen coexistence and women and youth violence prevention 
laws. (MJSP, 2012c) 
 
Over all, the ENPV was intended to reduce risk factors and increase protection tools for 
specific territories and populations affected by violence and crime in a concerted and 
coordinated manner between all levels of government (Ibid.).  
Table 5-5: Goal and General Objective for the National Strategy for Violence Prevention (MJSP, 
2013b) 
End Goal General Objective 
Contribute to the construction of a national 
system of violence prevention with territorial 
perspective, based in a connection between the 
State and society, which strengthens citizen 
security and democracy, as well as lifts the 
quality of life of the population. 
Deploy a concerted and articulated action 
between the Central Government, local 
governments and the citizenry to reduce risk 
factors and increase protection factors in the 
various territories and populations especially 
affected by violence and crime. 
 
The ENPV was a second attempt to materially improve the prevention file within the larger 
public security framework. Within the ENPV, it was noted that the ENPSV had contained 
several major deficiencies that required resolution. First, it argued that the definition or 
conceptual development of violence prevention as well as its outlines for inter-institutional 
activities to increase and improve prevention results were deficient. Second, it noted that 
further connections were required between the legal framework and public policies related 
to prevention. Despite the ENPSV’s stated importance to the outlining of institutional roles 
and responsibilities, the ENPV acknowledges that this was not done with enough 
elaboration to truly overcome the disorder and work duplication, which therefore continued 
(MJSP, 2012c). A year-end draft added that a new consultation process with focus groups 
sourced from the Violence Prevention Municipal Committees, funded by USAID and the 
UNDP had further aided the government to strengthen and address acknowledged 
weaknesses of previous policies; the results of which had been incorporated into the ENPV 
for actioning (MJSP, 2012d, p. 8). Apparent changes as a direct result of these late-term 
consultations included an increased emphasis on the impact of machist culture and gender 
inequality; an increased responsibility for the Minister responsible for prevention and the 
more frequent meeting of those members of the National Committee of Violence 
Prevention (CONAPREV).
44
 Although the ENPV was more developed, with a greater 
                                                 
44
 CONAPREV is comprised of the following membership: MJSP, MINGOB, MINEC, MINED, MINTRAB, 
MINSAL, STP, SIS, SECULTURA, PNC, FISDL, INJUVE, ISDEMU, CONNA, ISNA, INDES and 
COMURES. It is different from the GNPV in that it coordinates between the national government and 
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number of organisation, financing, and territorial implementation guidelines, it too 
remained a relatively marginalised document, according to interested entities. 
Organisations like the Municipal Violence Prevention Councils (CMPV) argued that, 
nonetheless, the ENPV represented a large advance in the material conception of violence 
prevention.  
The ENPV was the first published document that developed, to a material degree, the 
policy tools available not only for crime and violence indicators reduction but also for the 
improvement of coexistence and social cohesion tools which had long been discussed as 
ideals (MJSP, 2013a). The published 2013 document also spoke for the first time of a 
‘national pacification process that should be based on the construction of a social pact for 
security, to give continuity and sustainability’ (Ibid., p. 9).  It was to be the most direct 
reference in written policy that the government made to a national gang truce and the 
window of opportunity that this peace created to push forward its prevention programmes. 
The national pacification process was intended to provide an integrated solution to the 
‘multiple structural causes from which the problems of violence, crime and insecurity 
originated’ (Ibid., p. 14). Through the strengths and advances listed at the outset of the 
published document, the definitions of security within the prevention framework can be 
deduced. An instrument of structured and systematic dialogue between various levels of 
government was seen as an important advance to create operational spaces within the 
municipalities and give greater visibility to municipal governments and civil society 
organisations as the best protagonists of violence prevention. Building trust between local 
organisations, government officials, and the population through visibility and on-the-
ground programming was central to its implementation. Local knowledge and local 
relationships were considered some of the best possibilities for working with children and 
youth at risk and reducing the factors that might lead them to join in criminal activity. 
CMPVs were also seen as important tools for local leaders because they incorporated 
private entities as well and created a whole of community dialogue with potential results of 
employment, low-funding high-impact youth programming, and social cohesion. As a 
target zone, schools with the facilitation of the Ministry of Education (MINED) were 
considered to be an important area of implementation (Ibid., p. 15). 
                                                                                                                                                    
management cabinets at the departmental and local levels as well as civil society, private entities and 
international cooperants. It is more directly responsible for the promotion of technical and financial 
cooperation with non-government entities as well as to provide another system for monitoring and evaluation 
of policies, strategies, and initiatives to ensure their applicability to municipal prevention activities (MJSP, 
2012d). 
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The risk factors contained in the ENPV were, like the overarching PNJSP, viewed through 
the lens of citizen security, as a component of human security where individuals are 
considered the “point of departure” (MJSP, 2013a, p. 18). Specifically, the ENPV cites the 
Conference of the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights’ (OEA, 2009) definition of 
citizen security and state responsibility which states:  
Citizen security is threatened when the state does not perform its 
function to offer protection against crime and social violence, 
decrease the gap of inequality existing between men and women, as 
well as the causes and factors that generate social exclusion and the 
abuse of vulnerable sectors, which disrupts the basic relationship 
between governors and governed. (MJSP, 2013a, p. 19) 
In this manner, the strategy opens its discussion through a positive security approach which 
emphasises harmonic coexistence and the strengthened linkages between relevant actors to 
support conditions of human dignity with the full enjoyment of their human rights (Ibid.). 
The multi-actor nature of positive security is also demonstrated through the ENPV’s 
discussion of the importance of multidimensional security actions over the long term 
involving society actors and the participation of citizens (Ibid., p. 20-22). It argues that 
policies, strategies, programmes and projects/activities are not just an extension or 
application of the law. Instead, an approach from the bottom up or territorial dimension 
allows for the multi-dimensional nature extend from a diversity of actors to a diversity of 
issues which may contribute to greater security. In this approach, both social cohesion and 
social capital are key to the understanding of the security perspective. A conceptualisation 
of social vulnerability is a means through which security files may also be pursued as the 
National Institute for Youth (INJUVE, 2012) explained; vulnerability brings in an integral 
necessity of action which cannot be limited to a reduction in crime (MJSP, 2013a). 
Table 5-6: ENPV Structural Risk Factors (MJSP, 2013b; MJSP, 2013a) 
Structurally-formed Risk Factors 
1. Structural and Cultural Factors 
2. Factors of inequality and discrimination towards women, girls, boys and adolescents 
3. Institutional and Political Factors 
4. Issue specific factors like the traffic of drugs and others 
 
5.4.3 The treatment of gangs in law and written policy 
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In the context of the first FMLN government since the signing of the peace accords, policy 
and operations officials argued that a hard-handed approach was no longer the only tool to 
hand, nor were gangs the only target. Gangs are the first security risk brought to the fore in 
Salvadoran official discussion but they are not as dominant for those officials who work in 
regional context. Furthermore, unlike sensational media reports in daily newspapers, 
officials were much more cautious to address gang issues not only as a security risk but as 
based in those deeper historical origins of socio-economic inequalities and position them in 
terms of prevention programming potential rather than focus on military crackdown, as had 
been conducted in the past. Whilst all officials interviewed for this study spoke about both 
gangs and transnational criminal organisations (TCO) at some point when defining security 
risks and violence indicators in Central America, the means through which they 
communicated this violence differed. MJSP policy officials spoke in terms of groups and 
policies. Prevention policy officials preferred to discuss the themes found in criminal 
violence activities rather than highlighting specific groups or targeting individuals. 
Namely, they were more inclined to broad types of violence such as armed violence (80 
per cent of homicides are perpetrated with a firearm), gendered violence (a source indicator 
for cultures of violence endemic in society) or drug abuse prevention strategies, than they 
were to identify typical individuals or groups responsible for these actions. Security 
operations officials spoke in terms of the types of crime committed. Auto thefts, trafficking 
(drugs, arms, people, contraband), and the violence of murder were all considered security 
risks facing Central America but the perpetrators were left more ambiguous. Finally, 
regional diplomacy officials with the SICA spoke in terms of the abstract and technical 
themes which would require regional programming implementation in order to be 
addressed by the states themselves. Thus, even when the ultimate agreed upon sources of 
violence and crime were similar, the terms and means through which these issues were 
communicated were sensitive to a particular set of concepts or goals unique to that 
institution or individual.  
Since the topic of gangs is generally unavoidable in the context of criminal violence, all 
officials did make reference to the issue at one point or another. The general tone, set by a 
government advisor, was that gangs were not solely responsible for the problems El 
Salvador or indeed Central America was currently facing: on the one hand, the Salvadoran 
government positions gangs as “a major impact on the security of the country. On the other 
hand, they say that an important percentage of homicides are related to the process of 
trafficking and commercialisation of drugs” (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). In this 
P r i e s  | 151 
 
regard, although the split between realms of responsibility varies from assessment to 
opinion, there remained a relative certainty among government officials that a link has 
grown between gangs and TCO. This advisor on policy development pointed to a 2009 
presidential address given by Mauricio Funes that fundamentally restructured the collective 
gaze on criminal violence by separating the issue of gangs from that of TCO, indicating 
that whilst both issues needed to be addressed to find solutions to violence in El Salvador, 
those solutions would be different. 
Prevention policy officials also acknowledged the different solutions required for reducing 
the criminal violence perpetrated by gangs than the actions required to combat TCO, which 
fell out of their purview. Gangs represented a particular threat not only to the present but to 
the future stability of the country due to demographics and geography. Gangs are 
comprised of youth as young as 10 or 12 and the majority are in their late teens or early 
twenties (Wolf, 2011). These street groups flourish in marginalised and excluded areas 
where few opportunities exist for youths. As such, prevention programming was thought 
best directed to these areas and to these groups as a means to provide alternatives to crime 
(Interviews with PREPAZ Official, 2012; Flores, 2012). PREPAZ director Flores argued 
that prevention programming was required and needed to be structured specifically for the 
context of children, adolescents and youth and that the solutions had to be built within 
local communities (Interview with Flores, 2012). Another PREPAZ official took this 
argument further, stating that PREPAZ or prevention operations are the only facilitators 
currently in local communities coming to grips with location-specific security risks 
(Interview with PREPAZ Official, 2012). However, he went on to explain, the problems of 
violence are so much greater than firearms deaths and gang abuses. Prevention in this 
perspective additionally involves the important issues of maltreated children, intra-familiar 
violence, and violence against women. In this way, violence and prevention “is much more 
in-depth than we imagine, because it involves a re-education” (Ibid.).  
As such, in the eyes of prevention policy officials, security risks to individuals were not 
just those of gangs or TCO but emanating from a plethora of sources all of which needed 
to be addressed when planning solutions. These officials were also united in the conviction 
that police should not be involved in establishing long-term programming, a position that 
was contested by operations officials. Cotto’s perception that El Salvador’s position as one 
of the most violent countries in the world had been generated by government neglect of the 
spaces that generate violence agreed with those discussed above (Interview with Augusto 
Cotto, 2012). In other words, that “the state provided weak care for children and youth” 
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resulting in violent urban and marginalised areas facilitating a spreading gang problem 
(Ibid.). However, he believed that an essential component of the prevention-led solution 
had to involve police officers to build community policing networks (as in a pilot project 
sponsored by the UK government) and to ensure continuing protections against criminal 
violence. Nevertheless, officials were in agreement along the broad terms of addressing at-
risk youth in situ and building opportunities for an alternative lifestyle in conjunction with 
local governments. 
Civil society interested parties (Interpeace) and academics (IUDOP, UCA/Alberto 
Masferrer) along with foreign government-sponsored organisations such as GiZ 
(Germany), USAID (US), and CECI (Canada) all highlight the importance of working 
directly with local governments – even when developing regional initiatives – on gang 
policy. In the majority, they also supported prevention activities and noted the need for 
long-term policy to build security through the mitigation of gang influences rather than 
combating criminal violence over the short term. IUDOP director Jeannette Aguilar was 
broadest in her definition of the social origins of Central American security, noting that the 
high human and social cost of insecurity had a long history in the wars of the region and 
that combating crime was not sufficient to address the new ‘dynamic complexity to 
criminality’ (Interview with Aguilar, 2012). In this perspective, ‘the main concern is how 
security affects the poor in populated areas’ because they have little purchasing power to 
provide their own security (Ibid.). Furthermore, IDUCA, Interpeace, and GiZ officials all 
note the importance of youth in addressing both security and prevention policies – not just 
as gangs and vulnerable youth groups but as the future of the country (Interview with 
Kuechemann, 2012). This was said to require a whole of society solution to build a citizen 
culture of peace through the ministries of youth, education, and health as issues of 
prevention included not just gang considerations but ‘the greater issues that are practically 
the same in every country: school expulsions, familiar violence, and a lack of 
social/recreational spaces’ (Interview with Aguilar Umana, 2012). In this way, the security 
risks are not seen as solely violent individuals but as those in the communities of high 
crime and victimisation (Ibid.). 
5.4.4 Reaction to Government Policies 
Although FLMN laws and militarised government reactions from 2009 to 2013 had been 
less criticised by their own party members than similar policies proposed by the ARENA 
party in previous administrations had been, in discussion on the policy development 
process as well as its lack of appropriate implementation, many were quick to comment 
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(criticise). Truce negotiator Raul Mijango argued that their truce negotiations were a 
necessary reality after the failure of government policy:  
First, it needs to be said that the state public policy has been a 
punitive policy, expressed in the incrimination of crime repression 
levels. […] When there was the change in government, the 
government of Mauricio Funes was not able to disrupt this inertia 
of how to confront the phenomenon of violence and they gave 
continuity to the old public policies [of mano dura etc.]. The 
leadership that the President of the Republic put to the Public 
Security dossier was very weak and incapable of making an 
interpretation more profound of the phenomenon and so 
accommodated to continue with the implementation of the same 
policies that had already been attempted. This further introduced 
elements that came to further complicate the issue as in the case of 
the approval of the Law of the Proscripción de Pandillas that in 
practical terms penalised the whole of Salvadoran youth. (Mijango, 
2013) 
Others were not so much worried about the contents of security and prevention policies, 
some of which they had helped to write but rather over whether the government had, in 
fact bothered to follow its newly minted publications: ‘This document is not very public; it 
is not generally known. If you ask people if they know of the security policy document, 
they don’t know it […]’ (Interview with Guillén, 2013). As such, the FMLN’s early days 
in office focused on both broadening and deepening understanding of the complexity of 
violence facing Salvadorans, in consultation with a range of international, regional and 
local technical experts, but it was done in a haphazard manner which reflected both the 
newness of the party to governance and a tendency to pursue grand ideas without 
significant concrete development.  
Despite these lofty goals of conflating public security into a citizen security context and 
promoting a common vision between diverse institutions and civil society, most subjects, 
when questioned directly, acknowledged that the 2010 Security Policy had failed to be 
fully implemented and, although serving as a constant object of reference in security 
discussions and discourse, it remained inoperable. In particular, the Justice and Public 
Security Ministry (MJSP)’s social violence prevention unit, PREPAZ, noted that there was 
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a great deal of resistance to implementing prevention programming and that often, when 
initiating a new program, they would be forced to work on their own or with international 
institutions instead of with local bodies (Interview with MJSP Official, 2012). Local 
municipalities most often adopted a wait and see attitude and would jump in once they saw 
progress or benefit to themselves (Interview with Flores, 2012).  
Others, such as a foreign organization involved in local social violence prevention 
programming, argued that even the government was reluctant to act on the 2010 Security 
Policy (Interview with Quinn, 2012). They observed that it took outsiders with 
international funds to implement programming along the lines of the government policy 
rather than initiatives emerging from the government itself. At the same time, the first 
cabinet of the FMLN government, although it had what FESPAD director Maria Silvia 
Guillén called a ‘timid intent to give life’ to an integral policy addressing crime and 
introduce prevention, did not make significant progress (Interview with Guillén, 2013). In 
particular, Guillén highlighted the failure of former Vice-minister Campos to present a 
rehabilitation law proposal to the Legislative Assembly. However, she noted that during 
that period, improvements had been made, such as the end of raids on individual 
communities, a moratorium that did not last into the second cabinet: ‘With this cabinet 
[there has been] a return to massive operations in poor communities […] and there is no 
definitive integral prevention policy’ (Ibid.). As such, the PNJSP, despite beginning with 
energy, intent and support, quickly sank as the government returned to crisis-driven, 
reactionary policy initiatives which returned soldiers to street patrols and as guards in 
penitentiaries.  
The immediate reason provided for the government’s backtracking was the necessity for 
swift reaction to gang attacks on buses and urban centres. Officials acknowledge that the 
lack of resources and personnel with experience in the development and implementation of 
prevention policies was also a factor (Interviews with Flores, 2012; PREPAZ Official, 
2012). Police officials argued that there were not enough available officers trained on 
community policing, let alone in regular patrolling techniques, to meet immediate 
requirements and so military accompaniment was a stop-gap (Interviews with PNC 
Commissioner, 2012; Martinez Ventura, 2012). Nevertheless, there were several important 
developments in these early FMLN policies which illustrate its predisposition to a more 
balanced security framework. The goal was not necessarily to instantly find quick solutions 
to direct problems, such as homicide, but to generate new platforms from which underlying 
social structures could be addressed. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
When exploring the relationship between crime, violence, and security, the forms and 
constructs of violence must be considered prior to attempting to write policy or govern 
those threats. Chapter 4 already presented the actors involved in security governance in 
answer to the questions of who participates in policy formation and governance outcomes 
and in what spaces or levels they make a contribution. Building on those spaces, this 
chapter has explored the types of security perceptions, measurements, policies, and policy 
perceptions with which actors engage. To start, the location and scope of security 
perceptions is important for redefining where actors fit within different scales or levels of 
governance. How do these multiple levels of actor perceptions structure the security 
concepts used in policy and governance? What has the potential to emerge is an expansive 
interpretation of security, ranging from protection from the direct threats presented by 
gangs to broader themes of accessible public spaces and neighbourliness. What does 
emerge is often something much narrower – as if competing and contrasting opinions in 
dialogue end up regressing to the narrow definitions of crime as culprit. Organised crime 
and gang activities are situated in these spaces where crime is structured through a violent 
lens. Next, the issues of measurement which can provide the baseline data required for 
solid policy making. However, measurement inaccuracies and the seduction of numbers 
can often lead to overestimates on criminal influences. Much of the data produced by 
crime measurement is based on rumour or popular response (as in LAPOP or IUDOP, for 
example). For this thesis, these issues can inform the analysis of actor contributions to 
security governance projects including policy development.  
In a turn to the policies outlined above, there remains an uneasy tension between security 
ideals and the concepts born out of reaction to specific threat or crisis events. Whereas 
there appeared to be a concerted effort to identify for who the security was for, it was less 
clear for which values security was being constructed. Whilst citizen security allows for 
both to be implemented simultaneously, it does not entail that this is done with any great 
degree of success. In large part, this is also down to the fact that most aspects of the grand 
policy projects were never implemented or only done so half-heartedly. Instead, the 
governance structures and implemented programmes became a far greater indicator of 
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what security was being governed and how than policy publications. This means that while 
the spaces of interactions and the types of actors involved were expanded during the first 
FMLN administration, and security concept changes within policy development broadened 
within the constructs of citizen security, the implementation of policy was less successful. 
Through this discussion, an image emerges of the state as an organisation that very much 
considers itself essential to the provision of security and the development of national 
strategies to guide policy development, even when built on grass-roots contributions. At 
the same time, municipal level experiences demonstrate that multidimensional, micro-level 
consultations can sometimes be sufficient to address citizen requests for security in and 
around their daily lives. In order to interpret the ways in which security governance 
changed under the FMLN, an examination of case study governance efforts in practice are 
required.  
  
Chapter 6 
Security Governance Outcomes: Innovation in El 
Salvador 
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6.1 Introduction 
Security is a term highly contested both in theory and through the policy development 
process. As has been explored in Chapters 4 and 5, the different actors involved in policy 
formation bring their own interpretations of security and unique operational agendas to 
security governance, the dynamics of which can have very important impacts on 
programme implementation and outcomes. Not only does the process involve internal 
government competition on direction and managing authority but it is further impacted by 
foreign entities, NGOs, and civil society institutions trying to impact management 
strategies towards their own desired goals and processes. Domestic ‘ownership’ of the 
resulting forms and processes is also debatable as a function of that governance negotiation 
reality. How then do interventions and outcomes relate as a function of these actor security 
dynamics? This chapter argues that there is not one process outcome but that all levels 
continue to interact in negotiating implementation through interconnecting operational 
spaces. 
This chapter addresses what these security governance efforts look like from the 
perspective of developed policy through programming implementation and outcomes. To 
do this, examples of prevention programmes were examined at the regional, national and 
local level, each characterised by their own transformative space within the Salvadoran 
context. The first section examines the regional ESCA initiative through the perspective of 
the German project PREVENIR. It presents a classic example of security governance 
diplomacy where greater collaboration limited by its own weight depends on individual 
actors pursuing individual goals. The example of the SGT as a hybrid effort with key 
support from multi-actor networks developed almost as an afterthought as a sort of 
sustainability catch-up mechanism. Thus, in the final case study, three municipalities are 
introduced. Each had been running some form of prevention strategy prior to the SGT. 
With the territorialisation of the SGT in late 2012-early 2013, each was brought into the 
SGT framework with the intent of solidifying the pacification tenets through ground-level 
initiatives. To understand how municipal, national, and regional perceptions and practices 
in security governance relate to one another, these case studies have been chosen as 
negotiated spaces for security management. For better cross-case analysis, the selected 
cases represent prevention programmes leaving methods of combating violent crime and 
crime repression strategies for later research.  
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6.2 The Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) 
After a brief overview of the ESCA structure and development process, this section will 
look at the programme outcomes through Germany’s involvement in ESCA and the 
manner in which it brought its existing efforts in line with the objectives of a regional 
strategy within specific states. It concludes with local perspectives on ESCA outcomes to 
2013. 
During the years of ESCA development between 2011 and 2013, El Salvador’s participant 
government officials were broadly supportive of the strategy. Not only had the thematic 
pillars and encompassed projects been developed out of a process of national consultations 
and agreed upon through regional negotiation (not necessarily the most important security 
risks in each country but the most important security threats that they could agree upon 
collectively) but it was portrayed as a means of regional and international strategic 
engagement over the long term (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012). As a member of the 
Salvadoran negotiation team and Director of PREPAZ, Santiago Flores, explained, 
‘Currently, it is a reality that the Northern Triangle has its differences from the rest of the 
countries but the Regional Strategy rests on the achieved consensus because of this 
necessity, this reality, and this political decision to work together’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, it 
fell within the Salvadoran effort to increase a prevention focus within wider security 
activities as even the ‘combating crime’ component was largely constructed of ‘reduction’ 
and mechanism strengthening projects. As the Salvadoran negotiation team leader, 
Francesco Gonzalez, explained, ‘training to give better answers to the problems of 
insecurity have helped us to start thinking beyond combat-driven responses’ (Ibid.).  
In its official documents, the SICA defines itself as an instrument to coordinate regional 
activities in security with the objective to establish the components and activities necessary 
to strengthen security and wellbeing for the individual in a regional manner (SICA, 2011). 
In this context, and through much regional negotiation, Central American states agreed to 
four thematic pillars encompassing 22 initial projects (See Figure 6-1). Out of these 
proposed projects, eight were chosen for the initial implementation (See Figure 6-2). 
Again, the Salvadoran negotiating team was very supportive of this complement of themes 
and projects because it fit directly within their own national security policy (See Chapter 
6). However, Gonzalez emphasised that it would be a mistake for foreign observer states to 
think that the ESCA was just a strategy for funds on the part of Central American states:  
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Part of the effectiveness in implementing this strategy is the 
political support in making it sustainable. We expect all countries 
that support us to understand the concept that if you are helping one 
country and not another, the impact will be minimal. We must 
work together, knowing the mechanisms and procedures of the 
system, to generate the kind of synergy between countries that will 
be productive. (Interview with Gonzalez, 2012)  
Other members concurred over the strength of continuity and joint responsibility they 
perceived in the regional process (Interviews with Flores, 2012; Ortiz de Zelaya, 2012). 
The multi-level, multi-lateral nature of the ESCA was therefore considered one of its chief 
recommendations as geared to the development of policies, programmes, strategies and 
actions that permit the prevention of violence in the region (SICA, 2011a; Interview with 
Flores, 2012).  
Table 6-1: ESCA Components (Source: SICA, 2011) 
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Table 6-2: Initial Projects Approved for Development and Financing (Source: Briefing Documents, 
2012-2013) 
 
One of the significant limitations of the ESCA was its lack of detail contained within the 
projects presented in the 2012 framework. The debate actually centred on whether the 
ESCA represented a policy, a strategy, or a collection of projects. The director of the 
Democratic Security Unit argued that the ESCA was a policy because the projects 
themselves represented a concept of security and a means for prevention planning over the 
long term with a regional coordination focus (Interview with Vilchez, 2012). However, 
other members of the team working on the projects’ development were not convinced. One 
technical official stated bluntly, when asked about the policies developed for the ESCA, 
that the ESCA was not a policy and clarified that ‘[The ESCA] should function like a 
policy but I do not think it will arrive at this, it should, perhaps we are in the beginning 
stages and we don’t have the results’ (Interview with Loya Marin, 2012). From this 
perspective, there existed a common base, the ESCA, that had been agreed upon by the 
member states but the lack of common structural organisation meant that it was a 
collaborative effort to seek similar paths rather than a regional policy that could implement 
changes at a national level. Similarly, others argued that while the dialogue which 
surrounded the negotiation of the projects could be considered on some level as a strategy 
towards greater security and collective management of specific issues, this did not 
constitute a regional policy either (Interview with Chacon, 2012). Others were not so 
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complementary arguing that even the projects were lacking in sufficient definition for 
immediate implementation (Participant Observation, 2012).   
It was this collaboration that had some international donors concerned. At meetings in 
January 2012, chief hesitations over the initiative included the proposed model of 
execution; the lack of clarification or definition of responsibilities for participant parties 
including the SICA and members states; and the lack of flexibility of locking into a 
regional strategy (Participant Observation, 2012). Donor countries from the US to 
Germany alleged that the role of the SICA was unclear because it had never previously 
acted as an implementer of programmes or projects, being primarily a diplomatic body. 
However, the SICA responded that such concerns were premature; although its primary 
function to that point had been in the facilitation of relations between various entities, it 
was ‘in the process’ of developing important monitoring and evaluation capacities along 
with financial mechanisms to allow the institution to administer regional projects 
(Participant Observation, 2012; Interview with Chacon, 2012). Questions also arose over 
what would happen to existing bilateral projects that fit within the constructs of the 
strategy. Whilst the SICA wanted to have coordination fall under their control, some 
foreign donors were reluctant to make this move due to legal restrictions or the distrust of a 
regional process in general. Some like the US and Canada were willing to bring their 
bilateral projects in alignment with the thematic goals of the SICA without actually 
bringing their work under the structure. An odd result of this process was that foreign 
donors ended up ‘adopting’ specific components or projects – a means of implementing 
consistency across the region through the guiding agenda of one or a small number of 
interested parties. Nevertheless and despite concerns, the early development of the ESCA 
managed to provide a certain level of clarification as to what projects and programming 
were on-going in the region, clarifying gaps that could use further development.  
Over all, the initial Strategy received commitments to US$78,316,018 out of an 
identified/proposed US$333 million; 52 percent of committed funds were designated for 
violence prevention projects and 31 percent towards institutional strengthening. Projects 
DB1 and DB2 in the Institutional Strengthening category were the first to be implemented 
with 590 police among the 1,440 civil servant trained in the first year of implementation to 
2013 (SICA, 2012). Combined, prosecutors and judges represented another 500 individuals 
who participated in various training project efforts on the modernisation and harmonisation 
of regional legal mechanisms (Ibid.). Under a second project (DB2), national security 
institutions were provided ‘modernising tools’ (much in the form of training) with a 
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‘regional vision’ to help support the ESCA from a national perspective (Participant 
Observation, 2012). First, this meant that countries were facilitated in their creation of 
security policies that would address transnational criminal concerns within national 
security and justice institutions. Second, in conjunction with another regional unit, 
COMJIB, institutions were financed to pursue the harmonisation of criminal legislation to 
have more consistent prosecutions throughout the region. The quick implementation of 
these two components can be ascribed to two sources: (1) the effective management of the 
component leaders, the European Union and Spain; and, (2) the operating mechanism – 
training and workshop capacitation are well-understood and frequently implemented 
mechanisms of transferring knowledge (Participant Observation, 2013). Furthermore, they 
were also accepted topics of institutional strengthening which had an operational history in 
the region. The first desired result was to ‘increase the capacities for the adequate 
professional management of police forces and executive institutions of public security, 
citizens, and justice’ (SICA, 2011a). While the ESCA was not stepping out of traditional 
paths already long in action, its efforts to ensure both local and regional implementation of 
institution strengthening mechanisms marked a small step forward in creating a new, 
multi-level space for implementing specific activities.  
The thematic pillar with the strongest funding was that focusing on the Prevention of 
Violence – a reversal from many state budgets. It was generally agreed that this took place 
because prevention was less controversial than other topics and with fewer funding 
restrictions on the part of donor countries (Participant Observation, 2012). Its focus was to 
address the factors that create insecurity; develop policies, programmes, strategies, and 
activities that generate opportunities for youth; and strengthen coordination mechanisms on 
the prevention, attention, and punishment of violence against women, among others 
(Interview with Kuechemann, 2012). Leading the component was Germany and the 
UNDP. The German government first signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with the SICA in order to promote SICA projects meeting Germany’s funding agenda 
including violence prevention, health, renewable energy, and sustainable development 
(Interview with German Embassy Official, 2012). Most projects were executed through the 
German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Thus, individuals guiding the 
Prevention Component in regional negotiations were a representative from the German 
Embassy in El Salvador, a representative from the GIZ office in El Salvador, and a 
Panama-based UNDP Official. After the January 2012 regional coordination meeting, 
foreign donors agreed that the first project that would be actionable would be the BE1 – 
P r i e s  | 164 
 
‘Project for the Prevention of Social Violence from a Local Government Perspective in 
Central America’. The project was intended to give a territorial dimension to the ESCA to 
eradicate generating factors of violence and crime through the greater capacitation of local 
governments (SICA, 2011a). After its initial implementation, the project then would seek 
to gather successful experiences or best practices from each country, draw out general 
criteria, and then define a conceptual framework to guide national and local governments 
through a regional approach to citizen security and social violence prevention actions 
(Ibid.). A longer-term plan was to move into trans-border municipalities to strengthen 
coordination efforts across borders from a municipal perspective.  
Germany perceived this project as in line with projects they were already pursuing in the 
region, PREVENIR, which sought to reduce physical violence among youth through 
‘intersectoral’ prevention education (Interview with Esmail, 2012). Thus, instead of 
providing new funds to the ESCA as requested by the SICA, they chose to consider 
PREVENIR as part of their overall contribution to the ESCA and the Prevention 
component (Interviews with German Embassy Official, 2012; Kuechemann, 2012; Esmail, 
2012). This approach was not encouraged by the SICA because it did not engage with the 
fully integrated regional security governance vision adopted by ESCA developers but, at 
the same time, it was a project that was already operationalised – something that the ESCA 
desperately needed. Furthermore, that the ESCA projects had not been detailed or provided 
with a development methodology worked to Germany’s advantage in that they could 
broadly decide that their project, PREVENIR, was the manner in which aspects of the 
ESCA projects would be developed (Interview with Esmail, 2012). It was also a multi-
level, multidimensional project which linked different security jurisdictions across 
education, justice, youth, and employment institutions. The goal was to get mid-level 
management trained in prevention programming so that they could then transfer that 
knowledge to communities. These mid-level sectors would then be able to monitor 
implementation in a more detailed way than national authorities and take the results for 
best practice contributions to national and regional policy building. Sustainability was built 
into this programme through partnering with universities so that academic institutions 
would be able to create certification programmes based on these trainings. The project 
came out of baselines studies which found that national ministries lacked employees with 
the capacity to supervise the implementation of prevention programming and that, 
furthermore, there was a lack of knowledge as to what ‘prevention’ actually was (Interview 
with Esmail, 2012).  
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PREVENIR itself had gone through several reiterations prior to being brought parallel with 
the ESCA. Having been initiated in 2009, it was found to have limited impact over its first 
year. It then underwent significant revisions in 2011 and 2012 to build an internal strategy 
which, according to programme director Esmail, was missing from earlier iterations 
(Interview with Esmail, 2012). As introduced into the ESCA system, it had three 
components: to build prevention policies through the strengthening of Municipal 
Prevention Committees (CMPV) and the integration of youth, civil society, and the 
community police into municipal violence prevention strategies; the promotion of youth 
employment plans and job creation opportunities; and, the addition of prevention in 
education (Ibid.). In the national context, PREVENIR formed close alliances with national 
prevention institutions to get their ‘buy-in’ to the departmental and local training strategy. 
For El Salvador, PREVENIR was described as having a ‘give and take’ relationship with 
government ministries. Esmail explained that PREPAZ was interested in benefiting from 
the local level training intentions but that the stumbling block was to realise lasting ‘habits 
and attitudes’ changes rather than just structures and resources (Ibid.). PREPAZ Director 
Flores argued that the multidimensional integration of ministries in training at 
departmental and municipal levels fit with national policies and was also in keeping with 
the regional sentiments of the ESCA (Interview with Flores, 2013). Furthermore, the built-
in replication mechanisms meant that the project followed a basis of peer-support success 
stories.  
The example of PREVENIR as an implemented mechanism of the regional ESCA provides 
an illustration of how early projects were realised. Specific foreign donors including the 
EU, Spain, Italy, BCIE, and Germany adopted specific projects elaborated by Central 
American member states within the SICA and implemented them to their own 
specifications. In some ways, the lack of project detail proved to be of benefit, allowing for 
greater flexibility in implementation. However, this also meant that although member 
states had created a space to address security on mutual terms, the outcomes in terms of 
which projects were implemented or how they were implemented remained a negotiated 
and contested process. In principle, however, EU countries like Germany were in support 
of the overarching efforts of the ESCA and its regional integration efforts – Germany 
viewing it as a motion of solidarity for the confidence it has in the region and because it 
supports integration efforts (Interview with German Embassy Official, 2012). The SICA 
was left in a tight position during this period of negotiation with the international 
community, wishing to both maintain full coordinating control over the ESCA whilst also 
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recognising that a degree of compromise was required in order to ensure its ultimate 
realisation (Participant Observation, 2012). As such, the regional position of the SICA 
and member states was considered to be one where ‘the [Secretary General of the 
SICA], in coordination with national requests, is responsible for the integral 
administration of the projects, in coordination with the coordination mechanism, 
evaluation and follow-up and the representatives of the group of friends’ (Ibid.). In 
other words, one regional integration body is responsible for the future administration 
of the security intentions of its member states and, as such and in spite of the protests 
of dissenting parties, it intends to move forward with the ESCA as an integral effort 
for greater security in Central America. 
6.3 Non-norm Actors and Territorialised Security 
Governance 
Since a sudden and stunning gang truce emerged in the tiny country of El Salvador in 
2012, much was written about the nature and lasting power of such a controversial 
initiative. Given the lack of available information about the process, the Government of El 
Salvador (GOES) was alternatively framed as the instigator, the mediator, the dupe of 
devious criminal elements, or the hindering party in a positive forward-moving process. 
International observers and academics, a wide range of media commentators, and 
individuals working in security and gang-related fields also questioned the value of a truce 
with an opaque negotiation process, ill-defined participant roles and uncertain outcomes. 
At the same time, some have posited that the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) offered a 
glimmer of hope for a reimagining of citizen security and peacebuilding in the Salvadoran 
context. The success of such a truce could not rely on the good behavior of the two main 
gangs alone. Despite the surprising strength of the gangs’ structural cohesion exhibited by 
the truce declaration, even they would not be able to control their members over the long 
term without support. This section first discusses how a territorialised approach to the SGT 
was introduced. It then presents three short reflections on community cases. It concludes 
by drawing broad themes on the ability of state security structures to deliver security 
disputed by special interests.  
The SGT was a surprise to the country. On 9 March, 2012, homicide incidents dropped 
over the space of 24 hours across the country, cutting the number of daily murders by more 
than half; a clear indication that a new form of violence reduction was in play. The initial 
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hypothesis floated by media observers was that gang leaders and government officials had 
reached an agreement whereby, in return for a reduction in homicides, gangs or at least 
their leaders would receive certain unknown concessions (Pries, 2013a). The report 
provoked a range of denials and attempted clarifications from diverse sectors. The MS-13 
and M-18 gangs stated that they had brokered a truce between themselves and that no other 
parties were involved. The Minister of Justice and Public Security, David Munguía Payés, 
first argued that the homicide reduction was due to ‘“coordination, the efficiency of the 
police, and the intelligence work”’ rather than a result of any form of government-
sanctioned negotiation (Martinez, et al. 2012). Six months following the immediate event, 
Payés along with the SGT’s chief negotiators, ex-guerrilla and ex-politician Raúl Mijango, 
and Armed Forces Padre Fabio Colindres cautiously admitted that, in fact, the process was 
not the ‘work of a miracle’ nor was it developed and implemented at the behest of the 
Catholic Church, as some had speculated, but rather it was ‘a process carefully designed 
from the Office of the Ministry of Public Security, with the endorsement of President 
Funes’ (Martínez and Sanz, 2012).  
The international community and several foreign governments guardedly applauded the 
reduction in homicides, but the initial careful commendation of a proposed long-term 
strategy quickly faded. As one interview subject described it, in light of the ‘lack of 
transparency and general openness’ of the truce process, trepidation had overwhelmed 
most positive responses (Interview with Foreign Embassy Official, 2012). The SGT itself 
was a shock treatment or short term strategy which required support and programming if it 
had any hope of success. The Organization of American States (OAS), through Secretary 
General José Miguel Insula and its Secretary of Multidimensional Security (SMS) Adam 
Blackwell, was one of the only international organisations to officially and actively support 
the truce. The OAS was already working in El Salvador on a security diagnostic and had 
renewed working relationships with a broad range of actors in keeping with 
Multidimensional Security approach (Blackwell, 2015). A few other institutions, like the 
UNDP, responded with cautious comments like those of Director Marcela Smutt who 
stated that because of the truce, there was a possibility for the opening of discussions on 
the socio-economic integration of youth gang members at the same time as deepening 
prevention initiatives focused on youth at elevated risk (Interview with Smutt, 2013).  
In the minds of the SGT’s chief negotiators, it was indeed a long-term process which they 
were attempting to build. As truce negotiator Raúl Mijango explained, the immediate 
homicide reductions and the willingness of the top gang leaders led both him and fellow 
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negotiator Monseñor Fabio Colindres to the consideration that ‘this is something more than 
a simple truce; the conditions are being set up through which we can transform this into a 
real process that seeks the recovery of social peace in El Salvador’ (Interview with 
Mijango, 2013). There was a slow acknowledgement on the part of the negotiators that 
support and participation of the GOES, civil society, and the international community was 
going to be essential to the lasting power of the process. Mijango continued: ‘To think that 
the [responsibility for] ultimate success of this process will rest on the shoulders of the 
Bishop and myself is very presumptuous. Now the moment is to involve all the actors: the 
Government, the NGOs, private enterprise, the churches…so that everyone can own the 
process and make it theirs’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, within the year, three further gangs 
operating at the national level, La Máquina, La Mao Mao, and La Mirada Locos, 
committed themselves to the SGT process. It was through these advances that the 
negotiators were able to propose the next phase of the truce: to bring the process to a 
selection of municipalities, have them appropriate it and feed the results back into a 
national process.  
Suggested by the truce facilitators in conjunction and with the support of gang leaders, 18 
municipalities were proposed as a product of the new era of multi-lateral peacebuilding 
where grassroots contribute to national (and regional) policies instead of being enacted 
upon solely or their local initiatives remaining localised activities. In these zones, gang 
factions promised to refrain from all forms of criminal activity, turn in their arms and 
integrate themselves in community collectives that would work for the wellbeing of the 
locality (Martínez, 2012). Initially named municipios santuarios (sanctuary 
municipalities), public outcry at the permissive optics saw participants renamed municipios 
libres de violencia (MLVs). Here, in return for full crime reductions, the police were 
expected to limit large scale anti-gang operations and the military would withdraw 
completely. The idea appears to have a historical basis reaching as far back as pre-modern 
societies where sanctuary cities provided protection for offenders in ancient Israel, the 
Barotse, and in the Hindu Kush (Mitchell, 2007). Here, ‘the basic protection offered was 
against retaliatory violence but not against legal process, judgement, and [would result in] 
an end to protection if the judgement was negative’ (Ibid., p. 5). Zones of Peace (ZoPs), 
another sanctuary-related concept, also have a basis in the Salvadoran context, including 
that of the Coordinadora founded in 1998 in response to rising violence following the end 
of the civil war (Warfield and Jennings, 2012). Rupesinghe argues that this form of 
‘empowerment’ helps local communities ‘to build the will and the mechanisms to hold 
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governments and guerrillas accountable […] protecting and building on the peace once it is 
achieved’ (Rupesinghe, 1995, p. 327). As such, it appears that while aspects of the gang 
truce may be contentious for citizens, civil society and international stakeholders alike, in 
its current form the gang truce is anything but strange and original. Rather, it is built on a 
set of best practices, policy initiatives, and ideological methodologies championed by the 
government and non-governmental organizations since the 1992 Peace Agreements which 
ended El Salvador’s civil war and maintains a far-reaching historical basis. The reduced 
violence also allowed plans for service provisions to be contemplated by other government 
departments including the Ministries of Health and Education. Within the MJSP, an 
Attention to Victims Unit also had increasing freedom of movement and was able to 
venture into previous no-go zones and attend to individuals (Interview with Ortiz de 
Zelaya, 2013).  
While it was important that national services be afforded access to the MLVs, the truce 
negotiators found it essential that these municipalities realize horizontal integration. 
Mijango explained the hoped-for benefits of SGT territorialisation:  
[T]o bring [the process] to the territories; it will deepen [the 
impact] because in the territories we are providing agreements 
between the gangs and society and these are mini covenants that 
can strengthen the stability, the sustainability and the ‘no-
reversion’ of the process. (Interview with Mijango, 2013) 
Prior to the second phase of the SGT,  the process had remained an elite activity involving 
a select number of negotiators and gang leaders at the top of national gang structures, local 
level acceptance of these decisions was not inevitable. Local clicas, even when they bore 
the names of national gangs, did not necessarily enter into the SGT; they maintained their 
own agency and made their own territorial contributions to the patterns of violence. As one 
community worker explained, ‘the truce is only for some sectors; it is only small groups 
that are found in the truce’ (Interview with NGO Technical Official, 2013). Therefore, it 
was all the more important to SGT participants and facilitators that territorialisation of the 
process advance. Indeed, it required not only that horizontal appropriation of a top-down 
process be solidified but that it be sufficiently responsive in order to provide feedback on 
the functioning innovations to the national level for broad dissemination. The MLVs, with 
their individual political allegiances, were to have autonomy to pursue projects and 
programs that best fit their locale but remain mindful of greater applicability. Upward 
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dynamism in peacebuilding has been much sought-after but has often proved particularly 
difficult to operationalise. Donais and Knorr observe that weak political and social 
structures often limit full integration of ‘“the local” into existing peacebuilding efforts’ 
(Donais & Knorr, 2013, p. 56). In the Salvadoran case, as will be demonstrated, an attempt 
was made to mitigate the risks of the territorialisation process through the inclusion of 
several municipalities already well versed in the implementation of citizen security and 
social violence prevention programming. On the one hand, the inclusion of these 
municipalities may be seen as a cynical shortcut to results optics. Nonetheless, inclusion of 
rallying municipalities like Santa Tecla also created a functioning space for horizontal and 
bottom-up policy contributions allowing for the ‘recuperation of peace’ in El Salvador. 
6.3.1 Santa Tecla and Sonsonate 
Urban areas have long been a target for violence management and reduction. Violence and 
criminal activity is not a homogenous phenomenon across the country but is affected by 
geography as well as socio-economic and political factors.  Marginalised groups that live 
with elevated exclusion levels from economic activity or weakened governance capacities 
are often those with particularly stringent experiences of insecurity – not only measured 
through homicides but through negative interactions with traditional and non-norm 
conforming entities from local corruption in government institutions to community 
gatekeeper controls maintained by local criminal groups. Through UNDP programmes, 
Santa Tecla and Sonsonate engaged in efforts: (1) establish a baseline understanding of the 
variables at play within a citizen insecurity framework; (2) develop projects in conjunction 
with local actors to manage and reduce variables identified in the first step; and, (3) 
implement new initiatives to prevent criminal violence and associated activities through 
mechanisms designed to improve structural influences through youth programming and the 
improvement of local employment conditions (Interview with Smutt, 2013).  
Santa Tecla stands on the edge of the national capital, San Salvador; it sits on the urban 
periphery while acting the capital of La Libertad department in its own right. From the 
1990s, the municipality manifested the transformations that gang culture was undergoing 
in El Salvador. Youth gangs increased territorial confrontations until open warfare ensured 
criminal violence spread to every district. Repressive actions only served to marginalize 
gang members while community relations deteriorated. The municipality’s moment of 
change arrived in January and February 2001 when devastating earthquakes destroyed 
much of the city’s infrastructure and caused great loss of life in the Colonia Las Colinas 
district. Under the leadership of Mayor Óscar Ortiz, the municipal administration decided 
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to rebuild in a strategic manner. They conducted a diagnostic study on which the 
Participative Strategic Plan (2002-2012) was based. Citizens were consulted on their vision 
for their communities and chief among their demands was the needed for greater security. 
An inter-sectoral roundtable on coexistence and citizen security was also implemented to 
drive the implementation of plans and programs. The local government developed their 
own policy of coexistence and citizen security. Included in this plan were: a recovery of 
public spaces; an identification of target groups, including women and youth; and the 
training of police officers with a community-specific focus (PNUD, 2012b). From a 
homicide spike to 66.4 per 100,000 in 2005, the municipality made significant progress in 
such that it recorded only 8.2 per 100,000 in 2012, becoming a unique success story for the 
country. Its streets were clean, its parks transformed into relatively safe public spaces and 
its citizens protected in the case of violence and natural disasters. 
Having established a reputation as a prosperous municipality with a dynamic urban life and 
diverse economic opportunities, Santa Tecla was still one of the first to join the MLV 
phase of the SGT. Municipal officers argued that this was not because they needed help or 
more money; they had already been successful in their application for international and 
private funds to recover public spaces, establish youth scholarships and implement special 
youth programs to provide comprehensive support. Rather, as Coexistence and Citizen 
Security Commission Coordinator Stanley Rodriguez explained, their participation in the 
MLV was a function of their contributions to national security policy building (Interview 
with Rodriguez, 2013). Santa Tecla had served as the model for national prevention 
policies on multiple fronts and contributed directly to the PJSC. Because of their success at 
both implementing long-term programs and soliciting for international financing for their 
activities, they were also frequently called to share experiences with other municipalities 
(Ibid.). OAS representative Adam Blackwell also confirmed that it was intentional that 
many MLVs already had prevention plans in place (EFE, 2013). Thus, when the proposal 
to territorialize the SGT came to fruition, some saw Santa Tecla’s presence as one which 
was to facilitate their contribution of lessons learned and urban recovery experiences to 
other participants. 
On the other hand, Santa Tecla’s improvements had not left it immune to wider gang 
dynamics. Against all efforts, its homicide rate had risen again in 2011 with the rest of the 
country (Observatorio Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia Santa Tecla, 2012). 
Thus, some within the political leadership also saw an opportunity in the SGT’s MLV 
strategy to regain control of security with the result that, in 2013, their homicide rate had 
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reduced once more to a record low of 17 per 100,000 (Interpeace, 2014). FMLN Mayor 
Óscar Ortiz argued that the process created an opportunity to guarantee peace both for the 
municipality and for the country (Serrano, 2013). Residents of Colonia San José del Pino 
and comunidad San Rafael were particularly eager to join the process after decades of 
stigmatization, gang subjugation, and repressive police incursions. The MLV designation 
allowed the municipality to enter into sectors which had remained marginalized or 
abandoned over the previous decade and reinvigorate efforts to further recover “social 
peace” (ContraPunto, 2014). At the covenant signing between local gangs and Santa Tecla 
officials, gang signs proclaimed: ‘we recognize that our Salvadoran people deserve better 
security to live in peace’. Peacebuilding in Santa Tecla recognized that local-level efforts 
needed to continue apace while they held the necessary tools and capacity to contribute to 
sustainable peacebuilding activities to other municipalities and to their country.  
6.3.2 Ilopango and the Gang Truce Territorialisation 
On 22 January 2013, the municipality of Ilopango on the edge of the capital was declared 
the first municipio libre de violencia (MLV) in the country. It represented the first 
territorialisation step in a second phase of the Salvadoran Gang Truce (SGT) that had 
begun in March 2012. Ilopango had, prior to the truce, been one of the municipalities most 
affected by robbery, extortions and homicides and had been long considered an area to 
avoid. The two main gangs in El Salvador had become used to using the territory as a 
battleground as national rivalries were augmented by disputes between local clicas.  
Graph 6-1: Homicides in Ilopango (Interpeace, 2014) 
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Ilopango was one of the first municipalities to experience gang warfare between what grew 
to become the MS-13 and the M-18. One member explained to Interpeace workers, ‘here 
was fired the first bullet of the war between gangs’ (Interpeace, 2014, p. 5). As such, the 
homicide rate moved between 70 and 100 per 100,000 which accounted for about 85 
violent deaths in 2010 and 117 in 2011. With the SGT in 2012, this number dropped to 62 
and further reduced with the truce’s territorialisation in 2013. Undeniably, gangs had a 
significant impact on life in Ilopango and it was because of this that the municipality’s 
ARENA mayor, Salvador Ruano, embraced the idea of a truce as a potential solution to the 
continuing insecurity faced by his constituents. 
Under the opinion that here it began and so here the end must first be realised (Interpeace, 
2014, p. 5), Ilopango organised a local declaration echoing the gang truce press release of 
the previous year with the signing of an official declaration under the watchful 
coordination of municipal officials, local religious leaders, and with the support of national 
dignitaries including MJSP Minister Payes, ARENA founder Mercedes Gloria Salguero 
Gross, and leadership entities of both gangs. Also in attendance at the signing ceremony 
were members of the Prevention Council, COPACIL, who had long been at work in the 
community attempting to improve security and trust among its residents. Citizens attending 
the ceremony heard gang members promise to opt for a channel of dialogue and non-
violent conflict resolution: ‘We are in a permanent process of learning how to live the 
culture of peace and democracy’ (Ilopango, N/A). With the goal of providing space for 
youth that had joined criminal elements to reinsert themselves into the local community, 
gangs promised to reduce their criminal activities in exchange for alternative life 
opportunities. Nonetheless, gang members were determined to follow-up on their original 
statements. A media statement given by Borromeo Henriquez Solórzano of the MS-13 in 
Ilopango after the signing of the accord had indicated the awareness these groups had of a 
national and international spotlight:  
This is a historic process despite that many people have doubts and 
many people remain at the sidelines, but with the help that we have 
received from some religious personnel, mayors, business people 
and other non-governmental organisations, we believe that we will 
raise Ilopango as a national and international example. (Solorzano, 
2013) 
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Despite the fractured nature of the truce in Ilopango, both over-arching gang structures 
generally committed to reducing ‘bad’ activities in exchange for ‘good’ things from the 
government, private businesses, and civil society. Rather than a general promise to reduce 
homicides and other violent crimes like that which was issued in March 2012, both gangs 
had specific give and take expectations. From the process, Juan Carlos Campos, the M-18 
representative, expected ‘like anyone who is human’ to have the space to work, maintain a 
personal life and to build the trust between them and the Salvadoran people (Campos, 
2013). Local gangs expected that they would facilitate negative security allowing local 
residents freedom from violence and crime and, in exchange, the positive security for the 
whole community, themselves included, was expected to rise. Gangs representatives 
professed that public spaces would be safer and access to education, work, and social 
services like healthcare would be improved for all with the result that trust for them to 
participate in society would be reinstalled (Campos, 2013).  
Many of these expectations emerged following statements made by Raul Mijango and 
Padre Fabio Colindres in late November 2012 on MJSP property during a press conference 
marking the first year of Minister David Munguia Payes’ leadership. At that time they 
outlined the requirements expected of a MLV on the part of the government which 
included: the integration of gang members into community collectives working for local 
development; a community-policing dominated local PNC delegation; municipal projects 
for local development in high risk zones; local authorities, private business and external 
cooperation working to develop learning initiatives to facilitate youth-focused labour 
insertion opportunities including for former gang members; mental health campaign 
implementation prioritisation; accelerated education programmes; and a criminal 
observatory integrated with resident citizens in the zone (Mijango & Colindres, 2012). The 
statement also made provisions for the signing of a pact ‘for life and peace’ as a multi-
actor document. However, in order to really move the MLV process forward, in each of the 
eleven cities in which the process was implemented, it appears that success was largely 
dependent on its champion – the strength of its mayor and the structure surrounding 
them.
45
 
Taking the step to be the first MLV required leadership on the part of the mayor, Ruano. 
Interpeace explains that the figure of the mayor had been instrumental for young gang 
members because they knew that they were dealing with an actor who came from the 
                                                 
45
 Indeed, if judged by the municipal elections following the MLV process, a majority of the participant 
mayors were rewarded through re-election; this despite the fact that a polled 80% of citizens were against 
dialogue with gangs according to a year end IUDOP survey. 
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territory and who knew the realities and requirements for life and community change there 
as well as the authority to implement those changes (Interpeace, 2014). Furthermore, the 
mayor was considered “indispensable both in his role as intermediary between the central 
government and community interests with respect to the process as in his mediation role 
for the constant conflicts that arose on the land on a daily basis” (Interpeace, 2014, p. 7). 
Ruano became the spokesperson and advocate for greater gang programme support both 
for his municipality and for the SGT process in general. His advocacy came up against 
central government confusion on how to address the SGT process and its vacillating 
approaches to gangs. Specifically, the 2010 Anti-gang, Groups, Associations and 
Organisations with Criminal Nature Law (DL No. 458) became a large stumbling block in 
MLV process as programmes designed to aid youth and gang members reintegrate and 
rehabilitate within their local communities ran up against the restrictions in the law which 
facilitated the preference for repressive over alternative or prevention activities.  
Despite it being apparent that civil society organisations were generally ready to work 
within a MLV structure to further their prevention and reintegration efforts, ARENA party 
leadership were not necessarily as keen. A Security Advisor and deputy for the party, 
Cesar Reyes Dheming, argued that ARENA had not really been consulted in the launching 
of the initiative but rather it was the responsibility of individual local leaders. It was they, 
under their local security platforms in conjunction with private businesses, which looked to 
local solutions to improve security (Interview with Dheming, 2013). Furthermore, 
Dheming argued that the documents or declarations that had been signed as part of the 
MLV founding were rather different than that which had been portrayed in the media and 
by local actors. He stated, ‘They have driven accords when they do so with civil 
authorities, the PNC, the society of their communities, private businesses and it is certain 
not with gangs but that is what to do for the benefit of these individuals’ (Ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the ARENA party was not going to overtly interfere with local matters and 
MLVs were considered to be entirely local matters; they would present the risks, and how 
the government was driving the theme as well as using local ARENA governments, but 
their decisions were their own (Ibid.).  
The truce negotiator, Raul Mijango, and chief advocate for the SGT and its 
territorialisation across the country, argued that the process had been necessary as a 
counter measure to government public policy which had been punitive, expressed in the 
increased levels of crime repression that had been taking place since 2010 (Interview with 
Mijango, 2013). Thus, to his way of thinking, local governments were stepping in to 
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assume responsibility for security and violence prevention and through this territorial 
expression of willpower, strategic programmes for education, health, social infrastructure 
would also be included for profound results (Ibid.). During the early days of the MLV 
process, FESPAD director Maria Silvia Guillen felt that what took place in Ilopango would 
give substance to a transient and opaque truce process in which civil society and NGOs 
like FESPAD would continue to be facilitators because, despite Mijango’s rhetoric, the 
MLV were hardly the first to attempt to build solid prevention programmes with 
reintegration and job creation as a focus, despite the novelty of an official truce structure 
facilitating the 2013 move. Guillen noted that they had long been working with local 
governments and municipal violence prevention councils like in Ilopango (Interview with 
Guillen, 2013). Other organisations like RTI also noted their long-term presence in the 
municipality where their efforts were specifically aimed at establishing and developing 
local councils to facilitate prevention activities to reduce indicators of violence and crime 
in high violence areas (Interview with Garcia, 2012).  
At the time of the MLV ceremony, there was some confusion over what it would mean to 
on-going projects in the municipality. Ilopango already had an active prevention council, 
COPACIL, which met on a regular basis to provide interaction and networking 
opportunities for local organisations, entities, and private enterprises. At these meetings, 
the PNC would also contribute information on their ongoing actions and operations in 
order that prevention and repression stream operations could be aware if not coordinate. 
RTI had chosen to work with Ilopango as one of its municipalities of support at the 
invitation of PREPAZ during its CMPV expansion and numerous other actors had also 
joined in to share their ongoing prevention efforts and to coordinate in an effort to ‘avoid 
duplication’ (Observation, 2013). In 2013, the council was working to systematise their 
efforts and so had undertaken a process of organisational chart and project mapping to 
‘ensure an order of agreement when dealing with projects in the community’ (Ibid.). Every 
two months or every fourth meeting (meetings were held biweekly) special sessions were 
to be led by a different organisation, each of which would lead a capacitation on new laws 
and other prevention themes in development both in the community and nationally. Those 
organisations invited to be members of the CMPV also made bi-weekly presentations or 
updates on their ongoing projects as well as their ideologies and constructs in order for 
greater coherence and reduced overlap between institutions working in the field. They 
stated numerous times throughout an observed meeting and follow-up discussion how 
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these coordinating actions may appear relatively insignificant but had actually realised 
some improvements in community effectiveness (Observation, 2013). 
During one meeting, prevention projects with different orientations were discussed and 
commented on for potential strengthening and improvements (Observation, 2013). First, a 
reinsertion project focusing on at risk youth in Santa Lucia was being facilitated by ISNA 
with the support or observation of other council participants. Here, thirty individuals were 
to be enrolled in a 15 month mechanic’s course, part of which would work with aviation 
training. After six months of organisation-led training, a private company was set up to 
lead the practical training component. Although the programme was called reinsertion, 
when speaking about it in practical terms the logistics were considered a process of 
education and employment rather than specific components to ease reinsertion. Second, a 
series of workshops were planned in the residential area of San Bartolo to give work 
orientation workshops to those who attended. Attendance was free for all but information 
was specifically passed on to at-risk youth.  
Workshops were a particular favourite with prevention projects. Members of the council 
were also organising civil protection and environmental training workshops to training 
people for practical responses to local situations. It was expected that six communities and 
six organisations for a total of 22 individuals would participate. Other smaller or more 
targeted projects included fact-finding trips to Colombia and an international NGO-led 
‘Movemiento Scout’ which facilitated education through play. This last project’s 
philosophy was said to be ‘life for the youth’ teaching values that they are no longer 
learning through other structures during time spent playing games (Ibid.). Not all activities 
were training or conceptual, however, as the council had received funds from the MJSP to 
rehabilitate community centre infrastructure so that support could be further localised. 
Finally, a more conceptual programme to create a system of youth networks under the 
direction of PREPAZ was in the design stages. Input was expected from the council but it 
was expected to be organised and directed from PREPAZ offices in the capital. Aside from 
these youth networks, new committees of Peace and Coexistence were to be created in at 
least five different neighbourhoods throughout the municipality. Although the five were to 
be prioritised initially, others would be created if desired. The groups were to report to the 
municipal council but had relative autonomy to take care of prevention issues in their own 
neighbourhoods (Ibid.).  
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A FESPAD technical official sitting on the local council explained in an interview how 
FESPAD worked within this structure (Interview with FESPAD Technical Officer, 2013). 
It was often larger partners, like RTI, AECID, or USAID who would bring in infrastructure 
funds to improve public spaces, community centres, or football fields and FESPAD would 
then accompany that process to implement activities for youth (Interview with FESPAD 
Technical Officer, 2013). The role of the prevention council executive was also to 
accompany these processes, facilitate coordination with other community actors, and to 
give sustainability to the ongoing efforts. The local committees were also essential to the 
strengthening of this work but operated differently from the municipal prevention council. 
Whilst the council was part of the observatory of the municipality and the range of entities 
that were in action in that zone, committees at the very local community level were led by 
community leaders or groups of persons that were identified in each community. These 
community leaders were to be present at council meetings, a change after they found that 
leaders were making demands without real understanding so now they were included 
within the team that took the decisions (Ibid.). FESPAD saw their role as one of 
accompaniment with the committees to strengthen their capabilities and capacities but only 
if there was openness to do so. The technical official elaborated:  
We are giving the persons knowledge through which they can 
empower themselves and to look for better alternatives for the 
conflicts that are in their communities, giving them the tools that 
permit them to themselves solution the problems, which they have 
the capacity to negotiate. (Interview with NGO Technical Official, 
2013) 
FESPAD saw that improvements were slowly being made in result, including that it was 
easier to enter and implement their work activities as violence and crime indicators slowly 
decreased and the perceptions of security had increased. Although, for FESPAD, a key 
cause and indicator of public security was work or the lack thereof, they did not see it as an 
indicator at the community level where they worked because it was often outside the 
capacity of the local community to measure this and so needed to be dealt with at a macro 
level (Ibid.). It was acknowledged that there were other significant limitations with the 
building and maintaining of these levels of operation including the political climate and 
political party allegiances that differed at the different levels. They were attempting to 
reduce the political influences on long-term work but it was a work in progress and in 
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Ilopango, despite the different lines of work, ‘the councils are functioning, with different 
dynamics, but they are functioning’ (Ibid.).  
It was thus with caution that the prevention council initially approached the MLV proposal. 
The CMPV had been working over several years, with particular support from the central 
government from 2010 and so to add one more effort into the mix was approached with 
some significant concerns. First, local operators understood that local clicas were not all in 
favour of a national truce with a municipal agreement. Although the national declaration 
and corresponding homicide reduction indicated an organisational strength hitherto 
unsuspected, the nature of local operations entailed that ‘the truce is between the 13 in the 
zones of Dolores, Apulo, and the 18 that are in San Bartolo but within Ilopango there are 
other colonias where 13 and 18 operate, but they are not in the truce’ (Interview with NGO 
Technical Official, 2013). Both the police and FESPAD noted that, in result, it was not 
unexpected that some homicides had continued in the month following the MLV 
declaration. Not two weeks following the declaration, a gang member was shot by four MS 
subjects in San Bartolo Boulevard.  
Nonetheless, the military continued their plan to withdraw from their operations in peace 
zones like Ilopango because the Defence Minister expected violence and violent crime to 
continue its decline. The legal department in the MJSP noted that despite the publicity and 
confusion surrounding the MLV, within the boundaries of the law, the government was 
going to facilitate programming with concrete funds whilst ensuring that those who 
continued to commit crimes could expect the police to respond with repression tactics 
(Interview with Solorzano & Legal Team, 2013). Solórzano argued that although those 
who committed crimes could expect to be arrested, efforts were also being made to 
improve prison treatment and to improve arrests and put an end to dawn raids: ‘these plans 
go for the long term; I do not want to have a regression in the topic of gangs’ (Ibid.).46 The 
Human Rights Ombuds Office (PDDH) worried about the militarisation of security in El 
Salvador during this period, stated that in places like Ilopango, they did not know to what 
point a pact had been agreed, from what negotiation point the parties had started, and 
whether the negotiation was sustainable (Interview with Guardado de Ramirez & Civil and 
Individual Rights Team, 2013).  
 Organisations were further worried about the lack of transparency they believed was 
required to ensure effective policies would follow the implementation of such an initiative. 
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 Translation from: eso va para largo plazo, yo no quiero que haya retroceso en el tema de pandillas. 
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The government had announced a plan to build on the space created by the truce but details 
were few and far between, especially within the signed document at the centre of the 
municipal pact ceremony. IUDOP Director Jeannette Aguilar argued it was unclear as to 
whether the MLVs would be able to continue: ‘the so called facilitators have been 
incapable of forming a proposal, what they have been doing is putting it together on what 
already exists in the four selected municipalities’ (Interview with Aguilar, 2013). She felt 
that they had deliberately selected those communities, like Santa Tecla, that already had a 
development model which had allowed for the recuperation of public space and to offer 
their citizens a better quality of life but did not necessarily have experience with youth at 
risk or gangs. Because Santa Tecla had had a limited experience with gang violence to 
begin with, its programmes were not necessarily those of reinsertion or rehabilitation to 
Aguilar’s mind and thus were of limited benefit as an example to violence-prone 
municipalities like San Martin, Soyapango, San Marco or Ilopango (Ibid.). Questions were 
also raised by other concerned entities as to how gang members in Ilopango would make 
their living with the implementation of the local truce and it was felt that because of the 
lack of official planning or a transparent strategy moving forward, the MLV risked failing 
with a sharp uptick in violence.  
Despite promises made by the central government to support the second phase of the truce 
by providing up to US$72 million to MLV programmes, little if any of that money was 
actually received in those municipalities according to complaints made by MLV mayors.
47
 
Specifically, the government had promised funds for the MLVs that would not be tied to 
general violence prevention councils or programming. Ruano had initially worked with the 
central government, including the Vice Minister of Public Security, Douglas Moreno in 
conjunction with M-18 and MS-13 leaders, but when the promised re-direction of funds 
did not appear, he accused President Funes of hiding from the process, speeding its 
abandon. Mijango supported these claims, arguing that it appeared that gang members 
were making the majority of the efforts to uphold their end of the pact agreements across 
the country. What saved Ilopango’s MLV efforts from the failure experienced in several of 
the other MLVs, promoting a 50 percent decrease in homicides and increased local 
confidence in both their security and coexistence among their local communities, were 
some of the efforts pushed forward by the mayor, Ruano. Moving forward, community 
members, especially in the successful community of La Selva, reported a decrease in gang 
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 This number changed depending on the source. For officials within the MJSP the range was from good will 
to $72 million. By April 2013, Funes had reduced that amount to $33 million when discussed at a conference 
in Washington, D.C.  
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graffiti, increased security for students who had previously been extorted by gangs to 
attend school, and strengthened family ties as the connections between gang members and 
their families were slowly re-established (Interpeace, 2014). The increasing community 
connections also helped to mitigate the continuing negative effects experienced by police 
repression activities which the community felt often failed to observe their rights (Ibid.). 
Extortion continued to be an issue, however. Gang members had indicated that the practice 
as income generation would continue until the conditions existed for them to be reinserted 
into the local community through sufficient job programming but the looked-for 
eradication was never realised. Nonetheless, although it took some time to arrange, some 
advances did develop.  
Some government officials contemplated programmes based on the perception that gang 
members only wanted for a worker’s bench and a hammer to change their livelihood but 
the reality was much more complicated. The job programmes that had been scattered in 
pockets throughout the municipality were augmented with two widely publicised efforts: a 
chicken farm and a bakery. Whilst the move was widely lauded as a solid and progressive 
method to further reintegrate former gang members into the community, some posed the 
worried question as to where the customer business for the bakery was to originate and 
mused on whether gang members would demand patronage as a new form of extortion. 
Projects were not necessarily immune from police interference either with the M-18 bakery 
experiencing significant damage on several occasions after police visits (Interpeace, 2014). 
That these two token businesses were not expanded after one year, resulting in jobs for 
only up to 50 individuals, also meant that the leaving-crime-for-work equation did not 
stand up. Resentment also grew among some NGO workers and community leaders over 
the money that was being invested in gang rehabilitation through employment training 
programmes. They felt that the emphasis had the unintended effect of rewarding those who 
had previously threatened peaceful coexistence in local communities and left behind those 
who had struggled but had not resorted to a criminal life (Observation, 2013). In particular 
contention was the Temporary Income Support Programme (PATI). In an April 2013 
meeting with the MJSP vice minister, Douglas Moreno, Salvador Ruano, the Ilopango 
PNC deputy for the municipality, and Padre Toño, gang members were briefed on how the 
programme worked and offered up to 400 spaces to gang members leaving criminal 
activities. They were to receive job training and financial assistance for up to six months in 
exchange for work of up to 6 hours per day in local communities. These meetings on the 
very local level and attended by central government officials were considered essential to 
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the cementing of the truce process according to Ruano, but these conversations became 
political poison as public opinion remained opposed to negotiation with criminals; the 
president later denied that such activities had taken place on national radio and in media 
briefs.  
The participation of gang members in the PATI programme was also a contentious focal 
point. Ruano and the mayor of Quezaltepeque, Carlos Figueroa, defended the inclusion, 
arguing that PATI offered a good balance between the reinsertion programmes they were 
attempting to establish as MLVs and jobs programmes. However, unhappy community 
residents were supported by the outrage of the attorney general, Luis Martinez, who 
commented that gang member participation in the programme was ‘indignante y 
reprochable’ (Melendez, 2013). Following wide publication of gang participation in PATI, 
it appeared that FISDL removed its support for the programme in Ilopango (Santos, 2013). 
Partially in consequence and as a means to keep the pact in Ilopango functioning, Ruano 
used municipal development funds to further reintegration programmes in his municipality. 
This meant that the mayor found himself “at the boundary” of the law and especially in 
contravention of the 2010 anti-gang legislation that had caused issues throughout the truce 
process across the board. 
Unlike in other MLVs, in Ilopango, the pact between the municipality and gangs did not 
fail in the lead-up to the 2015 municipal elections but, losing some of its credibility 
through a combination of opaque operations and unclear resource management, managed 
to hold on to some longer-term projects and programmes. First, central government 
political support, especially at the hand of President Funes, impacted on international 
confidence in the truce process and thus in the MLV process despite its progress in places 
like Ilopango. Early MLV negotiations with central government officials had led to 
increased goodwill and understanding between government officials and local gang 
members. Most civil society and NGO entities were not included in the initial process but 
slowly joined their contributions as more technical and financial resources were required. 
The international community which had been waiting for an action plan since the SGT had 
been declared the previous year, also remained unbriefed despite offers of assistance. In 
some corners, like for the United States, gang negotiations was an anathema and so it 
would not consider supporting MLV programming in Ilopango despite a history of 
working there; it cancelled Ruano’s American travel visa around the time the MLV was 
declared. American support had already cost the Funes government one MJSP minister in 
the Funes administration so news that another vice minister was negotiating with gangs 
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directly in Ilopango was also not something that was overtly welcomed. But, most 
importantly, the Funes government could not decide whether it wanted to maintain a role 
in the truce or not and so promised funds for MLVs did not materialise.  
Second, despite the emphasis on prevention programming when the FMLN came to power, 
and its seeming ideological openness to truce negotiations, it was unable to bring itself to 
power-through public dissatisfaction over negotiations with criminal entities. Opacity in 
the truce process created enough distrust among interested entities that alliances never 
really formed around the MLV but rather pulled the MLV into on-going and long-term 
prevention frameworks. On the one hand, the FMLN government had created violence 
prevention councils and supported community committee networking to strengthen both 
local and national violence prevention policy and actions. On the other, it was unable to 
follow through with monetary and policy support to build the communication networks 
needed between municipal councils and MLV leadership. Interpeace and FESPAD were 
two organisations who were both members of the local violence prevention council and 
directly worked with the municipality to facilitate the long-term planning, development, 
and, crucially, implementation of the MLV’s rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. 
Their work was supported by the EU and by the OAS, both of whom found ways to 
support prevention programming development despite the central government’s lack of 
commitment. Their actions became more localised with the change in MJSP minister who 
further reduced central government interactions with truce activities. Thus, that which had 
begun in Ilopango with fanfare and benevolent central government presence morphed into 
an exercise in local-international collaboration with some openness to include gang 
members directly in the dialogue and development process. Some entities found the upside 
of this was that projects, like that which was under implementation with EU funding in late 
2013, could be developed for the longer term.  
Ruano was re-elected as an ARENA-representing mayor in Ilopango in the March 2015 
municipal elections despite the concerns and protests against his manner of addressing 
municipal development and gang rehabilitation and insertion programming.
48
 Ilopango 
managed to lower its homicide rate and keep it low. These tasks were accomplished in the 
face of anti-gang legislation outlawing the communication and support of gang members 
and without the support of some traditional international entities including the United 
States but with the continuing financial and technical support of the EU and the OAS as 
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 Ruano also faced embezzlement and intimidation charges in November 2013, logged by the Ilopango 
Municipal trustee, Percy Santos, over the alleged misuse of US$235,000. Ruano was also accused of buying 
weapons with public funds for personal use.  
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well as lines of communications between council entities. Entities like Interpeace were 
cautiously positive about the outcomes in Ilopango, in which long-term prevention 
programming in conjunction with the shock policy change of the MLV, had pushed gang 
member demobilisation and employment issues out into the open. Important here is how 
the network of interested entities worked together to build security in Ilopango. The 
violence prevention council, as a network of entities, worked with the broadest range of 
projects, programmes, and services from basic job training for youth at risk to the 
facilitation of central government-led community committees for more localised 
prevention programming. Prevention for them entailed opening new doors to further 
opportunities for those whom they felt were most at risk of joining gangs; useful 
employment of time to keep out of trouble was key. Municipal mayor Salvador Ruano 
became a figure point for gang rehabilitation and reinsertion in his community, driving 
national and international visibility with some success to attract support. As explained by 
other entities including central government officials and NGO technical workers, local 
buy-in with leadership figures was often seen as essential in order to successfully 
implement councils and programmes. It was international entities like the OAS and 
Interpeace that built the programme links between local initiatives and local government. 
Successful prevention in the opinion of Adam Blackwell, who acted as chief representative 
and pact supporter for the OAS in El Salvador, required programmes to address social 
vulnerabilities, state and institutional fragilities as well as the accelerants of crime and 
violence in pockets of vulnerability (Blackwell, 2015).  
Given that the actions and activities of the violence prevention council, the municipal 
government and participant international organisations still appeared to see gangs as the 
main security threat to avoid, despite numerous attempts to highlight the underlying causes 
of violence as poverty, marginalisation and exclusion, the final word on goals may go to 
the responses of gang leaders at the start of Ilopango’s foray into shock violence 
prevention via an MLV. First, both MS-13 and M-18 gang leaders felt that the process was 
not easy and so that, for a time at least, they would trust in the good will of the 
municipality and the pact’s participants (Campos, 2013; Solorzano, 2013). Second, their 
idea of violence prevention through reintegration was the possibility of opportunity: public 
trust to allow them space for work and life and to be given a fair shot (Ibid.). There was so 
much hope to accompany the persistent doubt and fear of insecurity in the months 
following the MLV declaration on 23 January 2013. But grandiose declarations and 
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dreams require grandiose support. And so extortion and fear, along with a healthy dose of 
opaque government bureaucracy, still rule the roost in Ilopango. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces specific case studies to provide examples of specific outcomes of 
formal actor security governance efforts in the Salvadoran context. As has already been 
demonstrated in previous chapters, interactions between actors and institutions take place 
in diverse spaces and may be manipulated to the agendas of specific actors within those 
forums. Security outcomes in the form of projects (PREVENIR) or innovative strategies 
(SGT) tend to be the product of multi-level negotiations between a range of interested 
parties or stakeholders. Specifically, in the territorial section of the SGT discussion, local 
context and actor dynamics have a significant impact on the manners in which they address 
security and the outcomes which arise.  
For the multi-level prevention project effort implemented by Germany in conjunction with 
the ESCA, the case illustrates the sometimes unintended consequences that collaborative 
security governance efforts can have. Whereas Central American member states had 
desired a strategy (with the intent to form a long-term regional security policy) that was 
developed by them for them and within the context of an institution of collective action, 
the outcomes were infinitely more fluid. Indeed, the case illustrates a reversion to more 
traditional frameworks of operations – a project modified by an international donor and 
implemented to their agenda with recipient modifications. The outcome involves multiple 
levels, with a diversity of participant subjects across multiple countries but is largely 
scoped by Germany’s project design (Interview with Esmail, 2012).  
In El Salvador’s experience with a national gang truce, the novelty of non-norm 
conforming actors (gangs, ostensibly independent negotiators) was difficult to manage – 
especially in the light of public and formal actor distrust. Both the public and international 
entities were disquieted by the lack of process transparency. One of the largest weaknesses 
of the process was that a narrative was not established early on along with an action plan 
for international reaction. Foreign donors exhibited some early willingness to participate in 
a reintegration process but given the unpopularity of negotiating with criminals and 
‘terrorists’, a stronger commitment from the government was required to give others 
confidence in the experiment’s potential sustainability. The outcome of this lack of 
commitment was that the territorialisation phase of the truce, an important innovation to 
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solidify the process, began based on a weak footing marred in public debate and 
international concerns over the ‘real’ story. Thus, MLVs faced contestation not only within 
their own communities but nationally as well. This chapter concludes that dominant actor 
security perceptions combined with their individual guiding agendas, serve to impact on 
the manner in which rescaled security governance is implemented and sustained. Having 
thus concluded the last section comprising the research question To what extent did 
security governance change under the FMLN government during their first administration 
(2009-2014)?, the thesis will turn to a chapter on research findings and their implications 
for security governance. 
  
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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7.1 Introduction 
For El Salvador, the actors at work within multi-level governance spaces may be 
considered ‘violently plural’ (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). During the first FMLN 
administration (2009-2014), negotiations took place on formal scales, like regional 
diplomatic dialogues and national policy consultations, as well as within informal or 
flexible spaces, like in the case of a negotiated gang truce. This thesis addressed how these 
actors perceive security and interpret the nature of their responsibility to address it. It 
covered both lived perceptions and contested realities. From these spaces of cooperation 
and contestation, these actors contribute to policy and programme design for security 
governance. Through the analysis of specific programme examples, this thesis draws out 
new understanding on the importance of multi-level spaces for the design of governance 
practice. Scales of security governance are found to shift and change according to the 
fluctuating goals of its participant actors over short periods. However, lasting change 
enacted through multi-scaled security governance requires lengthy actor commitments not 
often found in within a changing security agenda. This conclusion is divided into two 
parts: (1) a discussion of the research questions and their implications for the problem 
statement; and (2) the situation of the dissertation’s findings within the key conceptual 
debates. The chapter concludes with an acknowledgement of the limitations of the study 
and outlines potential avenues for further research.  
7.2 Main Findings 
The first research question reads: In what spaces, and by whom, is security negotiated and 
governed in El Salvador? In this thesis, a hybrid approach was used to conceptualise the 
multi-level spaces created for security governance in El Salvador; some of these are the 
formal spaces of institutions whilst others are temporary and fluid, established to negotiate 
a specific risk. What we see in the Salvadoran case of the new FMLN government (2009-
2014) is a fluctuation between these two understandings of citizen security. There was 
already a range of traditional and non-state actors participating in security production at 
multiple levels although authority, especially with regards to Mano Dura, was focused in 
the state. In the FMLN approach, they began governing in security spaces ideologically 
closer towards the human end of the citizen security scale. To do this, they sought to turn 
traditional security governance structures upside-down by proposing broad bottom-up 
consultations leading to a new national policy to frame security governance. They also 
went up a governance level to bring these ideas to the regional sphere in collaboration with 
neighbouring states. Foreign actors joined various rescaling efforts with expertise and 
P r i e s  | 189 
 
financing; they also implemented many of the programmes in the field. Finally, violently 
plural actors were included in a time-sensitive governance effort to reduce skyrocketing 
homicides. In the terminology of hybridity theories, the FMLN government initiated an 
end-user gaze and turned it on the national and regional security governance processes. 
What emerged were a set of negotiated spaces, both formal and informal, that brokered 
relationships for the production of security.   
The second research question reads: What are the main security concepts framing spaces 
of governance in El Salvador? Violence and crime have been positioned as essential 
components of security conceptualization throughout this thesis. Central to the result is the 
concept of citizen security as it is lived and applied in Latin America. First, it broadens 
security beyond the state to include a range of rights and responsibilities accorded to a 
democratic citizen in a manner similar to human security. Security concepts emerge in the 
structuring of actor relationships – the entities included in the process necessarily represent 
sectors considered important for the definitions of security. Thus, it is not enough to read 
the security policies that emerge from consultation processes to ascertain guiding concepts. 
Rather, the production dimensions – committees, local roundtables, or international 
consultations – are as important as the resulting documents for understanding concepts, 
framing, and intent within security governance spaces. Observed was a continuous struggle 
on how to confront violence. At its base, however, the issues came back to crime and its 
perpetrators. Socio-economic issues, gender- and familial-based violence, and access to 
education were included in security governance for their potential contributions to criminal 
violence and the creation of new offenders. Somewhat problematically, citizen security 
frames security in terms of citizen norm violations; insecurity is that which goes against 
the democratic contract. 
The third research question reads: What policies or programmes have emerged from the 
multi-level spaces of security governance in El Salvador? Both the SGT and the ESCA 
highlight alternative governance spaces where some part of traditional powers has been 
subverted. For the SGT, gangs undertook talks on building security with both traditional 
government actors and members of the shadow security apparatus that comprises another 
component of a violently plural society. We see that the gangs created or built on 
relationships with international organisations, state institutions, and local political mayors 
to influence the direction of security policy development at multiple levels in the years that 
followed. Specific security governance issues were negotiated between the participant 
countries with input from national-level officials but many of the programmes, especially 
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those directly related to prevention, had a local implementation focus. National 
governments were excited to toot the original approach of the ESCA as it was presented to 
an interested international community. In turn, the international community was tapped for 
financing as well as for support in the implementation of this ambitious array of projects. 
In these examples, entities chose to collaborate on security governance on those issues 
upon which they could communally agree represented a collective risk. However, those 
programmes emerging from and in support of the above case studies were less 
collaborative than they were ad hoc. Often, whilst the proposals emerging from multi-level 
security governance spaces were actionable, those that resulted were largely driven by 
individuals or single entities. Even in the case of the MLVs, those cities chosen had 
established prevention programmes with the capacity to produce programmes 
independently. Therefore, cooperation in spaces of security governance across multiple 
levels proved to last longer when there was a single or small number of actors that were 
willing to take the lead on programme development and push it forward independently.  
The problem statement questioned: To what extent did security governance change under 
the FMLN government during their first administration (2009-2014)? 
As has been demonstrated through this thesis, security governance was expanded in both 
form and function over the FMLN government’s first mandate. The ideological slant to 
broad grassroots consultation with which they came to power continued to enlighten their 
security governance experiments. The concepts of security that informed policy and 
programme negotiations were, at least on the part of the government, based in citizen 
security. Here they could pursue new security governance spaces but also the hard-line 
anti-gang operations when considered a necessary action to fulfil their broad 
responsibilities to the citizenry. In keeping with an understanding of citizenship as both 
rights and responsibilities, citizens and civil society were the early governance participants 
on which their strategy turned. Ideology was also responsible, at least in part, when state 
institutions supported gang truce negotiations, approaching gangs as outcasts to be 
reintroduced into society. Nevertheless, despite attempts to approach and implement the 
broader tenets of citizen security, interventions to reduce, manage, and transform violence 
were generally underfunded and under-supported by the participant parties that were 
necessary for their propagation. Most importantly, despite a range of scales and actors 
involved, government entities tended to be the cogs upon which interventions turned. It is 
for this reason that ‘state transformation’ or ‘hybridity’ are fitting terms to describe 
processes that take place with government support. 
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7.3 Implications for the Literature 
Security governance is a small but growing field with the potential for specific 
contributions to Latin American scholarship. This section will address the contributions 
this thesis makes to citizen security and governance literatures before drawing out some 
conclusions from the empirical research for consideration within the wider Latin American 
security context. First, citizen security is a vital Latin American contribution to wider 
security governance literatures. It combines the participation, rights, and responsibilities of 
individual citizens with state protections through the institutional rule of law. Citizen 
security’s conflation of national and individual security issues offers important 
contributions to the conceptualisation of complex security environments. Latin American 
states like El Salvador were early adopters of this fusion in the confrontations of their 
complex security environments of transnational criminal threats, non-traditional trans-
border risks, and criminal activity organised on a government-destabilising scale. This 
study was conducted during a period where there was new emphasis on local or individual 
contributions to larger scale policy development and security governance which responds 
to the broad citizen security concept. However, as Goldstein (2015) observes, citizen 
security can also be a regressive or reauthorizing concept that allows the state to use 
violence in spaces of exception or the crisis moments of the securitising process. This 
thesis has provided evidentiary support to this double-sided nature of citizen security. 
Citizen security necessarily demands investigation into how those security issues facing 
citizens are governed. In Latin America, where states are incapable of fully monopolising 
the use of violence, citizens do not receive their full democratic rights for security. Thus, 
rather than a question of government action, citizen security becomes a question of the 
spaces for security governance. The research presented here has demonstrated that these, in 
many cases, are not the formalised multi-lateral institutions of the European Union, for 
example, but rather flexible spaces that are largely issues-driven. Attempts to establish a 
security strategy within Central America or to scale out/territorialise a gang truce 
contribute support to theories of security governance hybridity and transformation. In a 
unique contribution, this thesis presents empirical material on the roles that international 
entities can play in practice through both hybrid and transformed governance.  
Theories of hybridity argue that international actors intervene in securitised policy or 
governance spaces on behalf of vulnerable end-users. Evidence presented on the 
development and implementation of the ESCA confirms that international organisations 
are often happy to participate in security governance spaces, especially those bypassing the 
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national security level, over a defence of the individual. In its study of the STA, this thesis 
also presents gangs as actors with the ability to negotiate policy and form diplomatic 
relationships with international organisations. In this way, multiple scales of security 
government take on a violent plurality building short-term but highly impactful order. 
Problematic for the inclusion of these other actors is that in many cases they are not 
responsible to the polity for their actions. They may be appointed as a representative but 
security governance frameworks by their nature are not voted on by the population. A 
significant issue arising of this and requiring further study are the democratic 
responsibilities of these actors. In the Salvadoran context, it remains elected officials, 
whether municipal councillors, legislative members, or the president, who ultimately 
respond to the electorate for the governance initiatives achieved (or failed) during their 
tenure.  
As such, there are inherent risks in dispersing responsibility for security policy 
development and programme implementation and the formation of security governance 
spaces does not usually result in coherent, planned, or even logical security responses. This 
leads to the conclusion that fraught social conflicts within multi-actor multi-level security 
governance impact on security outcomes but not in the manner intended by the instigating 
authority. However, it does provide evidence of how multi-level security was governed in 
practice during the first FMLN administration. In doing so, this thesis has focused 
specifically on the patterns, scales, and constructs of security governance, contributing 
material on where governance takes place rather than where institutions are lacking.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a multi-level study analysing three different levels of security 
governance in El Salvador. Specifically, it has looked at the changes in security 
governance impelled by the election of a new government that, in a small window of 
popular hope, had the relative freedom to try new things with security. With its studied 
security governance practices in their infancy at the time of research, this study opens 
significant new avenues for elaboration. First, the necessary limitations in the scope of this 
thesis meant that the case selection was relatively narrow. As such, including further actors 
at these levels alone may bring new insight to overall multi-level security governance in El 
Salvador. Given the dominance of the United States within regional security governance 
frameworks, a decision was made to specifically pursue other examples. A first next step 
would be to compare this thesis’ findings to existing literature and other data on US 
participation within these and concurrent security governance scales. However, this study 
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chose to focus on new, developing initiatives to observe opening interactions in the context 
of a new government. The reasoning was that agendas and working patterns would be less 
established and thus more easily accessible. This means that this thesis can only be seen as 
the study of a small number of examples of new attempts to develop security governance 
within El Salvador. The restriction of this framework notwithstanding, this thesis 
contributes to the study of security governance frameworks in peripheral states. 
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Appendix A: Sample research introduction 
Information used to introduce my research in situ. 
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Appendix B: Letter of introduction 
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Appendix C: Sample information sheet for interview 
subjects 
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Appendix D: Interview consent form 
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Appendix E: Sample interview outline 
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured and open-ended fashion. However, each 
interview began with an introductory set of subject identify questions if it was the first 
interview with that subject. All questions were adapted to the individual, organisation, and 
context. I also changed some structural questions depending on whether the subject was 
‘national’ or ‘international’.  
 Introduction of the project. Presentation of release forms including discussions on how 
the information would be handled, processed, and protected. 
 Explanation that the information would be used for this thesis only and that there 
would be follow-up on my part including a copy of the thesis should they note it. They 
were also free to follow-up and contact me regarding any questions they might have at 
a future date. 
I. Introduction / Baseline 
 Introduction of the subject, their position, and their organisations. Some would also 
choose to include nationality, education, and experience.  
 ‘Baseline’: In your opinion, what are the most important issues facing El Salvador / the 
region? In your opinion, what are the most important indicators to evaluate the 
situation of violence, security, and insecurity in the country? 
 What are the responsibilities of your unit/directorate?  What is their role in the creation 
of security policies in the country / region? 
II. Security Actors and Activities 
 What are the most important security priorities within established policies? 
 With whom do you work / collaborate with on the subject of security and the 
development of these policies? 
 What are the most important / productive / useful committees / working groups / round 
tables that contribute to this subject? 
 What are the most important activities that your unit / directorate realises / implements 
within the subject of security? 
 From where do you get the funds for your activities / projects/ 
III. Combat, Prevention and Institutions in Security 
 How do you perceive the balance for this government on the subjects of combat and 
prevention of crime in policy? In promotion (vocal support)? In projects and financing?  
 Have there been real changes in security policy approach over the past two years? 
 Do you see (recent changes) [gang truce, corruption investigations, regional security 
collaboration] as an ad hoc / short term or long-term policy or strategy?  
 Is your unit/directorate implicated/involved in these efforts (change/not change)? How? 
 To your mind, has there been a shift in operational funds in relation to the previous 
discussion? Why or why not? 
IV. Conclusion 
 Do you think that the mandate / goals of your organisation work well with the 
expressed goals in current and developing policies? In resulting programmes? 
 Are there significant concerns that you have over developing policies and 
programmes? 
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 What concrete developments do you foresee over the next year in the subject of 
security?  
 Are you able to provide me with relevant documents that would help me better 
understand the actions your organisation and others have been taking to develop 
security policies over the past five years? 
 Do you have anything you would like to add? What other questions do you think I 
should be asking? Do you know of other individuals who would be illuminating to this 
discussion and open to being interviewed?  
Thank you for your participation in this interview 
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Appendix F: Interviews 
AGUILAR UMANA, Isabel, 2012. Regional Coordinator – Youth Program in Central 
America, Interpeace - Regional Office for Latin America [Interview: 21 03 2012]. 
AGUILAR, Jeannette, 2012, 2013. Director, Universidad Centroamericana "José Simeón 
Cañas", Instituto Universitario de Opinión Publica (IUDOP) [Interviews: 19 03 2012; 22 
01 2013]. 
ALAS, Sandra, 2013. Directora, Secretaria Dirección Nacional de Gestión Departamental 
- Ministerio de Educación [Interview: 28 02 2013]. 
ALVARADO, Rubén, 2012. Former Director de Migración / OCAM, Dirección General 
de las Migraciones y Extranjería / OCAM [Interview: 29 02 2012].  
AUGUSTO COTTO, Howard, 2012; 2013. Subdirector de Seguridad Publica, Policía 
Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interviews] (28 02 2012; 18 01 2013). 
BID Official, 2012. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) - Especialista en 
Modernización del Estado [Interviews: 14 03 2012; 15 03 2012]. 
Blackwell, A., 2015. The OAS and the Peace Process between the Gangs in El Salvador. 
Unpublished speaking notes. Vienna Presentation. 
British Embassy (UK) Official, 2012. Official - Embassy of the United Kingdom 
[Interviews: 01 03 2012; 23 11 2012]. 
CARSANA, Daniel, 2013. Coordinador de programa de ciudadanía de seguridad en El 
Salvador, United Nations Development Programme (PNUD) [Interview: 26 02 2013]. 
CECI Official, 2012. Centro de Estudios y Cooperación Internacional (CECI) - Sub-
Director [Interview: 05 12 2012]. 
CHACON V., Alexander, 2012. Project Coordinator - Democratic Security Unit, Central 
American Integration System (SICA) [Interview: 27 03 2012]. 
Civil and Individual Rights Team, 2013. Procuradoria para la Defenca de los Derechos 
Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013]. 
CORLETO, Ana Maria, 2013. Asistente Técnica - Dirección Jurídica, Ministerio de 
Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013]. 
CRUZ, Edwin Wilian, 2013. Secretario Técnico del Comité de Seguridad, Municipio de 
Sonsonate [Interview: 24 01 2013]. 
CRUZ RODRIGUEZ, Pedro José, 2012. Lawyer and Consultant, Former UNDP / 
UNODC Analyst [Interview: 27 02 2012].  
Democratic Security Official, 2013. Sistema para la Integracion Centroamericana 
[Interview: 02 12 2012]. 
Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería Official, 2013. Jefe de Comunicaciones -
Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería [Interview: 01 03 2013]. 
Canadian Embassy Official, 2012. Embajada de Canada [Interview: 01 03 2012]. 
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Embajada de la República Federal de Alemania San Salvador Official, 2012. Ministro 
Consejero, Jefe de Cooperación - Embajada de la República Federal de Alemania San 
Salvador - [Interview: 27 02 2012]. 
ESMAIL, Rubeena, 2012. Director - PREVENIR - Regional Programme on Youth 
Violence Prevention in Central America, Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) [Interviews: 29 11 2012; 05 12 2012]. 
ESPINO GAITAN, William Ernesto, 2013. Encargado - Unidad del Migrante, 
Procuradora para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador 
[Interview: 25 01 2013].  
FERNANDEZ ORELLANA, Oscar A., 2012; 2013. Asesor en Políticas Publicas, FMLN, 
Asamblea Legislativa [Interviews: 27 11 2012; 11 12 2012; 21 01 2013]. 
FESPAD Official, 2013. Asistente Técnica - Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del 
Derecho (FESPAD) [Interviews: 19 02 2013; 21 02 2013]. 
Fiscalía General de la Republica Official, 2013. Unidad Anti-Narco-Trafico - Fiscalía 
General de la Republica [Interview: 29 01 2013]. 
FLORES, Santiago, 2012; 2013. Director General – PREPAZ, Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública (MJSP), PREPAZ [Interviews: 27 02 2012; 15 03 2012; 25 01 2013]. 
FUNES, Ernesto, 2013. Asistente Técnica - Dirección Jurídica, Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013]. 
GARCIA, Guillermo, 2012. Director - Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention 
Program, RTI International [Interview: 28 11 2012].  
German Official, 2012. Embajada de la Republica Federal de Alemania San Salvador 
[Interview: 27 02 2012]. 
GONZALEZ CORTEZ, Jose Franscesco, 2012. Technical Representative - Foreign Affairs 
El Salvador (RREE) [Interview: 29 11 2012]. 
GUARDADO de RAMIREZ, Gricelda Mercedes, 2013. Procuradora Adjunta para la 
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos – Procuradoria para la Defenca de los Derechos 
Humanos (PDDH) de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013]. 
GUILLÉN, Maria Silvia, 2013. Directora Ejecutiva - Fundación de Estudios para la 
Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) [Interview: 23 01 2013]. 
IBARA, Oscar, 2013. Jefe de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana - Alcaldía Municipal de 
Santa Tecla [Interview: 06 03 2013]. 
IADB Seconded Official, 2012; 2013. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
[Interviews: 29 11 2012; 01 05 2013]. 
INTERPOL, 2012. Subdirector - Jefe de la Oficina Regional de INTERPOL [Interview: 28 
02 2012]. 
SICA Seconded Official, 2012. Coordinadora de Projecto - Central American Integration 
System (SICA) [Interview: 27 11 2012]. 
JIMENEZ, Toni Armando, 2012. Coordinador de políticas públicas - Creative Associates 
International, Inc. [Interview: 20 03 2012]. 
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KUECHEMANN, Christof, 2012. Resident Director - Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) [Interview: 21 03 2012]. 
LARA, Benito, 2013. FMLN Deputy & Public Security Commission Member - Asamblea 
Legislativa, FMLN [Interview: 18 01 2013]. 
LINARES, Eduardo Alfonso, 2013. Former Jefe - Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado 
(June 2009 - December 2011) [Interview: 26 02 2013]. 
LOPEZ SERRANO, Gracia, 2012. Political Analyst - Embassy of Canada, El Salvador 
[Interview: 27 11 2012]. 
LOYA MARIN, Nayelly, 2012. Project Coordinator - Democratic Security Unit, Central 
American Integration System (SICA) [Interviews: 27 03 2012; 03 12 2012]. 
MARTINEZ VENTURA, Jaime Edwin, 2012. Director General - Academia Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública (ANSP) [Interview: 06 12 2012]. 
MARTINEZ, Franklin, 2013. Concejal Municipal de Seguridad y Convivencia - Santa 
Tecla Municipality [Interview: 28 02 2013]. 
MATALLANA, Jairo, 2012. Especialista Técnico, Seguridad Ciudadana - Área de 
Prevención y Recuperación de Crisis, PNUD Panamá [Interview: 27 02 2012]. 
MENCHU TUM, Rigoberta, 2012. Presidential Candidate, Guatemala [Interview: 21 01 
2012]. 
MIJANGO, Raul, 2013. Negotiator - Salvadoran Gang Truce [Interview: 26 01 2013]. 
MJSP Policy Advisor, 2012. Advisor, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública (MJSP) 
[Interviews] (24 02 2012; 13 03 2012; 28 11 2012). 
MJSP Official, 2012. Technical Officer - Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica 
(MJSP), PREPAZ [Interview: 15 03 2012]. 
NGO Technical Official, 2013. Asistente Tecnica [Interviews: 19 02 2013; 21 02 2013]. 
ORTIZ de ZELAYA, Fatima, 2012; 2013. Attention to Victims Director - Secretaria 
Ejecutiva Consejo Nacional Contra la Trata de Personas, Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública (MJSP) [Interviews: 02 03 2012; 05 03 2013]. 
ORTIZ GOMEZ, Francisco Raúl, 2013. Programmes Coordinator - Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES) [Interview: 22 01 2013]. 
OVALLE RAMIREZ, Werner, 2012. Coordinator - Regional Programme of Border 
Security in Central America SEFRO, Central American Integration System (SICA) 
[Interviews: 21 03 2012; 30 11 2012]. 
PDDH Official A, 2013. Asesor - Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Civiles e Individuales, Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) 
de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013]. 
PDDH Official B, 2013. Asesor - Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Civiles e Individuales, Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) 
de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013]. 
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PDDH Official C, 2013. Asesor - Procuradora Adjunta para la Defensa de los Derechos 
Civiles e Individuales, Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) 
de El Salvador [Interview: 27 02 2013]. 
PNC Official, 2013. Analista Criminal - Investigación de Secuestros, Homicidios y Crimen 
Organizado, Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 26 02 2013]. 
PNC Official, 2012. Executive Secretariate - Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 22 
02 2012]. 
PNC Official, 2012. Jefe del Consejo Técnico - Dirección General, Policía Nacional Civil 
(PNC) [Interview: 11 12 2012]. 
PNC Official, 2012. Seguridad Publica y Regional - Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) 
[Interviews: 03 12 2012; 08 12 2012]. 
PNUD Official, 2012. United Nations Development Programme (PNUD), Democratic 
Security Unit - Security Project Coordinator SICA/PNUD [Interview] (21 02 2012). 
PNUD Panama Official, 2012. Especialista Tecnico de Proyecto y Monitoreo - PNUD 
Panama [Interview: 27 02 2012]. 
POZAS, Mario A., 2012. Consultant - Former SICA Directorate [Interview: 06 12 2012]. 
PREPAZ Official, 2012. Coordinador del campo [Interview: 15 03 2012]. 
QUINN, Alan, 2012. Legal Representative and Projects Director - Centro de Estudios y 
Cooperación Internacional (CECI) [Interview: 24 02 2012]. 
RAMIREZ LANDAVERDE, Mauricio Ernesto, 2013. Subdirector General - Policía 
Nacional Civil (PNC) [Interview: 04 03 2013]. 
RAMOS, Carlos G., 2012. Director - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales 
(FLACSO) [Interview: 10 12 2012]. 
RAUDA PORTILLO, Nelson, 2013. Director General - Dirección General de Centros 
Penales, Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Publica (PNC) [Interview: 31 01 2013]. 
REYES DHEMING, Cesar Rene, 2013. Diputado - Comisión de Seguridad Pública y 
Combate a la Narcoactividad, Asamblea Legislativa, ARENA [Interview: 04 03 2013]. 
RIKKERS, Jeanne, 2013. Coordinadora Regional - Investigación Programa de Juventud 
en Centroamérica, Interpeace - Regional Office for Latin America [Interview: 29 01 2013]. 
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-TERCERO, Antonio, 2013. Director General - Servicio Social 
Pasionista (SSPAS) [Interview: 30 01 2013]. 
RODRIGUEZ REYES, Stanley Arquimides, 2013. Comisión Coordinador - Comisión de 
Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana, Consejo Municipal de Santa Tecla [Interview: 28 02 
2013]. 
ROSE, James, 2012; 2013. INL Regional Gang Advisor - American Embassy San Salvador 
[Interviews: 30 11 2012; 27 02 2013]. 
SANCHEZ MEJIA, Juan Carlos, 2013. Coordinador, Programa de Transparencia, 
Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD) [Interview: 22 01 
2013]. 
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SMUTT, Marcela, 2013. Coordinadora, Area de Gobernabilidad Democratica – 
Programa de las Naciones Unidads para el Desarrollo (PNUD) [Interview: 15 01 2013]. 
SOLORZANO, Boris Rubén, 2013. Director Jurídico - Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad 
Pública (MJSP) [Interview: 01 02 2013]. 
TAGER, Ana Glenda, 2014. Directora Regional – Oficina para América Latina Interpeace 
[Communications: 25 02 2014]. 
TOLENTINO MEMBRENO, Dania Elena, 2013. Asistente de Magistrado - Sala de lo 
Penal, Corte Suprema de Justicia de El Salvador (CSJ) [Interview: 23 01 2013]. 
USAID/SAN SALVADOR Official, 2012. Democracy and Governance Director -
USAID/SAN SALVADOR [Interview: 11 12 2012]. 
VÍLCHEZ ASCHER, Erich Constantino, 2012. Director of Political and Legal Affairs - 
Democratic Security Unit, Central American Integration System (SICA) [Interview: 20 03 
2012]. 
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Observed Sessions 
1. 29 January – 1 February 2012: SICA Regional Meetings with Country Representatives 
and Group of Friends in Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
2. 8 February 2012: Regional Teleconference on SICA Strategies 
3. 9 February 2012: Regional Security Trafficking Meetings 
4. 15-17 February 2012: Studies conference in San Salvador 
5. 12 March 2012: ObSICA Meetings 
6. 14-15 March 2012: Anti-Trafficking Meetings 
7. 16 January 2013: Santa Ana Site Visit 
8. 24 January 2013: Sonsonate Site Visit 
9. 31 January 2013: Prisons HQ Site Visit 
10. 21 February 2013: Ilopango Site Visit 
11. 23 February 2013: FMLN Security Policy Planning Day 
12. 25 February 2013: GiZ Training Sessions Preparation for PREVENIR Trainings 
13. 27 February 2013: PDDH Group Sessions 
14. 28 February 2013: Santa Tecla Site Visit 
15. 6 March 2013: Sonsonante and Santa Tecla Site Visits 
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